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University Governing Bodies…are seen by many as occupying a figurehead 
position, of importance only in cases of major institutional crisis, or where the 
chair openly takes issue with the Vice-Chancellor (Baird, 1997:73). 
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Abstract 
The thesis adopts a contingent constructionist approach to examine 
university governing body visibility amongst staff, as an unexamined factor 
in the literature. Institutional visibility includes the profiling and projection of 
the formal, collective actions and decisions of the board within the 
university, through to less formal exchanges and encounters of governors 
in the university setting. The perceived impact of these activities on the 
board’s effectiveness, including the performance of its accountability, 
stewardship and strategic responsibilities are explored. Five key 
dimensions to institutional visibility are identified, in: supporting the board’s 
formal accountabilities; enabling board interaction with staff; facilitating 
organisational change; influencing relations between the board and senior 
management, and modelling and manifesting university mission and values. 
The qualitative mixed methods approach comprises discourse analysis of 
online role descriptors of the board, followed by semi-structured 
interviewing of board secretaries and two vice-chancellors across the HEIs 
in the sample. The research found that governor visibility through 
interaction with staff outside the ‘boardroom’ was perceived as a key 
contributor to board effectiveness, ahead of the display and disclosure of 
formal transactions and decisions as markers of the board’s accountability. 
Deeper engagement as enabled by institutional visibility included 
governors’ input to strategic initiatives and ‘facework’ (Giddens, 1990) 
encounters with academic board and departmental staff. The research 
recommendations include strengthening internal university communications 
on the outcomes of board decisions and the publication of news features on 
the backgrounds, motivations and contributions of governors. A more 
embedded approach is proposed for senior management to enlist 
governors at the developmental stages of strategic projects, to provide 
independent expertise and assurance to these. Increased opportunities for 
co-visibility and engagement between governing bodies and academic 
boards or senates were also favoured outcomes of visibility. Beyond my 
professional practice, the recommendations are applicable to sector-wide 
guidance on governance policy and practice. 
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Statement of EdD integration and personal professional development 
Registration on the EdD programme has been a period of both intellectual 
growth and knowledge development, gained through understanding 
professional peers’ and governors’ experiences around the ‘doing’ of 
university governance, alongside advancing my own practice. The 
development of my professional practice over this period forms part of a 
wider learning experience, including my professional examinations towards 
becoming a chartered secretary and career advancement and promotion to a 
senior position at Northumbria University. The EdD journey is therefore 
integral to a professional development ‘biography’, which represents ‘an 
unfinished product constantly undergoing change and development’ (Jarvis, 
2009:25). This approach appeals to a constructionist conception of identity in 
line with the theoretical theme running through the three stages of the EdD. 
This statement is divided into two key sections. Section One demonstrates 
the integration of the three phases of the EdD, and Section Two charts my 
professional development. 
Section One: Integrating the stages of the EdD 
The theoretical and conceptual connections between the three EdD stages 
are evident. To illustrate, a common theme in my research has been the 
challenging of structural and system-oriented approaches to university 
governance, whether at a macro governmental level, or a fixation on 
institutional transactions of inputs and outputs in university governance. In 
contrast, my research has attended to governing bodies and their actors as 
under-examined, potentially rich sites of enquiry to explore micro practices in 
the ‘doing’ of university governance, as examined in the Foundations of 
Professionalism, Methods of Enquiry (MoE) I and II assignments, Institution-
Focussed Study (IFS) and thesis.  
A social constructionist lens through which to view university governance 
practices has been adopted and refined throughout the EdD research. This 
was implicit from the outset of the EdD, in the identification of Giddens’ 
(1991) concept of ‘identity work’ in the construction of professional identities 
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in the Foundations of Professional (FoP) module, through to the emergence 
of a ‘weak’ or ‘contingent’ constructionist perspective for examining 
governing body and actors in shaping governance practice in the MoE II 
research. This led to the refinement of a contingent constructionist position in 
the IFS and the thesis. Throughout, a nuanced reading of university 
corporate governance has been adopted which recognises subtle and two-
way sources of power to and from the university governing body. However, it 
is acknowledged that a recurrent reading of the governing body as a site at 
and through which more complex modes of power circulate is not a value-
free position, reflecting a view of research that ‘all standpoints are partisan; 
and…no one escapes a partisan standpoint…’(Gouldner,1973:56). Holding 
middle and senior management positions in two HEIs during registration on 
the EdD has undoubtedly influenced my capacity to challenge critical 
perspectives which reduce HEIs’ senior management teams to agents 
instrumental in imposing a one-size-fits-all model of ‘managerialism’ on their 
institutions. Instead, my work throughout the thesis considers the complexity 
of governance and management processes, and the potentially positive 
influence of governance and leadership when viewed through the 
contribution of the university governing body.   
The table on the next page below plots the key topics, themes and theories 
underpinning each element of the EdD: 
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EdD Elements Topic  Perspectives and 
Theories 
Foundations of 
Professionalism  (FoP) 
The construction of 
the professional 
identity of the 
secretary 
 
Professional identity of 
secretary as a ‘reflexive 
project’ (Giddens) 
Governance as a narrative 
and meaning-making 
practice  
MoE I: research 
design exercise 
Perceptions of chair 
succession on board 
performance 
Qualitative weighted mixed 
methods 
Emergence of a general 
interest in social 
constructionism 
Contemporary 
Education Policy 
(CEP) 
HEFCE’s Code of 
Practice on 
Accountability and 
Audit (2008) and the 
consultation on it as 
part of a process of  
policy text production 
Construction of policy 
discourses 
Interrogation of neo-liberal 
discourses of HE 
The construction of 
accountability to HEFCE 
MoE II:  piloting 
research 
 
The professional 
contribution and 
identity of external 
governing body 
members 
Identification of interest in 
‘weak’ or ‘contingent’ 
social constructionism. 
Searle (1995) 
IFS ‘Account-giving’ 
behaviours of a case 
study governing body 
Application of social 
constructionism to concept 
of ‘accountability’ as a 
meaning making act within 
shared parameters. 
Searle (1995) 
Thesis  Institutional visibility 
of the university 
governing body 
amongst staff 
Application of a social 
constructionist approach, 
including Giddens’ 
structuration theory.  
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Each stage of the EdD is united by use of a qualitative research design, 
through delivery of semi-structured interviews, to shed light on the 
perceptions of governors, senior management and secretaries as 
professional peers, around aspects of governance practice. This is 
accompanied by an interest in discourses around HE governance and policy 
throughout the EdD (e.g., CEP, the IFS and the thesis).  My development as 
a researcher was built on during each stage of the programme. The MoE I 
pilot research was formative in providing an opportunity to build a research 
design which influenced the research apparatus, including the ethical 
considerations and sampling decisions in the MoE II small-scale research, 
the IFS and the thesis. I encountered first-hand the challenges associated 
with gaining access to external council members and independent governors 
for interview purposes. The ability to anticipate these challenges and adapt 
the research design accordingly was an area of skills development in 
progressing to the IFS and thesis stages.  
Section two: development of professional practice 
Participation in the EdD has contributed directly to my professional 
development. For example, my knowledge of the contexts of corporate 
governance is significant, through research involving more than 20 HEI 
settings and, in particular, the interviewing of participants in MoE II, the IFS 
and the thesis. On embarking on the EdD, I had a superficial understanding 
of the legislative and policy landscape in which English HE governance was 
located, along with the regulatory outputs of bodies including HEFCE and the 
CUC. My progress through the EdD has enabled me to gain an in-depth and 
advanced understanding of, and critical engagement with, the wider policy 
environment, the gap between sector policy and governance practice in 
HEIs, and the contradictions and compromises involved in bridging 
regulatory rhetoric and reality. This includes my professional role to help 
interpret, impact-assess and implement policy into practice. 
Scott et al (2004) identified three choice models and motivations for students 
undertaking a professional doctorate, as follows: extrinsic-professional 
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initiation; extrinsic-professional initiation; and intrinsic-personal/professional 
affirmation. These provide a reference point for examining my own 
motivations for enrolling on the EdD, along with the evolution of my interests 
and priorities in parallel with my professional development. The three modes 
of motivation in Scott et al’s model have each applied to varying extents at 
different stages of my EdD experience, reflecting the observation that 
professional doctoral students have multiple simultaneous or sequential 
motivations (Wellington and Sikes, 2006., Burgess and Wellington, 2010). To 
illustrate, extrinsic-professional initiation was my main motivation for EdD 
study. As an administrator with experience of working in several professional 
support roles since graduation, I was nonetheless new to supporting HE 
governance arrangements. The EdD was therefore a basis for deepening 
and extending both my theoretical and practical understanding of university 
governance.  
Alongside a desire to accelerate my understanding of HE governance and 
seek to advance my career prospects, was the need for intrinsic personal 
and professional affirmation, to satisfy a long-held interest in undertaking 
research beyond master’s degree level. This interest in applied research in 
HEI settings was ignited by undertaking an Open University validated 
Postgraduate Certificate in HE Management and Administration. In turn, in 
securing promotion and becoming more established in HE corporate 
governance during the doctorate, extrinsic-professional continuation entered 
my motivations. In other words, undertaking the doctorate at a mid-career 
point, may be characterised as a mode of ‘professional extension’ (Costley 
and Lester, 2012:258) which include consolidating and advancing my 
expertise in the area of university governance, and setting out my credentials 
in the profession. 
Personal growth in undertaking the EdD includes greater confidence and 
tacit and explicit knowledge, and the authority and confidence with which I 
support the governing body and governance system in my employing 
institution. This includes my ability to co-ordinate board and committee 
effectiveness reviews in my institution, the investigative and analytical 
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elements of which have been strengthened through the research skills honed 
in the EdD. In turn, the enhanced knowledge of governance arrangements 
and good practice across many HEI settings built during the research has 
applications to arrangements in my workplace. Specific insights which have 
informed my professional practice include enhancing communications and 
relations between the governing body and academic board, as an area 
where I have facilitated in-house workshops. The importance of governors’ 
informal interactions and contributions outside the boardroom has remained 
a recurrent interest since the MoE II assignment, and explored in the IFS and 
thesis through a focus on accountability and institutional visibility 
respectively. The risks and opportunities identified as an outcome of the 
research have been of direct relevance to my co-ordination of a recent 
review in my current role of how the role of elected and nominated staff 
governors could be maximised, including how best to negotiate potential 
tensions between ‘representing’ and being ‘representative’ of specific staff 
constituencies, and communications to and from these groups to the 
governing body. 
However, the principal contribution that undertaking the EdD has made to my 
professional development is the advanced appreciation it has given me of 
the importance of cultural factors and human relations underpinning effective 
governance. From the FOP module through to the thesis, the continued 
contention that human dynamics needed to be examined to fully understand 
university corporate governance effectiveness remains intact. However, my 
understanding has grown from a level of theoretical understanding at the 
outset of the EdD registration, through to practical insights into board 
dynamics, and the significance of the quality of relationships between key 
players which I support in my role as secretary. The importance of informal 
relations alongside the formal protocols is identified as an outcome of my 
research to ensure that frameworks and guidance are culturally sensitive, 
specific and flexible. An area where my research findings resonate with my 
professional development is recognising the importance of the secretary as a 
14 
 
creative practitioner with the ability to adapt and identify solutions to ensure 
governance support is effective.  
The application of the outcomes of my EdD research relates to my own 
professional setting as well as to the research participants, a number of 
whom had reflected on their own practice as a result of the interview 
process.  For example, several participants actively reflected on the ways in 
which they could improve internal, less formal communications about the 
deliberations and decisions of the board or features on individual governors. 
Additionally, in the final sections of the IFS and the thesis, I concluded that 
there was potential for the research findings to be disseminated to sector 
bodies such as the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education (LFHE) and 
the Committee of University Chairs (CUC). In May 2013 I was invited to run a 
session as part of the LFHE Governor Development Programme on ‘What 
makes Boards work’. The session, which was attended by governors, 
managers and secretaries, enabled me to integrate some of my research 
interests and insights into informal modes of governor institutional 
engagement and cultural conditions for good governance into the discussion.  
The LFHE places periodic calls for research into university governance which 
has a practical orientation around real-world issues and solutions. As noted 
in Chapter Six of the thesis, I intend to explore whether aspects of my 
research findings could feed into the illustrative practice notes under 
development by the CUC to supplement the principles in the HE Code of 
Governance (2014). For example, the proposed alternative frameworks for 
board activity which supplement the formal protocols of reporting, could be 
influential in informing the content of future practice notes for publication. In 
turn, I would like to adapt elements of my IFS on the account-giving role of 
the governing body, and the thesis findings into journal articles. This could 
include publication in Higher Education Quarterly or Studies in Higher 
Education, or sharing my research findings at a seminar or conference 
session of the Society for Research into Higher Education (SRHE). 
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 Chapter One: Study Context  
1.1                Introduction  
A paradox exists in relation to the university governing body,1 centred on its 
profile within the ‘governed’ institution. The formal powers enshrined in a 
university’s governing instruments and successive higher education (HE) 
codes of governance, position the governing body as ‘unambiguously and 
collectively accountable for institutional activities, taking all final decisions on 
matters of fundamental concern within its remit’ (HE Code of Governance, 
2014:9). However, a paradox is presented as a result of a prevailing 
perception amongst governors, senior managers and secretaries and clerks2 
that the governing body’s remit, membership and contribution to university 
governance and leadership is insufficiently understood amongst the internal 
constituencies of the university. This study will explore this paradoxical 
perspective through examination of the institutional visibility of the university 
governing body amongst staff, and whether it is possible to identify a 
relationship between board institutional presence and the effectiveness of its 
governance practice. This will be achieved through examination of the 
implications of the online discourses on the role of the governing body for 
board visibility, and a principal focus on the perspectives of the secretary on 
governing body visibility amongst staff groups within their own workplace, 
and what this may mean for the board’s performance.    
 
The ‘problem’ of board visibility first presented itself when interviewing Sir 
Nick Montagu, Chair of Council at Queen Mary, University of London as a 
case-study participant in my Institution-Focussed Study (IFS). Montagu 
advocated a role for the governing body by which it steered from a distance, 
1 The terms ‘governing body’, ‘board of governors’ or ‘board’ are used interchangeably and synonymously in this 
study, for the purpose of descriptive variation. Specific reference to the ‘Council’ or the ‘Board’ will normally denote 
a specific HEI’s governing body. ‘Governor’ is used throughout to refer to a member of a university governing body, 
whether a Board or a Council, and may be preceded by ‘independent’, ‘external’, ‘lay’ (interchangeable), ‘ex-officio’, 
‘staff’ or ‘student’, to denote different membership categories. ‘Trustee’ is used as equivalent term for ‘governor’, 
reflecting the fact that most university governing bodies in English HEIs are trustee boards. 
2 Reference to ‘secretary’ denotes the role-holder appointed as ‘secretary’ or ‘clerk’ to the university governing 
body. The term secretary will be used throughout. 
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and the low institutional visibility and profile associated with this 
organisational positioning. He publicly reiterated this perspective in his 
capacity as Chair of The Committee of University Chairs (CUC): 
…people won’t have a clue - and I’m talking about academics - what 
the governing body does. It doesn’t loom large in their lives. That is as 
it ought to be (Times Higher Education, 24 May 2012:17). 
 
Montagu’s observation prompts the question: ‘why should a governing body 
operating behind the scenes of a leadership stage on which the vice-
chancellor is the protagonist, be regarded as a normal organisational state of 
affairs?’ The implication of this viewpoint is that a more prominent role for the 
governing body risks upsetting a perceived (although most likely an artificial 
or non-existent) balance in the corporate, executive and academic eco-
system of the ‘governed’ university, and impairing or compromising the 
performance of the bodies and role-holders operating in and across these 
domains. These questions were not pursued in my IFS, but ignited an 
interest in understanding perceptions and the implications of governing body 
institutional visibility amongst staff, as the topic of this thesis. An empirical 
basis for equivalent observations to Montagu’s was sought in the HE policy 
and critical literature. Bargh, Scott and Smith’s (1996) research captured a 
similar insight from a staff governor:  
Most of the time the governing body is simply not part of the 
consciousness of the staff - governors are insignificant; along with the 
governing body. As long as the governors are rubber stamping a 
benevolent directorate nobody bothers about it (125).  
A survey of UK HEIs commissioned by the Leadership Foundation for Higher 
Education (LFHE) and the CUC also concluded that both governor and 
senior manager respondents were uncertain whether staff in their institutions 
knew what their governing body was responsible for. Of Australian HEIs, 
Baird (2006) observes that ‘Although a few powerful board chairs had raised 
the profile of their governing body, for the most part there was little sense of 
engagement between the board and the university it governed’ (306). 
Referring to US HE, King (2009) argues that minimal evidence exists of the 
governing board impinging on the daily preoccupations of university staff.  
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These critical perspectives are neutral in making a judgment on whether a 
university board should be distant from the mainstream majority of staff. 
However, the LFHE and the CUC survey findings and the critical reflections 
above, do not elaborate on the desired levels or extent of a university’s 
governing body proximity to staff, or the implications of visibility as a factor in 
board performance. This study will advance an understanding of the 
observations and assumptions made around governing body visibility 
amongst staff. Institutional visibility includes the profiling and projection of the 
formal collective actions, transactions and decisions of the board in the 
university, through to the less formal exchanges and encounters of 
governors within wider university settings. The extent to which these 
interactions engender recognition and legitimation of the board, its members 
and the wider governance system by senior management and wider staff 
groups will be examined.  
1.2 Research rationale  
This research seeks to advance an understanding of a finding in my IFS that 
the case-study Council’s ‘downward accountability’ to staff constituencies 
was perceived as a significant responsibility discharged through effective 
board performance. The concept of ‘depictive accountability’ was coined in 
the IFS to denote accountability exercised through the presence, and 
demonstration of the actions and transactions of, the governing body. 
However, the IFS found that arrangements in place to demonstrate 
accountability to staff were under-developed and insufficiently understood. 
This finding ignited an interest in the forms through which the governing body 
is made, or makes itself, visible, and how it is present(ed) in a university 
setting. 
Why is it important to understand the institutional visibility of the university 
governing body? An overarching research driver is that this is a neglected 
variable in the HE ‘good governance’ literature, with the potential to shed 
light on board performance and effectiveness. Five broad themes are 
identified which constellate around the rationale for examining board visibility 
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amongst staff, and merit exploration as contributors to governance 
effectiveness. These relate to the institutional visibility of the governing body 
amongst staff in: 1) advancing and articulating the accountability functions of 
the board; 2) supporting governing body knowledge development of the 
context of the governed university to inform its discussions and decision-
making; 3) organisational development and setting and steering the 
university’s strategic direction; 4) fostering and facilitating cultural 
engagement, and behaviours supporting and demonstrating constructive 
relations between the board and senior management, and 5) setting the 
institutional tone and communicating and sharing the university’s values. 
In response to the first element of the research rationale, one aspect of the 
accountability of the governing body will be to explore how, and on what 
basis, it is ‘seen’ by university constituencies. This includes the implications 
of board presence for staff confidence in the governance system as one 
enabler or outcome of its success and perceived effectiveness. Whilst not 
specific to HE, Carver observes that ‘Corporate governance, once 
overlooked, is now center stage’ (2002:1), thereby implying increased focus 
on the board’s accountability for company performance.  As Clarke and 
Branson (2012) observe, ‘Recurrent waves of corporate failure, climaxing in 
the 2007/2008 global financial crisis has focussed attention keenly on the 
apparent defects in regulatory institutions and corporate governance’ (1). 
These conditions have arguably intensified public, shareholder and company 
insider scrutiny of the board (Coaldrake, Stedman and Little, 2003). 
Universities have not experienced corporate scandal on the scale of Barings 
Bank (1995), TransTec (1999), Tyco (2000) and Enron (2001), with their 
varying degrees of corruption, fraud, misappropriation, collusion, directorial, 
board, audit committee and external auditor incompetence. However, a shift 
in the profile of the university governing body would appear to have occurred. 
As Kelleher (2006) comments: 
Up to a few decades ago the governing bodies of universities in most 
systems would have been rather shadowy groups whose precise 
function would not have been altogether clear to the other members of 
the university or to the general public (1). 
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Alongside an increased accountability to stakeholders and interest groups, 
Carver’s dramaturgical metaphor of the board being placed ‘center stage’ 
extends beyond a heightened profile for the structures and systems around 
the board, to connote a wider perspective of board performance, in being 
‘seen’ by a company’s ‘audiences’ and stakeholders. Several commentators 
in the corporate governance literature have argued that boards have largely 
operated behind closed doors (Useem, 2006), and that this has prevented 
policy-makers, critical commentators, shareholders and other stakeholders 
groups from fully assessing the contribution of the board to company return 
and performance in the wider sense. The corporate disclosure and 
transparency requirements and expectations on HEIs may be less stringent 
than in the private sector. However, calls for improved openness around 
HEIs’ decision-making at the level of the governing body and senior 
management are becoming prevalent in the new operating and regulatory 
environment in which many students are financing their own studies. The 
‘black box’ metaphor has arisen in a number of studies in the literature 
review, for the obscured or concealed conduct and operation of the board. 
Huse (2005) calls for research ‘to open the black box of actual board 
behaviour to contribute to the creation of accountability’ (66), and Le Blanc 
and Schwartz (2007) favour research which brings into exposure the ‘black 
box’ of how boards actually operate, including as a route to understanding 
the behaviour and contribution of the chairman and other directors.3 
However, despite this turn towards transparency, the contribution of 
institutional visibility in creating a chink of light in, if not collapsing, the black 
box of university board practice, is unexplored territory in the critical or policy 
literature.  
The second strand of the research rationale is the extent to which board 
visibility can be understood as a contributor to its collective and individual 
capacity to respond effectively to a transformed regulatory and funding 
environment. The raised profile and diversification of duties and demands on 
3 Tricker (2009) recommends that researchers break into ‘the black box of the boardroom and focus on board level 
activities, directors’ behaviour, and board leadership’ (235). In the HE literature, opening the black box has been 
applied to exposure or elucidation of academics’ performance. Henkel (1997) quotes a senior administrator in a 
university referring to centralised audit processes authorising the opening of the black box of academic decision-
making to justify academic performance (140). 
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the governing body going forward is cited in policy and critical studies. To 
provide one of many examples:  
As HEIs generally increase in size, become more competitive (and 
therefore take more risks), and become part of a global HE market, 
then the responsibilities of governing bodies will inevitably become 
more demanding (Schofield et al, 2012:4). 
Understanding the institutional placement and positioning of the university 
governing body and what this might mean in terms of strengthening the skills 
of governors is therefore timely in the new business and operating 
environment. This includes reforms informed by ‘The Browne Review’, An 
Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance 
(2010), the government HE White Paper, Students at the Heart of the 
System (2011) and the intensification of competition between universities 
through the creation of an open market for academic programmes as 
‘products’, delivered by academics as service providers which are subject to 
‘consumption’ by students as ‘customers’. How the institutional visibility of 
the governing body amongst staff supports the board and arguably executive 
management through the advice and interventions of the governors in 
responding to the new funding and regulatory environment will be explored. 
Gillies (2011) has called for governing bodies to focus inwards and ‘primarily 
serve the complex of stakes that is the institutional interest’ (para. 26) in the 
new funding and regulatory environment. The unstated consequence of the 
university governing body turning inwards to attend to institutional interests is 
that its purpose and performance is more likely to come under the glare and 
scrutiny of a wider set of institutional groups. Baird (2012) echoes this 
perspective, and cites equivalent levels of attention placed on Australian HE 
boards, through which ‘Governing bodies receive greater formal deference to 
their authority’ (153) from staff stakeholders. Institutional visibility as a means 
of activating the accountability of the governing body to staff has potentially 
positive consequences for the board, requiring it to ‘up its game’, optimise its 
performance and demonstrate that it meets its collective responsibility to act 
in the university’s best interests. This includes whether the degree of 
institutional visibility of the governing body will facilitate or sharpen 
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governors’ understanding of the changed ‘eco-system’ (Kennie and Price, 
2012) for HE, and the impact of the ‘disruptive innovation’ (Christensen, 
1997) and potential game-changers such as Massive Open Online Courses 
(MOOCs) on the delivery environment about which the board advises senior 
management.  
The third area where institutional visibility may afford insights into board 
effectiveness is as a vehicle for enabling and expressing board behaviours, 
and the cascade of these to staff to foster a shared vision and values. The 
extent to which institutional visibility sheds light on boardroom and executive 
and non-executive director (NED) dynamics as key to board performance 
(McNulty, 2003), will be explored in the study. In the university context this 
includes interpersonal relations amongst governors, and the frequency, 
depth, quality and constructive nature of their relationships with the vice-
chancellor and wider senior management teams. Visibility as a precondition 
for, and product of ‘Effective leadership and governing body dynamics’ 
(Schofield, 2009) as an ‘enabler’ of effective governance, will be examined in 
this context. The study is based on an assumption that the institutional 
visibility of the governing body is not confined to business conducted in the 
boardroom. An objective, therefore, is to examine perceptions of the 
importance and implications of the institutional visibility of the governing body 
amongst university staff which may help advance an understanding of how 
best to negotiate and transcend organisational boundaries between 
governance and management. An intended outcome of the research is 
understanding the means through which board visibility is expressed within 
the ‘spaces’ of the university - from the boardroom through to the offices of 
senior management and departmental arenas - and its contribution to flexible 
and more responsive and better- informed deliberation and decision-making.  
 
The fourth and fifth areas include an increasing emphasis in the corporate 
and HE policy literature on the significance of shared values as central to 
organisational success. This centres on corporate and university boards 
setting the ‘tone at the top’, as embodied in the UK Corporate Governance 
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Code (2014) which states that ‘directors should lead by example and ensure 
that good standards of behaviour permeate throughout all levels of the 
organisation’ (2). In turn, the revised CUC HE Code of Governance (2014) 
recommends ‘an ethical framework for the personal behaviour of governors’ 
(7), along with board ownership and approval of an ethical framework (12) for 
the university, ensuring the board’s own diversity and equality, ‘including in 
its own operation’ (21). However, these two key policy documents fall short 
of identifying how setting the tone might be translated into wider institutional 
practice. I would argue that the board’s manifestation and modelling of 
desired responsible and ethical behaviours by staff presupposes a degree of 
board visibility and wider knowledge of its role and decisions, and actions 
taken by staff groupings. Examining board institutional visibility may help 
understand how to embed governing body effectiveness.  
 
1.3     Corporate Governance and HEIs 
 
‘Corporate governance’ in the context of the university, and through the 
governing body, is central to this study. Prior to summarising the migration of 
corporate governance principles to HE regulation, the etymological and 
statutory basis for the ‘corporation’ as a legal structure for different types of 
universities merits explanation. The word corporation derives from the Latin 
‘corpus’, as a physical body or collection of individuals, and applies to the 
legal structures of governing bodies in English HE in having ultimate legal 
authority and accountability for the university, whether it takes the form of a 
pre-1992 chartered corporation, a post-1992 Higher Education Corporation 
(HEC) or, as the case with a small number of HEIs, a company limited by 
guarantee. The concept of the ‘legal personality’4 of the governing body is as 
an entity entering into a range of legal relations on behalf of the university, 
which ascribes a statutory form to the governing body. However, the visibility 
of the governing body as a means of manifesting and realising a potential 
4 Legal ‘personality’, as enshrined in UK company legislation since the late-Victorian period, is based on the 
concept of the company as a juristic person with the capacity to contract with, sue and be sued by, other legal or 
natural persons. The legal personality of the university governing body is constitutionally and legally unambiguous, 
in line with its ultimate responsibility (and liability) for institutional financial strategy, borrowing, investment, 
safeguarding of resources and assets, and compliance.  
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wider symbolic identity or representative role beyond its legal form and 
structure remains unexamined.   
The principles and lexicon of ‘corporate governance’ have been imported into 
HE regulation in the last two decades, including HEFCE’s Model Financial 
Memorandum between HEFCE and institutions (2010),5 The CUC Guide for 
Members of Higher Education Governing Bodies in the UK (2009, 2004) and 
the successor HE Code (2014). The CUC Guide regards ‘corporate 
governance’ as synonymous with disclosure and reporting, which is 
expanded on in the British University Finance Directors Group (BUFDG) 
requirement that HEIs ‘include a corporate governance statement and 
statement of responsibilities, including reference to the institution’s systems 
of internal control and risk management, within their financial statements’ 
(Part IV, Annex II:113).6  The definition of corporate governance in the Model 
Financial Memorandum (2010) combines the traditional company board 
responsibilities of strategy-setting, monitoring, risk management and 
sustainability, with the charity connotations of ‘stewardship’ and ‘trusteeship’:  
The corporate governance arrangements of an HEI are the means by 
which strategy is set and monitored, the executive is held to account, 
risks are managed, stewardship and trustee responsibilities are 
discharged, and sustainability is ensured (2010/19:14). 
 
Whilst the CUC’s Model Statement of Primary Responsibilities (2009) 
recommends that boards conduct business in accordance with ‘best practice 
in higher education corporate governance’ (6:111), sector guidance falls 
short of describing the distinctive features of HE corporate governance. The 
silences and ambiguities in the definitions and discourses around the 
authority and accountability of the governing body will be examined later in 
the thesis.  
 
 
5 In 2014, the Model Financial Memorandum was replaced by the Memorandum of Assurance and Accountability 
between HEFCE and Institutions. Both documents are referred to in the thesis.  
6 This reflects the revised 2005 ‘Turnbull Guidance’ on Internal Control produced by the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC). 
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1.4 The Primary Research Question (PRQ) and Sub-Questions (SQs) 
Silverman (2001) recommends that research questions should seek to say ‘a 
lot about a little (problem)…avoiding the temptation to say a little about a lot’ 
(5). This empirical economy has informed the shaping of a single PRQ for 
this study, built on the hypothesis that a relationship exists between 
university governing body visibility and its effectiveness. The PRQ 
constitutes what Creswell (2008) describes as the ‘central question’ which 
‘asks for an exploration of central phenomenon or concept’ (129) which in 
this study is the implication of institutional governing body visibility on its 
performance: 
PRQ: What perceived role does the institutional visibility 
of the university governing body amongst staff 
groups play in contributing to its effectiveness?  
Robson (2002) characterises ‘good’ research questions as ‘clear’, ‘specific’, 
‘answerable’, ‘interconnected’ and substantially ‘relevant’ to respond to the 
phenomena under enquiry. As well as satisfying Robson’s litmus test of 
‘clarity’ and ‘specificity’ addressed above, the third criterion of ‘answerability’ 
is addressed through ensuring the PRQ is sufficiently focussed to be 
investigated. This stance is echoed by Andrews (2003) who observes that a 
research question should not be ‘so all-embracing that it would be impossible 
to answer it within the confines of a research project’ (2). Two sub-questions 
(SQs) are identified:    
SQ1: Which arrangements and activities supporting the board’s 
institutional visibility are more effective than others in 
supporting board performance, and on what basis? 
SQ2: What risks are associated with the institutional visibility of 
the university governance body as threats to its 
performance? 
The SQs demonstrate ‘interconnectedness’ to the PRQ on a thematic basis 
through exploration of the different strands and practices of board visibility, 
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and methodologically through the sampling strategy of selecting 20 English 
HEIs for the website analysis phase, and from which the interview 
participants are drawn. The practitioner-informed nature of this study 
addresses the influence of ‘practical stimuli’ (White, 2009:27) as factors 
shaping the PRQ and SQs. These practical stimuli include the identification 
of ‘investigable’ (Savin-Baden and Major, 2012) research questions, which 
take account of the need to maximise use of my finite time and resource 
constraints as a part-time researcher employed in a full-time professional 
role.  
1.5 Research assumptions  
Research questions are not formulated in a theoretical vacuum (Campbell et 
al 1982). However, alongside epistemological and theoretical factors, 
professional interests have influenced the research assumptions and 
development of the PRQ. The research assumptions are informed by my role 
as head of governance and a secretary to a governing body in an English 
university. Sikes and Potts (2008) observe that insider researchers ‘almost 
routinely include a declaration of their positionality in their research writing’ 
(5). In line with this perspective, the locus of my role as a member of 
executive management with professional responsibilities for supporting and 
advising the board of governors, has informed my interest in board 
institutional visibility as a research ‘problem’, and influenced shaping of the 
PRQ. The following assumptions underpinning the PRQ and SQs have 
formed over a seven-year period of professional involvement in governance 
in two English HEIs, first as an assistant secretary and currently as a head of 
governance and secretary to a university governing body:  
1) the institutional visibility of university governing bodies and the 
contribution of this process and practice to board and institutional 
effectiveness is insufficiently examined in the critical and policy 
literature;  
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2) university governing body institutional presence operates on a 
spectrum. At one end of the spectrum is the board performing a 
predominantly ceremonial role in ratifying decisions reported up to it 
by senior management, through to an attentive and active body, 
holding the vice-chancellor to account and contributing to the strategic 
direction and sustainability of the university at the other end; 
 
3) mainstream academic and support staff knowledge about, and 
insights into, the purpose, make-up and transactions of their 
university’s governing body is variable, and likely to be at the level of 
general awareness of its role. In turn, there is no single perspective 
through which the governing body is visible to, and perceived by, staff, 
reflecting the heterogeneity of staff groupings inhabiting the 
‘multiversity’ (Kerr, 1963) or ‘super-complex’ (Barnett, 2000) university 
of the 21st century. Staff are shaped by, shape, and represent a 
‘matrix of influences’ (Trowler, 2012:11), interests and identities;   
 
4) the secretary, as with the governing body, has a limited institutional 
visibility amongst staff, and is a critical, but often under-estimated role-
holder contributing to the conditions and arrangements necessary to 
support board effectiveness. Of the secretary at Tufts University in the 
US, Gittleman (2004) observes, ‘He remained a force with 
trustees…but kept a low profile amongst students and faculty. People 
rarely got his title right, and they never understood the authority he 
had in his hands’ (187-188). Alongside a relatively low institutional 
profile for the secretary, there is a deficit of critical research on the role 
and influence of the role-holder in effective governance practice. 
When performing effectively, the role has been conceived as 
operating in a ‘triadic relationship’ (Llewellyn, 2009:18) with the chair 
and the head of institution; 
5) governing body effectiveness is not a fixed output of board practice. 
Board institutional visibility is a potential vehicle for staff to 
acknowledge and, at more developed levels, understand its function. 
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The extent to which this is of itself a factor in board effectiveness, or 
an outcome of it, will be explored in this study;  
6) risks linked to an invisible or low-profile board include detachment 
from the institution it oversees, and the potential impairment of its 
capacity to make sound decisions in the university’s interests. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum is an over-active governing body which 
poses the threat of encroachment on executive management or 
academic policy or programme matters outside the compass of 
strategy and corporate accountability. The risks of governors crossing 
what are already permeable lines between governance and 
management, include immersion in operational detail, and distortion 
of, or delays to decision-making. Other risks include damage to 
relations between governors and senior management, and threats to 
governor independence and vulnerability to lobbying by staff and 
students.  
1.6      Exclusions from the study 
Students, as with staff, are recognised as heterogeneous groupings with 
different motivations, modes of study, conceptions of, and demands from, the 
student experience. However governing body visibility amongst students is 
not the focus of this study, although it is anticipated that observations on 
board and student engagement may arise in the semi-structured interviews.    
An examination of academic governance structures and arrangements will 
feature in this study, solely in the context of the interface of educational 
strategy and academic board or senate and its actors with the board. 
‘Academic governance’, perhaps unsurprisingly given the primary mission of 
universities, is more clearly understood than its corporate counterpart. The 
term academic governance is ‘widely used as an expression for the way that 
academic matters are governed. It is separate from (but related to) corporate 
governance for which the governing body is responsible’ (Middlehurst, 
2011:5). Academic governance encompasses activities overseen by the 
academic board/senate including the curriculum, admission of students, 
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assessment, student conduct and regulation and academic quality and 
standards. The structures of, arrangements for, and actors populating the 
academic governance sites of the academic board or senate will feature in 
this study in the context of the governing’s body ultimate, but generally 
delegated, oversight of academic mission or ‘educational character’. Parallel 
to presumptions that governing bodies enjoy limited visibility within their 
governed HEIs, Diamond’s (1991) study of faculty academic governance in 
US universities found that its formal features were of minimal interest and 
relevance to the majority of staff.  
Within this framework, the concept of ‘shared governance’ as a model of 
institutional self-government of academic affairs which administrators, faculty 
and students share responsibility (Alfred, 1994) will not be examined beyond 
the corporate governance focus on the board. However, the broad cultural 
outcomes of shared governance, including improved engagement between 
different staff constituencies, will be examined in the context of the governing 
body. Related to this, the study also excludes direct examination of 
governing body engagement with stakeholders external to the university. 
This is not intended to imply that such external relationships are insignificant, 
or do not attract increased attention as mapped in my IFS, including regional 
bodies such as the Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), business partners, 
government and sector bodies. The transfer of knowledge and relationships 
into the university arena, building on external connections facilitated by 
independent governors, may emerge from the semi-structured interviewing 
discussions.   
Finally, university board ‘profile’ will be used as a synonym and shorthand for 
the degree to which it is rendered visible to staff. However, board profile as 
associated with the demographics, including the diversity of its members, are 
excluded from the study. The demographic profile of the board as a driver for 
company performance has been viewed through the prism of diversity of 
membership. The major corporate governance reports on board directorship 
and dynamics in the last two decades, including the Tyson Report (2003) 
and Higgs Review (2003), recommend improving the breadth of board 
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membership from different backgrounds. For example, the gender diversity 
of board directors has been identified as a driver for improved decision-
making (Fondas and Sassalos, 2000).7 In HE,  Bargh, Scott and Smith 
(1996) examined university governing body members’ age, gender, ethnicity, 
educational background, occupation and party political affiliations.8  
1.7 The evolving role of the university governing body: implications 
for its visibility and effectiveness 
This section charts the evolving role and positioning of the governing body 
within the university, particularly in relation to academic management 
structures, and the implications of this for its visibility within the university. 
Prior to outlining examples illustrative of the changing conception and 
complexion of the university governing body, the Memorandum of Assurance 
and Accountability between HEFCE and institutions (2014) provides a 
regulatory point of departure. The definition in the Memorandum captures the 
‘steering from a distance’ model (Olsen, 1988) whereby the governing body, 
as the legal embodiment of institutional self-government, depends on board 
accountability and visibility to HEFCE:  
To give expression to the principle of autonomy, every institution is 
headed by a governing body which is unambiguously and collectively 
responsible for overseeing the institution’s activities, determining its 
future direction, and fostering an environment in which institutional 
mission is achieved and the potential of all students is realised. The 
governing body ensures compliance with the statutes, ordinances and 
provisions regulating the institution and its framework of governance. 
HEFCE funding is provided explicitly to the governing body as the 
institution’s ultimate authority (1-2). 
The internal accountability of the governing body, and the cultural 
contribution it makes in creating the conditions in which the university’s 
mission is realised, as well as to students as beneficiaries, is also 
signposted in the definition. However, the statement is silent on the 
governing body’s relationship to staff, and therefore a perspective on the 
7 More recently, the Davies Report (2011) prescribed that FTSE 100 companies should aim to have a minimum of 
25% women represented on their boards by 2015. 
8 The Equality Challenge Unit (ECU) published a 2009 report which researched the composition and equality and 
diversity monitoring of governing boards in UK HEIs, arguing that age and ethnicity on boards was essential for 
good governance and effective decision-making which should set the tone for diverse HEIs. 
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governing body serving the interest of academic staff communities above all 
other stakeholders is not traced in the definition as a tenable position. It is 
unclear whether governors, executive management or staff more widely 
would recognise the breadth of governing body duties captured in the 
definition.  
The evolving role of the university governing body is surveyed, to examine 
the implications of this for its institutional visibility and how this supports 
policy and regulatory priorities for the purpose and performance of the board. 
As Shattock (2002) observes, ‘The balance between corporate-dominated 
and academic-dominated university governance has fluctuated considerably 
over time’ (231). These fluctuations are arguably represented through the 
university governing body and its institutional presence, which bring into 
focus debates about the locus of authority of the board for fundamental 
matters at the crossroads of corporate, executive and academic-self-
government. Oxford’s and Cambridge’s governance arrangements remain 
anomalous in the English university sector, but merit reference in signalling a 
significantly different set of constitutional, structural and dynamic 
relationships and visibility amongst staff constituencies, than ‘mainstream’ 
HEIs. Cambridge’s 3800 strong electoral constituency of the Regent House 
and its interaction with a minority lay executive and policy-making Council 
illustrates this, as does the evolving role of Oxford’s Great Congregation from 
the medieval period to the present. It was not until 2002, through 
implementation of new statutes recommended in the 1997-98 North 
Commission, that a single governing council was established at Oxford.  
A more recent civic university example is provided by Ives, Drummond and 
Schwartz (2000) who conceive the founding membership and composition of 
the Court of Governors of Birmingham University in 1901, as inextricably 
linked to the assertion of civic pride, ‘intended to demonstrate ownership of 
the new University by the City and the Midlands region and a means to 
mobilise interest and support over the whole area’ (quoted in Shattock, 
2002:236). These displays of civic power point to the collective authority and 
capacity of courts to enlist regional support, although board visibility as an 
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enabler of civic activities, whether for public engagement and commercial 
purposes is only implicit. Nonetheless, the observation signals the presence 
and profiling of, and appointment to, the governing body as a political 
manoeuvre rather than a neutral constitutional process. 
Moodie and Eustace (1974) argue that the powers of the court and council of 
the nineteenth-century universities were largely unconstrained, due to the 
absence of regular sources of government funding. Staff ‘were almost 
entirely dependent on lay governors to generate the funding on which 
teaching and research (including academic salaries) depended’ (Shattock, 
ibid.). In contrast, Moodie and Eustace’s study of civic, red-brick and ‘plate-
glass’ (Beloff, 1968)9 university governance illustrates the waning of court 
and council authority in a context of funding stability for universities through 
the University Grants Committee (UGC) which reduced the need for councils 
to exert or represent civic influence for the financial and reputational gain of 
the university. The courts, council and laymen are depicted as predominantly 
ceremonial and symbolic bodies, headed by the chancellor who, whilst ‘the 
most visible of the laymen’ (91), holds a largely honorific role. The authors 
assign lead trustee status to the chairman of council, who is high profile in 
being expected ‘to exert himself to forward the interests of the university 
externally (which is likely to mean locally), and to make business smooth 
internally’ (92), as an ambassador for civic relationship-building. However, 
the institutional authority base of the chairman who ‘by definition an outsider’ 
(ibid.) is constrained to act in relation to significant strategic or funding 
matters affecting the university. This position may appear to support chair 
independence and objectivity. However, another interpretation is that the 
marginal influence of the role-holder limits the capacity holding the vice-
chancellor to account, or exercise influence over scholarly or strategic 
activity. The depiction of the governing body as constrained in its capacity to 
act or influence institutional policy or strategy, signals governing bodies of 
reduced visibility and effectiveness, as a point taken up in the policy 
9 The authors were academics at the University of York at the time of writing the study. York received its Royal 
Charter in 1963, and is categorised as a plate-glass university. 
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responses of the 1980, which sought to strengthen the authority of councils, 
as discussed next. 
The ascendant authority and influence of the university governing body 
The Jarratt Report (1985) sought to increase the influence of the university 
governing body for institutional performance purposes. However, the Report 
did not seek to raise the profile of the university councils as collegial, 
representative or civic bodies, and instead advocated their alignment to the 
principles and practices of commercial boards, thereby importing the ‘rhetoric 
and practices of business efficiency’ (Bargh, Scott and Smith, 1996:8) into 
HE. The Report recommends replacement of ‘primus inter pares role of the 
Vice-Chancellor’ (Kogan and Hanney, 2000:185) with an executive 
leadership approach, and introduction of performance management 
measures and strategic planning frameworks jointly developed by senior 
management and a cabinet of lay councillors. The heightened institutional 
visibility of council is recommended in Jarratt through a reversal of the 
authority of senates and councils, with ‘the governing bodies...to be 
enhanced to the exclusion of the senates’ (Shattock, 2006:14).  
Shattock (2006) continues that Jarratt assigned increased prominence to the 
university governing body as a vehicle instrumental in advancing a 
Conservative agenda for HE which made universities more accountable 
whilst purportedly autonomous of the state, including the introduction of s43 
of the Education (No 2) Act 198610 which placed a new duty on HEIs, 
through the governing body, to safeguard freedom of speech on campus. 
Arguably, it also paved the way for the 1992  Further and Higher Education 
Act (FHEA) changes which formalised to a greater extent the ‘contract’ 
between funded universities and government, through the Model Financial 
Memorandum which made  ‘the governing body, not the institution, 
accountable for delivery’ (14). In turn, commentators argue that Jarratt’s 
model of HEI council-centred corporate governance was predicated on 
severance of collegial connections with the academic staff base through a 
10 Related 1990s legislation includes the 1994 Education Act, s22 of which requires the governing body to oversee 
university relationships with Students’ Unions.   
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hierarchical planning model ‘explicitly hostile to the power of departments’ 
(Kogan and Hanney, 2000:185) reduced to cost centres reporting to 
centralised management services.  
The Report undoubtedly seeks to elevate the status and influence of the 
university councils in improving university’s strategic performance, the 
implication of which is the heightened profile and participation of lay actors: 
encouraging the greater involvement of laymen in a university’s 
affairs, especially in the sphere of strategic, academic and financial 
planning. They take the view that Council as a body should play a 
much more active role in such matters (1985, 3.47:28). 
However, it is simplistic to describe the Jarratt Report in wholly pejorative 
terms, by reducing its recommendations to a New Public Management 
manifesto for HEIs. A closer reading of elements of the Report challenges 
critics’ views that one of its key pillars is converting university councils to the 
status of corporate boards. For example, Section C of the Report includes 
progressive proposals on institutional corporate governance and 
recommends a parallel ‘informal process which operates in conjunction with 
the established committee structure of the institution’ (3.54:25), which is 
arguably enabled and articulated through lay councillor engagement with 
senior management outside the formal deliberative structures. Writing one 
decade after publication of the Report, Bargh, Scott and Smith (1996) imply 
that the assertiveness and activity of the councils as agents for the 
successful strategic and financial performance of their universities had not 
sufficiently advanced, with power flowing principally to ‘senior management 
teams headed by vice-chancellors in their post-Jarratt role as chief 
executives’ (12).  
Aside from Jarratt, a number of commentators cite the ascendancy in the 
influence of the university governing body. King (2009) cites that:  
 
...governing boards have become more active, if not at the heart of the 
academic enterprise then in the paraphernalia of external relations 
and strategic direction that increased organizational corporatization 
makes inevitable for all such structures (65). 
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Arguably, the board is more active and, by assumption more externally 
visible, as a vehicle for competitive advantage in a context of global 
competition. However, this is not to be viewed as a wholly externally-facing 
activity to which staff is oblivious within the governed university. As early as 
1986, Clark’s describes trustees’ contribution in US institutions principally in 
financial terms:  
Administrators and professors expect trustees to help the institution, 
particularly in garnering and giving money; college presidents joke 
that the basic rule for trustees is “get, give or ‘git’ off” (117). 
This stance is echoed by a number of commentators pointing to the 
escalating external dimension of the university board in a context of global 
competition. However, these perspectives do not shed light on the reality or 
empirical elements of the governing body’s relationship with staff, as will be 
undertaken in this study,  thereby addressing Llewellyn’s recommendation 
that future investigators ‘look beyond the chair-head of institution nexus and 
consider other contributors to higher education governance, and governing’ 
(2009:61). 
    
1.8 University governing body size and composition: proxies for 
visibility and effectiveness?   
The university governing body is seldom the protagonist in HE policy. 
However, where the governing body is inscribed in policy11 from the Jarratt 
Report onwards, there is a focus on its size and shape, particularly in those 
policies influenced by, or espousing, market-oriented, neo-liberal principles. 
These include the 1997 National Committee of Enquiry into Higher 
Education, (the ‘Dearing Report’) and the Treasury-commissioned Lambert 
Review of Business-University Collaboration (December 2003) which make 
11 A caveat associated with policy analysis is the incoherence of policy texts, reflecting policy-making as process 
taking ‘place within arenas of struggle over meaning’ (Ball, 1997:266). National policy texts on HE are no exception, 
as multi-authored artefacts in which compromised positions or contradictory perspectives are inscribed, and the 
limitations this places on policy analysis as a reliable representation of specific perspectives or priorities. As Ball 
(1997) observes, a trajectory perspective on policy from its context of influence, through to policy production, 
practices and outcomes ‘attends to the ways in which policies, evolve, change and decay through time and space 
and their incoherence’ (266).  
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recommendations on the size and shape of the university governing body - 
the numbers, classes and categories of members - which could be regarded 
as facets of governing body visibility.  
In what ways may the size and shape of the university governing body be 
regarded as a node in a nexus of visibility and board effectiveness? In both 
the Dearing Report and the Lambert Review the size and profile of the board 
in particular is a barometer for measuring the effectiveness of university 
governance - through its ability to make responsive and enterprising 
business decisions. For example, Dearing recommends that the statutory 
membership limits of 24 members (plus the principal) set in the ‘new’ 
universities should apply to the pre-1992 councils, which Dearing and 
Lambert arguably caricature in some HEIs as unwieldy, collegial forums, 
incapable of reaching consensus on matters of institutional interest due to 
competing, irreconcilable academic and corporate interests. Lapworth (2004) 
critiques the Lambert Review for its misplaced ‘return to the familiar themes 
of size and effectiveness of the governing body’ (302) and misunderstanding 
‘of the organisational structure and culture of universities by assuming a top-
down approach is appropriate’ (ibid.), led by the governing body. Latitude for 
institutional self-management and regulation at the site of the governing 
body, and the limits of organisational autonomy remain unresolved tensions 
indelibly inscribed in the policy recommendations.  
Whilst not clearly articulated in either the Dearing Report or Lambert Review, 
the university governing body is positioned as a node in knowledge transfer 
and exchange promotion between universities and large-scale business and 
small-to-medium sized enterprises (SMEs), whether through the appointment 
of more commercially-minded governors to boards, or the board’s brokerage 
or facilitation of engagement opportunities. These opportunities highlight the 
pivotal positioning at the crossroads of institutional internal interests, the 
market, civic society and government priorities for HE, and the potential 
significance of governing body visibility in helping express the institutional 
tone for entrepreneurial engagement espoused by Lambert.  
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The Dearing and Lambert reports have been highly influential on 
recommendations on the size of the university governing body in the 
successive CUC HE governance codes.12 Therefore, similarities exist 
between English HEIs’ governing bodies, which generally comprise 18 to 25 
members, with a lay or external governor majority, nominated and/or elected 
academic and support staff and student governors, plus the vice-chancellor 
or principal. However, despite almost universal policy calls for the reduced 
size of governing bodies, the wider implications of this for governing body 
visibility amongst, and representation of, staff are insufficiently understood. 
For example, a larger governing body of 25 members as opposed to 12, 
would not in itself heighten the visibility of the board as a collective body 
amongst staff. However, the size and the distribution of its membership may 
increase the ‘bandwidth’ of the board in terms of the spread of expertise of its 
members.  Practical and constitutional considerations are also required 
around measures to reduce the size of the governing body. For example, 
reduced numbers of governors on a board, in turn limits the individuals 
populating the sub-committees, or engaging with senior management or 
wider staff groups in more informal settings, which may place pressures on 
those in post, and associated adverse impacts on board institutional profile 
and presence. The constitutional consequences of ‘streamlining university 
board membership includes the ratio of an independent or lay governor 
majority in the Anglo-Saxon governance systems to staff and student 
‘representatives’.  
The recent review of university and wānanga governing bodies in New 
Zealand proposes the passing of legislation to decrease the size of councils 
from 12 to 20 members. The reforms illustrate the tensions arising from this 
process, and the implications for the political visibility of the governing body 
amongst staff. The Ministry of Education rationale for the reform is the 
creation of more focussed and autonomous councils, freed from a 
12 For HEIs with polytechnic origins, the Education Reform Act (ERA) 1988 (granting independence from local 
authority control) and the Further and Higher Education Act (FHEA) 1992 (awarding university title and status to 
eligible institutions) placed in statute boards of between 12 to 14 members (plus the Vice-Chancellor) in which more 
than 50 percent ‘independent members’ should be ‘Persons appearing to the appointing authority to have 
experience of, and to have shown capacity in industrial, commercial or employment matters or the practice of any 
profession’ (ERA, 1988, s7.2 (a)). 
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requirement for ministerial appointed members, and with fit for purpose 
membership and accountability for leading their universities and challenging 
executive management in a globally competitive HE sector.  Criticism of the 
reforms include that a ‘one-size fits all approach proposed by government 
lacks the evidence to justify significant change’ (Lont, Greatbanks, O’ Kane, 
2014), and risk reducing stakeholder representation of staff and students, 
and conflating or confusing ‘council size and council capability’ (ibid.). The 
concerns register a tension between a perceived trade-off between 
government endeavours to improve governing body performance and ‘focus’ 
it through a more concentrated membership, risk disconnecting and 
disengaging the board from staff groups, and rendering it visible only on the 
basis of increased staff scrutiny of, and scepticism about its decision-making, 
rather than through a spirit of positive interest and engagement. The next 
section will explore several international examples of national HE 
governance reform, and touches on the implications of these for governing 
body visibility and effectiveness.  
1.9  Comparative examples of university governing body reform 
The positioning of the university governing body at the interstices of state 
‘control’ and ‘supervision’ (van Hught, 1989; Neave and van Hught,1991) has 
received limited focus in comparative studies of governance reform, in the 
context of board, university and sector effectiveness. To illustrate, state 
‘supervision’ of universities is predominantly achieved through the governing 
body being ‘seen’ by the state as the government’s eyes and ears through 
ministerial appointments to university boards. However, state supervision of 
HEIs is not conceived as a wholly positive phenomena, as ‘governments are 
ambiguous and show different faces at the same time when it comes to their 
steering approaches’ (Huisman, 2009:3), which may indeed lead to 
increased state intrusion in institutional affairs, rather than empowering 
governing bodies to self-govern. The focus on the macro-structural 
machineries of governance and university boards as nodes in a nexus of 
state steering and control models, neglects examination of the internal 
interaction and - through the lens of visibility - a ‘supervisory’ dynamic 
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between the governing body and staff constituencies, of seeing and being 
seen.  
However, examination of several national HE governance changes as 
enacted within HEIs pose questions for the visibility of the governing body 
and its contribution to institutional effectiveness as part of a reform agenda. 
The 1997 MUB13 Act in Dutch universities was intended to promote 
‘efficiency and effectiveness in university decision-making, in line with the 
overall governmental steering strategy that aimed to enhance institutional 
autonomy’ (de Boer, 2009:222). Under these reforms, the former university 
councils were abolished and their co-determination of fundamental university 
matters with the five-strong executive board (later three) was removed to 
streamline systems and eliminate concerns about a lack of clarity, and power 
struggles between, the two bodies. However, the legislation did not signal 
erasure of the council as governing body but instead established a five-
member, ministerial appointed supervisory board,14 to oversee a new central 
executive board.15 The raad van toezicht was therefore established as the 
top-tier governing body beneath which is the College van Bestuur and, below 
that, the deans.  
 
However, the positive impact of the legislative changes on constructive 
relations with staff has been questioned. This includes the perceived 
diminution in the authority and influence of the professoriate and faculty 
councils, through the abolition of disciplinary research groups which had held 
significant sway over research-centred decision-making. Therefore, the 
extent to which the raad - at the pinnacle of institutional visibility and 
authority - provides increased accountability to government and improved 
institutional performance through empowerment of executive leadership is 
unclear. The reforms illustrate the decline of a democratic, shared and 
collegial approach to governance, characteristic of Continental European 
models, and a closer alignment to, or convergence with, Anglo-Saxon 
13 Modernisering Universitaire Bestuurorganisatie. (Modernisation of University Administrative Organisation). 
14 raad van toezicht. (Supervisory Board). 
15 College van Bestuur (Executive Board). 
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university governance based on corporate and managerial models. The 
positioning of the board and its institutional relations with staff helps illustrate 
this shift.  
 
The second example of governance reform in Japan illustrates the complex 
relays between relinquishment of state control of universities and the 
increased autonomy granted to the national university corporations in 2004, 
and the implications for the institutional positioning and visibility of 
universities’ governance bodies. The 2004 removal of universities from direct 
government control granted autonomy to the universities in the management 
and allocation of funding and employment of staff. However, this has not 
reversed an outward-looking focus for the university governing bodies 
towards the state, to instead turn inwards to institutional needs and the 
potential this may engender for the increased visibility and connectivity of the 
boards to staff groups. Enactment of the legislation removed a singular focal 
point of a top-tier governing body, and replaced this model with three 
deliberative bodies of equal standing: an administrative council most closely 
akin to an Anglo-Saxon university governing body in comprising not less than 
fifty percent external members and responsible for financial and resource 
management; a board of directors comprising the president, executive and at 
least one external member, and an education and research council 
(analogous to an academic board). The rationale for introduction of this 
‘horizontal’ as opposed to ‘hierarchical’ model was the replacement of a 
state-centred model with stakeholder-centred one, to ‘ensure accountability 
and responsiveness to society’ (Oba, 2006:4). However, the responsive of 
the model to the staff constituencies of the university, and the three bodies’ 
visibility to, connection with staff constituencies has been questioned in a 
Nikkei News survey. In turn, feedback on the profile and performance of the 
administrative council demonstrates reservations amongst staff (and the 
council’s external appointees) about its accountability role, including council’s 
limited influence in monitoring the performance of the president, and its 
restricted function in perceived rubber-stamping of the ‘real’ decisions taken 
by the board of directors.  
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 1.10 Corporate board visibility and performance 
The penultimate section of Chapter One outlines the implications of the 
visibility of corporate boards, to shareholders, employees and wider 
stakeholders for company performance. The omnipotence and implied 
omnipresence of corporate boards is seldom questioned, with bodies 
presented as operating at ‘the helm of the company, making important 
decisions’ (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2013:211) as a ‘permanent 
authority’ (Carver, 2002:50) pivotal to the successful performance of owner-
accountable organisations. This is echoed in the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2014) requirement that the role of the listed company board of 
directors is broad and far-reaching, ‘setting the company’s strategic aims, 
providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management 
of the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship’ (op. cit.).  
Shareholder-centred models of company governance overlook the interface 
between the company board and its employees, including whether a unitary 
board with a balance of executive directors (EDs) and NEDs heighten its 
visibility to company employees. For example, it has been argued that the 
presence of executive directors enables the board to contribute to the 
decision-making process and to evaluate the outcomes of them more 
effectively that NEDs (Maassen 1999; Williamson 1985, Davis 1991, Muth 
and Donaldson 1998). However, the implications of this for the collective 
presence of the company board and respective visibility of NEDs and EDs as 
a factor impacting on performance, remains a question overlooked in the 
empirical research.  
The annual general meeting is a key mechanism through which shareholders 
scrutinise the performance and behaviour of the board. Whether the notion of 
a ‘shareholder spring’ - through increased resistance by institutional and 
collective shareholders voting against resolutions on executive remuneration 
and compensation - is myth or reality, the increased visibility and 
accompanying scrutiny of for-profit companies is a factor. Aguilera (2005) 
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notes, ‘We need to better understand the role of boards of directors in 
different institutional settings before we can engage in the debate of how to 
increase board accountability’ (40). On this basis, understanding the way in 
which the board and its directors are visible within and across the shifting 
boundaries in institutions16 and its influence on, or how it is influenced by, 
accountability, is an area ripe for examination. 
1.11 Thesis structure 
An overview of the thesis structure at the end of Chapter One, means that 
this summary commences with Chapter Two, which surveys the key 
corporate governance theories and the extent to which they address or 
neglect board visibility as a variable in board effectiveness. This is followed 
by a review of the literature on HE corporate governance and the 
implications of it for board institutional visibility and effectiveness, and the 
(re)presentation of the university governing body in landmark HE policy and 
its contribution to the success of the university and its role in relation to wider 
society and the economy. The chapter concludes with case-studies of HEI 
governance breakdowns and board role clarity, visibility and the quality of 
relationships between key actors in the governance system in mitigating the 
likelihood of governance failure. Chapter Three examines the 
epistemological foundations for the research, including the contingent 
constructionist reading of university governance adopted through a focus on 
the collective and individual meaning-making capacity of governors as actors 
in the ‘doing’ of governance. The chapter also examines governing body 
institutional visibility and effectiveness as constructed processes and 
phenomena.  
Chapter Four sets out the PRQ and SQs and the assumptions underpinning 
these, and describes the rationale and structure of the qualitative mixed 
methods research design and sampling strategy. This includes aligning the 
discourse analysis (DA) of online governing body role-descriptors and semi-
16 NHS Boards are allocated increased accountability, in which they are required to manifest and demonstrate their 
responsibilities, in which ‘Effective boards ensure their organisation has a continually evolving and clearly 
articulated leadership strategy to develop and sustain a culture of high quality care’ (Kings Fund, 2014:7). In a 
context following the Francis Report (2013), NHS boards extend beyond hospital and trust resource allocation, as 
the ‘ultimate responsibility for the quality of care provided by an organisation’ (7).  
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structured interviewing to the study’s contingent constructionist approach. 
Ethical considerations conclude the chapter. Chapter Five presents the 
findings of the two research phases, evaluating the four discourse strands 
and fragments identified from DA of university webpage governing body role-
descriptors, and the constitutional, organisational and cultural first cycle 
themes identified in the coding of the 12 semi-structured interview 
transcripts. Chapter Six integrates the findings in the previous chapter and 
addresses their response to the PRQ and SQs, with the implications for my 
professional practice and development. This chapter also includes 
recommendations for wider application in other HEI settings and in HE sector 
body guidance. The thesis concludes with the limitations of the study, 
identifies areas for further research and the implications of the research for 
my own insider-outsider, practitioner-researcher status. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1 Corporate governance theories  
Key theories of corporate governance provide a lens through which to 
examine the function and contribution of the company. A number of theories 
are surveyed,17 acknowledging that none of these make explicit reference to 
the visibility of the company board, whether to shareholders or employees, 
the second stakeholder category of which is relevant to this study. However, 
examination of the theories has informed the identification and refinement of 
the theoretical approach to my research.  
Agency Theory 
Given the ‘dominant grip’ (McNulty et al., 2005) of agency theory on 
governance research, it is appropriate to outline its resonances for company 
board visibility and performance. The key premise of agency theory is the 
separation of ‘ownership’ and ‘control’ in the modern corporation (Berle and 
Means, 1932), through which the self(ish) interests of the agent 
(management) potentially threaten the financial return to the ‘principal’ 
(owners and shareholders) who should be subject to close monitoring and 
constraining. Agency theory lends itself to modes of visibility through the 
scrutiny of the managerial behaviour of ‘agents’ by ‘principals’. However, 
oversight by the board of directors is more complex and diffuse than 
conceived by agency theory, which attends solely to the forensic ‘gaze’ of the 
board in ‘measuring or observing the behaviour of the agent’ (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1967:6). As a result, the theory neglects scrutiny and oversight of 
the board by those in and around the company. The ascendancy and 
exercising of shareholder rights is now more prominent in many major 
companies, through the publicly-visible forum of the annual general meeting, 
including examples of high-profile shareholder voting against remuneration 
policies and packages. As Clarke and Branson (2012) note: 
17 Resource-dependency theory and managerial hegemony theories are not surveyed in this study. 
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Boards of directors acting solely as monitors for shareholders as 
envisaged by agency theory is a one-dimensional view of the role and 
responsibilities of directors (4). 
Applying agency theory to the university setting prompts the question of 
which bodies and constituencies constitute the ‘agent’ in the diffuse and 
distributed management and governance system of the university, 
characterised by a dynamic between devolved academic autonomy and 
central authority. In turn, in the context of an HEI, which groups and bodies 
are defined as the ‘principal’, and the nature of their ‘shareholding’ and stake 
in the university is neither clear, nor confined to a single constituency. As 
Massy (2010) notes, HE sector governance is a series of ‘didactic 
interchanges between principals and agents’ (222), and conceives the 
principal operating on several levels, including through government 
apparatus and university management and administrations, constraining the 
behaviours of agent faculties and departments around actions which do not 
further the collective, corporate interests of the university. However, an 
alternative reading would be to reverse this relationship, with academic staff 
and students as the principal, whose interest in the university sits at the core 
of its mission and values, scrutinising the behaviours and decision-making of 
management as ‘agents’. Irrespective of the model adopted, the multiple 
visibilities between different interest groups in the university setting, exposes 
the limits of agency theory as a lens for understanding board behaviour and 
performance. 
Stewardship theory 
Stewardship theory was developed in reaction to agency theory, and posits 
an optimistic view of company ownership, with ‘manager as “steward” rather 
than the entirely self-interested rational economic man of agency theory’ 
(Muth and Donaldson, 1998:6), and a trustworthy custodian of resources 
entrusted to them by shareholders (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 
1991, 1994). Arguably the stewardship model presents the board as less 
active than the protagonist role played by the principal in agency theory, and 
is therefore less visible as an outcome, in being ‘advisory’ to, rather than 
45 
 
‘account-holding’ of, the chief executive (Albrecht et al., 2004). However, the 
concept of stewardship sits more comfortably with the trustee dimensions of 
the university board’s responsibilities, as custodians or stewards of the 
mission, affairs and assets of the university.  
 
One aspect of stewardship theory which has implications for board visibility 
beyond the collective presence of the board is analysis of Executive Director 
(ED) and NED network-forming outside the ‘boardroom’, citing evidence of 
extensive and extended networks which ‘enhance performance regardless of 
whether the board is independent or managerial’ (Muth and Donaldson, 
1998:22). The external-facing aspect of ED and NED networking prioritises 
company growth over other forms of performance. In turn, this strand of 
stewardship theory omits specific reference to the role of visibility on which 
effective networking by necessity is arguably predicated. However, 
conceptualising a broader role for the board and its directors outside the 
boardroom, resonates with the alternative modes of university governor 
modes of visibility through staff engagement, as will be examined in this 
study. 
 
Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory implies both a longer and wider line of sight for board and 
directors’ responsibilities and obligations, and a broader set of audiences 
than shareholders. The theory shifts the focus from shareholder primacy to 
the role of the company’s investment in a wider set of stakeholders, and the 
‘investments made by non-shareholder groups, such as workers’ (Heath, 
2009:506) and the social and ethical returns for the company and society. In 
the university context, stakeholders encompass staff, students and their 
sponsors, funding councils, sector bodies and other partners and funders of 
teaching, research and enterprise, through to suppliers and consumers of 
services. One criticism of stakeholder theory is its neglect of how ‘trade-offs 
against the interests of each of these stakeholders groups might be made’ 
(Mallin, 2008:18). This concept of competing stakeholder interests also 
46 
 
reflects the complex decision-making terrain navigated and negotiated by the 
board and senior management in university governance. Examination of 
institutional visibility may shed light on the practices through which the trade-
offs are made by the university governing body in its deliberation and 
decision-making in seeking to balance multiple perspectives and priorities.  
 
Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy theory explores the company’s alignment to societal values 
(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975) for capital, labour and customer benefits (Pfeffer 
and Salancick, 1978). Legitimation is arguably dependent on the board’s 
capacity, as the ultimate leadership body, to effectively communicate what it 
and the company does, and for whose benefit. This presupposes board 
visibility within the external and internal environment, through the 
performance of ‘socially desirable’ actions in return for stakeholder approval 
of the company’s mission, objectives and actions. Board disclosure of its 
environmental and corporate social responsibility (CSR) obligations and 
performance have been analysed through a legitimacy theory lens. Arguably, 
socially and ethically desirable acts of disclosure through company annual 
reports are means by which the board renders these activities publicly 
visible, as tools and techniques for ‘managing public impressions’ (Neu et al, 
1998) and building confidence in the company and the effectiveness of its 
performance. Legitimacy theory informs an understanding of the ‘impression 
management’ activities of HEIs to a range of stakeholders in an environment 
of intensified competition, particularly around the recruitment and retention of 
students and research-active staff. The theory also lends itself to 
understanding the contribution made by the institutional visibility of the 
university governing body as a vehicle for influencing positive impressions of, 
and confidence in, the mission and direction of the university by diverse 
internal ‘publics’ (Lindblom, 1994) of the university.  
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2.2 Corporate board effectiveness 
The key themes in corporate board effectiveness merit summary prior to an 
in-depth examination of the HE critical literature on governing body 
effectiveness. Tricker (2009) argues that a focus on personal and collective 
board behaviour and basic values is required to move the frontiers of 
governance research forward.18 Arguably, the ethical basis for this research 
imperative is as important as its empirical foundation in a context of 
heightened board accountability and corporate responsibility. The ‘value-
creating’ board (Huse, 2005, 2007) in reaching beyond shareholder return 
and regulatory compliance is an emerging theme in the corporate board 
effectiveness literature. Within this, a focus on the human values and 
dimensions of the board as a means of understanding its performance is 
becoming more established in the corporate governance research, to redress 
an imbalance brought about from a previous focus on board structural 
variables.  
Pettigrew and McNulty’s (1995) study of the corporate board demonstrate 
that its ‘sources of power are not simply structural and formal bases for 
authority but are about directorial behaviour, dynamics and influence in and 
around the ‘boardroom’’ (847). In turn, Sonnenfeld (2004) observes that 
human values are the ‘missing ingredient’ in understanding board 
effectiveness, neglected by examination of the ‘usual suspects’ (Finklestein 
and Mooney: 2003) of board size, insider and outsider member balance and 
CEO and Chair roles. More recently, McNulty (2013) argues that behavioural 
factors for EDs and NEDs beyond the constraints of legal and governance 
codes dictating board structure and composition, are central to 
understanding board influence over company success. However, the 
literature fails to attend to the visibility of the board, despite the potential 
influence of the phenomenon on critical discussions of board identity, 
collectiveness and communication with stakeholders (including employees) 
as contributors to board success, beyond maximising company profit.  
18 An ethical imperative to examine behaviours and basic values in corporate governance will not be elaborated on, 
but a call for this reflects the primacy of human agents in the ‘doing’ of governance. The UK Corporate Governance 
Code for listed companies, emphasises the importance of what boards do in practice, and by who, and ‘the 
importance of the general principles which should guide board behaviours’ (2010, Preface: 5). 
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The majority of corporate governance studies reinforce the classical 
governance norm of shared intention and collective behaviour as the sole 
route to effective governance (Carver, 2002), with the board ‘only being 
effective if it is a collective decision-making body’ (Van den Berghe and 
Levrau, op.cit.). The latter authors conceive the corporate board as a 
‘collegial body, striving to reach decisions in a consensus style’ (ibid.). 
However, an irony exists that the university governing body is arguably less 
‘collegial’ in composition than its corporate counterpart as conceived by Van 
den Berghe and Levrau, as a result of an increasing trend in the HE sector to 
reduce the size of governing bodies, which generally leads to a reduction in 
the number of nominated or elected staff and student governors. To 
summarise this section, Pye et al (2011) in three decades’ worth of 
qualitative research into directorial behaviour in UK listed companies, point to 
a common finding across the studies that ‘it is not so much what is said or 
done but, how it is said or done, and what is given attention and how, which 
are critical to performance’ (1). The implications of these findings are that the 
tone and manner of board delivery is as significant as the content of 
performance, and indicates the potential of board visibility as a variable in 
framing and presenting this.  
2.3 Critical and practitioner literature on HE governance 
effectiveness 
Cornforth (2004) observes that ‘the governance of non-profit 
organisations…is relatively under theorised in comparison with the 
governance of business corporations’ (1). Compared with a wealth of studies 
on corporate board effectiveness, in common with third sector theorising, 
there are relatively few theoretical models and studies of university 
governance effectiveness. The limited adoption of political and theoretical 
frameworks for understanding HE governance is echoed by Huisman (2009) 
who cites the rarity of studies rooted in public administration, sociology and 
political science. However, an emerging body of literature examines the 
macro systems of HE governance, in which political and sociological 
frameworks are adopted to understand the dynamics and impact of 
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governance reform through national HE steering systems at the crossroads 
of the state, the market, the HE sector and institutions. For example, Orr and 
Jaeger (2009) identify two frameworks for understanding the effectiveness of 
German HE governance reform at the ‘system’ level through a focus on 
‘structure’ combined with an ‘actor-centred’ approach. However, the actor-
centred approach conceives the national policy-making arena as the ‘centre’ 
(Peters, 2001) of focus, with policy-makers as faceless, abstract personae 
implementing governance reform. In contrast, my research places 
institutional governing body actors in the university setting at the fore, in the 
‘doing’ and practice of governance, as an antidote to macro-structural  
approaches to HE governance.  
My thesis responds to the deficit of studies exploring human dynamics and 
behavioural factors in university governance, through a focus on HEIs’ 
governing bodies and the actors populating these. As Kezar and Eckel 
(2004) observe: 
…previous scholarship focused almost exclusively on structural 
theories and to a lesser extent on political theories and provided 
limited explanation of, or few ideas for, improving governance (373). 
A limited number of studies have examined human dynamics in university 
governance through a political lens. These include an influential ethnography 
of power and conflict at New York University (Baldridge, 1971), and 
Birnbaum’s 1980s and 1990s work on managerial philosophies and practices 
and their influence on academic governance systems in US universities. 
More recently, a second strand of critical literature on governance in HE has 
attended to the micro practices of power relations in academia in which 
management and bureaucratic conceptions of the university are perceived to 
control and constrain academic activities. In the literature, academic boards 
and senates and the quality assurance and enhancement systems they 
govern are the principal spaces through which power is exerted. In turn, 
academic staff are the subjects upon whom the authority of managers and 
monitoring regimes are imposed. The majority of studies are therefore 
characterised by a critique of managerialist models for HE, including the 
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perpetuation of gender difference (Morley, 2003) or racial inequalities 
(Pilkington, 2011). However, a review of the HE critical literature indicates 
that the governing body is a neglected site of enquiry, and board visibility to 
external constituencies or internal university stakeholders remains 
unexamined. My thesis asserts that attending to collective and individual 
governor actors’ visibility amongst staff has the potential to vivify and 
exemplify the role of governors in the ‘doing’ of governance.  
The present research contributes to an emerging, but limited literature on the 
university governing body as a research focus. The majority of studies 
survey national HE governing body policy reform and its impact on board 
composition and ‘conformance’ to regulatory codes and protocols. An 
example is Baird’s study of the impact of corporate models of accountability 
or the market on Australian HEIs’ councils (1997, 2012).  As an outcome, the 
‘performance’ role played by the university governing body in steering 
strategy and sustainability is a neglected area of focus. Whilst it has been 
argued that a fully effective governing body necessitates a focus on the 
political and value-based dimensions of governance (Chait et al, 1996), the 
symbolic, collective or actor-oriented contribution of board visibility as a 
series of micro practices in institutional governance, with potential 
implications for board performance, has been overlooked.  
This is arguably a symptom of what Kezar (2006) cites as conceptualisations 
of board effectiveness centred on systems and structures, which prioritise 
the ‘careful execution of certain processes according to a set of principles’ 
and achieving specific outcomes (971) as measures of ‘efficiency’. 
‘Effectiveness’ as a more authentic and embedded activity does not feature 
in such models, and the expressions of this will be examined in this study 
through the vehicle of institutional visibility. The critical literature has afforded 
increased attention to the assemblage and constitution of university 
governing bodies as key factors in their effectiveness, which may appear 
promising in reflecting on the symbolism, collective recognition and 
understanding of the board within the institution. As early as 1996, Bargh, 
Scott and Smith argued of university boards that ‘how these bodies are 
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assembled and maintained in terms of selection and appointment of 
governors is a critical factor in their legitimation and operation’ (71). Critical 
attention has focussed on the ‘faceless’ structural components and abstract 
systems around, and information flows to and from the board, at the expense 
of examining  the cultural and organisational contribution of the board and its 
members to university success in a wider sense, including interaction with 
senior management, academic board and senate, and wider staff groups. An 
observation of the key bodies constituting the university governance system, 
is that ‘There is also virtually no scholarship on how these groups interact’ 
(Kezar and Eckel, 2004:373). An examination of the institutional visibility of 
the governing body, as an enabler or outcome of the interaction of these key 
bodies and actors in and across the governance system, will help address 
this critical deficit.  
One relevant example from the literature review is the work of Rytmeister 
(2009), which foregrounds the micro practices of council members’ governor 
role-construction around university strategy-building in Australian HEIs. 
Aligning to the constructionist stance of my study, Rytmeister examines 
university councils as a ‘social group’ (149) inhabiting different sites and 
spaces in and around the university, from council meetings, through to less 
formal settings including joint management and board away days or retreats.  
The role of the institutional visibility of the governing body and its actors is 
implicit, but unexamined in Rytmeister’s study, as a variable in the role-
construction of governors and the collective capacity of the board to 
contribute to strategic development. 
This chapter concludes with an overview of the practitioner literature - for use 
by secretaries, chairs and governors - which provides a framework for 
understanding university governing body effectiveness. Schofield’s 2009 
LFHE study on university governing body effectiveness has been relatively 
influential in the UK HE sector: many governing bodies have adopted or 
adapted the ‘enablers’ and ‘outcomes’ of effectiveness as reference points at 
milestones in governance reviews, including annual and periodic evaluation 
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exercises.19  The role of the institutional visibility of the governing body as an 
‘enabler’ and ‘outcome’ of effectiveness is complex and recursive, as visibility 
may be a precursor or contributor to effectiveness (enabler), and/or a 
‘product’ (outcome) of it. The six enablers identified by Schofield are: 1) 
Effective leadership and governing body dynamics; 2) Effective governance 
structures and processes; 3) Effective governing body membership; 4) 
Commitment to vision, organisational culture and values; 5) Effective 
performance monitoring and measurement and 6) Effective information and 
communication.  
 
Governing body institutional visibility as an element within each of the 
enablers is not addressed explicitly in Schofield’s study, although visibility as 
a variable contributing to the expression and enactment of several of the 
enablers merits discussion. To illustrate, ‘effective governing body 
membership’ is unlikely to be realised if the governing body confines the 
compass of its information to the business items formally reported to it at 
board meetings. An effective governing body member therefore is likely to be 
both external-facing, drawing on the experiences and expertise from outside 
the university, and inward-facing, as relevant to this study and institutional 
visibility by connecting with staff constituencies as part of a process of wider 
institutional engagement. In turn, the fourth enabler of ‘commitment to vision, 
organisational culture and values’ in terms of developing an nuanced 
understanding of what the vision, culture and values are, its commitment to 
this is arguably demonstrated through the institutional visibility of the board’s 
actions and actors. This enabler aligns to the ‘contextual’ pillar of 
‘competence’ Chait et al (1996)20 identify in relation to US college trustee 
boards. The contextual pillar is arguably contributed to through the 
institutional visibility of university board trustees on a collective and individual 
basis, affording them broader insights into institutional activities which may 
19 The HE Code of Governance (2014) requires that ‘reviews must be conducted at least every four years with, as a 
minimum, an annual summary of progress towards achieving outstanding actions arising from the last effectiveness 
reviews (25). 
20 The six pillars are: ‘contextual’ (alignment to the institution’s cultures and norms); ‘educational’ (development of 
trustees knowledgeable about their roles and responsibilities); ‘interpersonal’ (dynamics and cohesion); ‘analytical’ 
(interrogation of information and data); ‘political’ (relationships with key stakeholders) and ‘strategic’ (envisaging 
and shaping strategy). 
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help inform more balanced decisions which take account of the college’s 
values and norms.  
 
The extent to which the governing body is institutionally apparent to staff may 
also support the enabler of ‘effective information and communication’, with 
visibility as one vehicle through which board behaviours, discussions and 
decisions are manifested and disseminated within the university. These 
include setting and modelling the institutional tone that others, including that 
which senior management teams are expected to model, or communicating 
key decisions made by the board to university staff. One area for 
examination in the study is to understand which protocols, practices and 
arrangements are considered more effective than others in engendering staff 
engagement with the governing body and vice-versa. This includes the 
significance of interpersonal and more informal means of governing body 
communication with a spectrum of staff stakeholders, in contrast to more 
formal reporting channels such as publication of governing body agendas 
and minutes.  
2.4 Ineffective university boards and governance breakdowns 
The final section of Chapter Two summarises the views of commentators 
who have questioned the capacity of university governing bodies to be 
effective, and assesses board visibility as an influencing factor. Clark’s 
conception of the board as ‘the long-run caretakers’ (1986:117) implies that 
trustees are reactive and passive in their stewardship of institutional 
interests. In turn, Chait et al (1996) depict US university board trustees in the 
following way: 
As part-time amateurs largely unfamiliar with the organisational 
culture, trustees are not especially well equipped to oversee the work 
of full time professionals and to be the ultimate arbiters of a prudent 
course of action (4). 
‘High-performing’ and ‘high-profile’ are not automatically synonymous 
attributes of the university governing body. However, the shortcomings in the 
quotation above are unlikely to be addressed by a board which had a low 
institutional profile amongst staff.  Indicators of visibility are implied in King’s 
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(2009) conception of  university boards as predominantly symbolic entities 
with a public relations purpose, as ‘decorative gatherings of the great and 
worthy whose very presence added to the legitimacy and glow of the 
institution’ (65). Whilst the presence of the governing body per se is 
presented as inherently value-adding in this description, its effectiveness in 
ensuring holding senior management to account, or its contribution to 
university strategy development and review, is overlooked.  
Shattock (2013) argues that university governing body influence has 
diminished and, through the metaphor of ‘distance’ as a dimension of 
visibility, regards boards as having limited influence on strategic decision-
making in the new regulatory and funding environment:  
Governing bodies seem simply to be wearing the emperor’s clothes; in 
the post-2010 world of university strategy and executive action are 
intrinsically linked and the governing body is just too far away from 
that action and too lacking in expert knowledge to contribute 
effectively to the policy decisions that have to be taken (223). 
This depiction of distant and dilettante boards and governors is contrary to 
my professional experience of supporting two HEIs’ governing bodies 
throughout the period of policy change charted by Shattock. Engagement 
with executive management on the reputational, quality, public benefit and 
income drivers for determining tuition fee levels and student number controls 
and recruitment more generally, has been a feature of respective council and 
board contributions to discussions and decisions in the two HEIs in which I 
have supported corporate governance activities. This includes robust and 
constructive debate with senior management, extending beyond the board’s 
constitutional remit in approving tuition fee levels or access agreements.21 
HE governance breakdowns - human commission and omission 
Demonstrating the dominance of structural theories, Greenhalgh (2015) in 
assessing the 2004-2011 governance breakdown at the London School of 
Economics (LSE) argues that Lord Woolf’s Report ‘presents his 
21 Board deliberation and decision-making on tuition fee pricing in the two HEIs I have in worked has afforded me 
insights into the tensions and trade-offs including in drafting the institutions’ Office for Fair Access (OFFA) ‘Access 
Agreement’, and wider ‘public benefit’ and commercial factors. This includes fee income versus expenditure on 
student support packages, and price points as a perceived proxy for institutional reputation and quality. 
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recommendations almost entirely as a set of measures for tightening and 
clarifying the structures and procedures of governance’ (207) such as the 
requirement for an embedded School Ethics Code. The findings of the 
Report therefore disregards Shattock’s (2006) observation that governance 
breakdowns are attributable to ‘acts of omission or commission’ (81) by 
individuals, more often than the consequences of constitutional or procedural 
breaches. Given the general absence of board behaviour and institutional 
culture as factors omitted from the official audit trails of governance failure, it 
is unsurprising that collective governor or actor visibility remains 
unexamined.   
However, a limited number of examples exist where a consideration of 
deficits in institutional visibility of the board as a factor fuelling governance 
failure are enlightening. The contra-transparency metaphors of board 
obscurity and distance from the reality of the institution are associated by 
Brown (2001) with governance failure at the former Swansea Institute in the 
late 1990s. Brown cites a ‘litany of issues arising from…secrecy’ (43) 
amongst senior management, including withholding information from a board 
operating predominantly ‘behind the scenes’ (45). Two recent cases of HEIs’ 
governance failure illustrate how shortcomings in governing body oversight 
may be bound up with the extent to which it is institutionally visible, and the 
impact of this on its capacity to detect and challenge non-compliance, 
maladministration negligence and, in the first example, unethical and criminal 
acts. The Freeh Report (July 2012) into alleged incidences of child sexual 
abuse perpetrated between 1998 and 2001 at Pennsylvania State University, 
concluded that the board of trustees ‘did not perform its oversight duties’ 
(2012:15) and failed to properly investigate both allegations and subsequent 
criminal charges brought against a staff member.  
The cultural and behavioural flaws of the board cited in the Report include 
over-confidence that the President was managing the allegations 
appropriately, leading to insufficient scrutiny of the seriousness of the 
allegations, or assessment of the criminal, ethical and reputational 
ramifications for the University. The trustees were seen to be over-proximate 
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rather than distant from management, thereby complicit with and complacent 
about ‘‘The Penn State Way’ as an approach to decision-making, and a 
resistance to seeking outside perspectives’ (129). The board’s close cultural 
alignment to the University’s mission and values impaired its independence 
and assertiveness in challenging management. Paradoxically the heightened 
integration of the Board rendered it less visible and diluted its ability to be 
accountable, whereby ‘The Board allowed itself to be marginalized by not 
demanding thorough and forthright reports on the affairs of the University’ 
(102),22 and reduced its ability and appetite to challenge the President and 
other senior officers. 
The London Metropolitan University (LMU) case in 2008 involved non-
compliance with HEFCE and HESA data return requirements and led to the 
breakdown and mass resignation of the board, audit committee, the 
departure of the vice-chancellor, and a multi-million pound funding claw back 
by HEFCE.23 Subsequent to the HEFCE investigation led by KPMG in June 
2009, Sir David Melville’s enquiry, which was commissioned by LMU’s board, 
concluded that a dominant senior management team overlooked reported 
discrepancies in student non-completion and dropout data and the funding 
risks associated with this. This extended to obfuscation of information by 
senior management to the audit committee and the board through one ‘single 
bullet point in a large presentation on a wide range of funding matters, 
delivered without particular emphasis and not featuring as part of the 
subsequent discussion’ (7).  
This prompts the question of whether a more assertive approach taken by a 
more proactive governing body would have assisted it in eliciting information 
and data independent of senior management. Firstly, it is unlikely, given the 
perceived culture of intimidation at LMU, whether key operational staff more 
familiar with the existence of the audit committee and board would have felt 
confident to bypass management and ‘whistleblow’ through escalation of 
22 Chait (2012) observed that ‘Every board has to strike a balance between two undesirable extremes: one is undue 
deference and the other is undue interference’ (quoted in Kiley, 2012), with the former more characteristic of the 
board in the Penn State case. 
23 The incident has been cited as analogous to the LIBOR manipulation scandal in the private sector (Shattock, 
2013:221) given the nature if not scale of the financial penalty imposed by HEFCE on LMU through its funding 
clawback.  
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concerns to the board. For example, the Melville Report points to the alleged 
blocking by senior management of concerns raised about LMU’s data 
compliance by less senior staff which they endeavoured to escalate to the 
audit committee.  Both the audit committee and the board are described in 
the Report as overly distant from those who managed the assurance 
activities of the University, to request information and data and understand 
the implications of non-compliance with the HEFCE completion rule.  The 
board’s institutional visibility and presence is not presented as a panacea or 
guarantor of governor or executive management avoidance of 
misjudgements. However, there is a role to be played by governance visibility 
in enabling governor engagement with wider groups of staff, which potentially 
strengthens the board’s capacity to ask the right questions, of the right 
people, at the appropriate time for accountability or performance purposes. 
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Chapter Three:  Theoretical Approach  
 
3.1 Social Constructionism 
 
Corporate governance has been described as a ‘subject in search of its 
paradigm’ (Tricker, 2009:233), devoid of a ‘single widely accepted theoretical 
base’ (ibid.) and lacking empirical, methodological or theoretical coherence 
(Pettigrew, 1992). Despite these observations, a number of commentators 
identify an ‘interpretive turn’ in governance research in the last two to three 
decades (Fawcett, 2013, Wagenaar, 2011). The shift in research focus 
arguably seeks to redress the empirical research gaps identified by Kezar 
and Eckel (2004), who argue that the study of human relations in HE 
governance research is poorly understood, as are cultural theories 
examining ‘how symbolism, values and beliefs affect institutional operations 
and focus’ (374).  
 
A social constructionist approach is adopted as the theoretical lens through 
which to view university governing body institutional visibility and 
effectiveness. Constructionism conceives the individual meaning-making 
actor within collective and shared frameworks of understanding. This study 
argues that university governance apparatus and the transactions of 
decision-making by the board, form part of this framework of understanding 
within which governance actors operate. Constructivism contrasts with the 
solipsistic stance of constructivism (Crotty, 1998:58) whereby reality solely 
originates from, and is generated by, individual subjects (Berger and 
Luckman, 1967., Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Social constructionism ‘resists a 
simple portrait but is better understood as a mosaic of research efforts’ 
(Holstein and Gubrium, 2011) or a ‘broad church’ (Lock and Strong, 2010:6), 
held together by ‘expansive tenets’ (ibid.). The authors identify five key 
themes of social constructionism: 1) an emphasis on meaning and 
understanding; 2) its situation in social interaction; 3) socio-cultural 
processes specific to time and place; 4) an anti-essentialist drive and 5) a 
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critical approach to power structures and operations.24 Danziger (1997) 
identifies two strands of social constructionism. The first is a ‘dark’ 
continental mode influenced by Foucauldian and successive post-structural 
thinking focussing on inequalities of power. The second is a ‘lighter’ Anglo-
American strand rooted in pragmatic concerns around the operation of 
contemporary social structures. This strand is relevant to the professionally-
oriented nature of this research which seeks to understand visibility as a 
phenomenon of governing body effectiveness, and make recommendations 
to enhance board performance.   
 
The role of governing body institutional visibility as a vehicle for, and part of a 
process of, the ‘construction’ and communication of the meaning, values and 
beliefs of the board and the governed university, will be examined in this 
study through adoption of a ‘contingent’ or ‘mild’ constructionist approach.25  
As Bevir and Krupicka (2011) observe: 
 
Governance is a cultural practice – or better, cultural practices. It is a 
practice because it is a contingent activity (452). 
 
The contingent components of constructionism adopted in this study 
therefore merit explanation, as does the relationship between ‘realism’ and 
‘relativism’ which inform this. As Burr (1998) observes: 
The extreme relativistic views that were often espoused under the 
banner of social constructionism seemed to lead down a road to social 
and emotional paralysis (14). 
The contingent aspect of constructionism tempers a risk of social and 
emotional paralysis, and resists relativism’s abandonment of any concept of 
reality and its ‘bewildering array of alternate (and, it could be argued, equally 
valid) realities in themselves’ (ibid.). Key thinkers in the field of contingent 
constructionist schools of thought include Searle (1995), who argues that the 
capacity of actors to shape ‘social reality’ is predicated by ‘institutional 
24 Burr (1995) identifies four themes uniting different social constructionist schools of thought: 1) A critical stance 
towards taken-for-granted knowledge; 2) Historical and cultural specificity; 3) Knowledge is sustained by social 
processes and 4) Knowledge and social action go together. 
25 This contrasts with a ‘strict’ or ‘radical’ constructionism which conceives the construction of social meaning as a 
constant and all-embracing process. (Sismondo, 1993). 
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facts’.26  Searle argues that the constitutive rules by which humans are able 
to agree that ‘X counts as Y or X counts as Y in the context of C’ (1995:28) 
constitute institutional facts and create ‘collective intentionality’.27 In the 
university setting, such ‘facts’ include the decision-making structures 
embodied in, and operating around, the governing body. Contingent 
constructionism also includes a prevailing ‘system of intelligibility’ (Crotty, 
1998:54), or mutual intelligibility which is central to actors’ ability to act 
collectively (Garfinkel, 1967) and through which they create social order. Part 
of this ‘order’ is the assembly of ‘status functions’ (Searle, 1995:40) as 
boundary markers imbued with shared social meaning, which include the 
attribution of a symbolic status to physical objects (e.g., currency). 
Governance is arguably built on status functions through the hierarchical 
ordering and physical and symbolic boundaries associated with the university 
governing body. In turn, systems of intelligibility are created and circulate 
around the practice of governance, including: governing instruments, 
regulations and protocols and the accountability artefacts of board business 
items and reports as consumed and interpreted by governing body actors.   
The constructionist view of actors operating within, as well as shaping, 
collective frameworks of understanding, aligns to the consensus-led, 
meaning-making of the board in seeking to serve the best interests of the 
university through making effective decisions. Collective and individual 
governor sense-making in the university context, is arguably an ongoing 
process and activity to aid deliberation and decision-making on matters of 
accountability and strategy. Institutional visibility is arguably one variable in 
this process of meaning-making for exploration in this study. Actor sense-
making is predicated by shared and meaningful understanding of the key 
risks and opportunities facing the university, including in the external 
environment and its impact on internal structures and interests, as well as 
interpersonal relations and dynamics at the interface of the board and senior-
management and other staff. In acknowledging the complexity and non-fixed 
26 Searle adopts a linguistic approach to examine ‘reality’ based on a pre-linguistic undeniability, which has also 
been described as ‘pre-predicative intersubjectivity - that provides the possibility for discursive life’ (Lock and 
Strong, 2010:9). 
27 This is alongside individual intentionality, but humans engage in co-operative behaviour through the fact that ‘they 
share intentional states such as beliefs, desires and intentions’ (1995:23). 
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nature of social relations, a constructionist model also supports an ‘open-
systems’ approach to university governance, through examining the 
interaction of groups and bodies in the governance process (Kezar and 
Eckel, 2004) with the potential to deliver more effective governance through 
decision-making informed by a more contextualised and situated 
approach. 28  
The constructionist project also locates individuals in a relationship with 
social ‘symbolic forms’ (Lock and Strong, 2010:7). The university governing 
body can therefore be regarded as a symbolic institution with the potential to 
engender confidence in, and legitimise the leadership and direction of, the 
university. The extent to which the institutional visibility of the governing body 
constructs, sustains and communicates the governing body as a symbolic 
form which staff actors hold in regard and interact with at various levels is 
implicit in my research. This reflects Lock and Strong’s observation that 
constructionism is built on ‘shared agreement as to what these symbolic 
forms to be taken to be’ (ibid.) which lends itself to the collective visibility of 
the board as a means of helping create organisational order and stability. 
The view of Bevir and Rhodes (2006) is one of state-agency governance 
based on ‘situated agents using their local reasoning consciously and 
subconsciously to modify their contingent heritage’ (9). This resonates with 
the contingent constructionist view of actors interacting with, and re-shaping 
beliefs, traditions and structures in the everyday ‘doing’ of university 
governance. However, a wholly decentred, networked model of governance 
favoured by Bevir and Rhodes is not subscribed to in this study. This is on 
the basis that the university governing body is conceived as an axis around 
which the activities of governance actors, senior management and other staff 
groups rotate.  
The final paragraph in this section summarises Giddens’ theory of 
structuration (1984)29 to understand the ‘dynamism and globalising scope of 
modern institutions’ (1990:16) as applicable to the characteristics and culture 
28 In line with constructionism, an ‘open systems’ approach accepts the importance of frameworks and systems in 
conjunction with the interactions between a range of internal and external forces and actors.   
29 ‘Structuration’ bridges the macro-micro dualism in functionalist sociological tradition, and advances the agency of 
individuals to re-shape and reform social structures and systems, in line with constructionist thinking. 
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of the contemporary university.  Structuration theory aligns to a contingent 
construction approach in several ways, including its recognition of ‘isolable 
sets of rules and resources’ (1984:17) for social institutions as a fiction, 
arguing instead that ‘Rules typically intersect with practices in the 
contextuality of situated encounters’ (Giddens, op.cit.,18). From this 
perspective, the rules and codes of university governance are imbued with 
meaning in conjunction with actors in the doing of governance as a set of 
institutional ‘practices’ and ‘situated encounters’. The thesis will explore the 
extent to which ‘situated encounters’ are enabled through arrangements and 
acts of board and its members’ visibility to tiers of staff, including the vice-
chancellor and their teams.   
A second aspect of structuration theory resonating with this study is the 
observation that the ‘nature of modern institutions is deeply bound up with 
the mechanisms of trust in abstract systems’ (1990:83). This is applicable to 
the characteristics of the university governing body as a legal abstraction 
consisting of a set of ‘experts’ selected predominantly from outside the 
university. How the board is ‘regarded’ by staff, and whether the collective 
board and individual actors’ institutional visibility engenders trust relations 
and demystifies the board as an abstract system, reflects this area of 
structuration theory. Cornforth (2004) identifies the apparent contradiction of 
the non-profit board built being built on purposed ‘representatives’ of the 
governed institution’s membership groups who are predominantly 
independent ‘experts’. The implications of this paradoxical perspective for the 
trust and confidence that staff place in the governing body and governance 
more widely is potentially played out in discussions of the visibility of the 
board. This resonates with Giddens’ notion of ‘facework commitments’30 as 
the ‘trust relations which are sustained by or expressed in social connections 
established in circumstances of co-presence’ (1990:80) as an antidote to 
abstract systems within modern institutions, and may shed light on governor 
institutional visibility and engagement outside the confines of the boardroom. 
30 Giddens adapts Goffman’s concept of ‘face-work’ (1955) to refer to individuals’ impression-management 
strategies in everyday life. 
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3.2 Space and visibility: locating the university governing body  
The university governing body may be conceived as an ‘institution’ and 
complex ‘organization’ of membership hierarchies, coalitions and relations31, 
with an identity and visibility implied by this. The form of the contemporary 
university governing body, however, is arguably fuzzy rather than fixed.  
Marginson and Considine (2000) conceive a hybrid form within the 
‘enterprise’ university comprising corporate and public sector characteristics: 
…governing bodies start to take on a distinctly corporate character 
(drawn not so much from business itself as from an ‘ideal form’ 
corporation modelled in public sector reform (4). 
As I have argued elsewhere, the governing body occupies a unique, ‘supra-
institutional governance space’ (Dawkins, 2011:52) outside mainstream 
organisational parameters. This positioning impacts on the degree and 
nature of institutional visibility and proximity with the governed university. 
Contradictions in the conception of the governing body exist when applying a 
spatial perspective. One viewpoint regards the governing body as a ‘non-
place’ (Augé, 1995), bearing the features of ‘the ephemeral and the transient’ 
(VIII) through the infrequent and periodic congregation of its members for 
formal meetings. This echoes Deem et al’s (1995) reference to the 
‘evanescent quality’ (90) of school governing bodies, as deliberative 
structures ‘unlike the organizational character of either educational 
organizations or business and commercial organizations, both of which have 
a greater degree of permanency’ (ibid.).  That a governing body’s external 
members occupy professional lives outside the university, and its staff and 
student members have a primary role and identity within the university, 
reinforce the impermanence of its collective identity, as well as the shifting 
identities of individual governors as trustees.  From a constitutional and 
conceptual perspective, however, the board may also be conceived as an 
omnipresent force, linked to its ostensible omnipotence in the university 
setting through its ultimate authority for all fundamental university business.  
31 Deem et al (1995) apply this model to school governing bodies. 
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Whist the hypothesis of the study is the interlinking of the institutional 
visibility and perceived effectiveness of the board, the two concepts and 
practices are decoupled in the next two sections of this chapter for 
exploratory purposes. The constructionist argument advanced is that both 
visibility and effectiveness are constructed and context-specific phenomena 
predicated by the shared understanding of board actors within the 
frameworks of the meaning of the governance system. 
3.3 Constructing university governing body visibility 
‘Visibility’ as a mode of sensorial perceptibility, or cognitive or meteorological 
phenomena, is outside the scope of this study. Lending itself to a 
constructionist stance - visibility - whilst not wholly subjective, is regarded as 
a non-fixed phenomena which ‘inheres in configurations, connections, 
events, forces, mechanisms, associations, regimes, strategies, practices, 
rhythms and situated activities’ (Brighenti, 2010:38). These elements of 
visibility are exhibited through the practices enacted in, through and around 
the university governing body, including meetings and business reporting 
cycles, the constitutional protocols of membership, the business that flows to 
and from the board, and the interpersonal dynamics between governors and 
executive management.  
Brighenti (2010) conceives visibility as a ‘sociological category…constituted 
from within social events’ (43). From a constructionist perspective the 
visibility of the governing body will be viewed through the social events in 
and around the board and its actors, enacted through episodes including 
formal board meetings, exchanges with the chair, vice-chancellor and 
secretary, governor engagements with senior management and less formal 
interactions with staff.  In this study, institutional visibility is conceived as an 
overarching notion and conceptual shorthand for the reciprocal relationships 
between the governing body and staff - the board’s regard for staff groupings 
and, in turn, staff recognition and understanding of the role and performance 
of the board. Within this, the study will explore the extent to which the 
institutional visibility of the board is instituted on a metaphorical basis, 
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through its symbolic and ceremonial status as the ultimate authority on 
matters of fundamental concern in the university and, in material terms, 
governance actors’ doing of governance. 
The non-fixed and contextually-sensitive properties of institutional visibility 
are illustrated by the varying degrees and dimensions of governing body 
presence, which depends on the different staff segments with which 
governors interact. Factors include the organisational and hierarchical 
proximity of staff groups to the governing body. For example, senior 
management team members with responsibility for strategic portfolios and 
projects will have an accountability relationship to the board, which will also 
entail periodic physical interaction with the board, including through 
attendance at governing body or committee meetings.  In turn, interest 
groups within the university setting, such as the branch committees of the 
recognised trades unions are likely to be more alert to the discussions and 
decisions of the board than the wider staff base.  
 
Figure One has been devised as a tool to plot the varying degrees of 
governing body institutional visibility. It highlights activities on a spectrum 
from apparency, as a limited and latent insight into the role of board amongst 
staff based on an awareness of its existence and purpose, to transparency 
as open and proactive disclosure of board business, through to engagement 
as a mode of developed and deep interactions with different staff groups, 
from senior management members with university-wide portfolios, through to 
academic staff groups. The examples cited in Figure One are not intended to 
be exhaustive and are approximately allocated to a point on the spectrum 
plotted. However, the spectrum provides a reference point against which to 
periodically assess the activities prioritised in the online discourse analysis 
phase and for exploration in the semi-structured interviews with the 
secretaries and vice-chancellors. 
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Figure One               Institutional visibility spectrum 
LOWER VISIBILITY                                                          HEIGHTENED VISIBILITY  
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3.4 Constructing university governing body effectiveness 
A constructionist position presents university governing body effectiveness 
as a process and activity, in contrast to the predominance of the inputs or 
outputs of board machinery in structural and systems-based models.  As 
Schofield et al (2012) argue, university board effectiveness is ‘situation and 
time bound’ (62), implying its resistance to a single definition of ‘good’ 
governance in board practice and broader institutional success. This 
conception of governance effectiveness privileges ‘enablers’ and ‘outcomes’ 
over the fixed inputs and outputs of board performance, satisfied through 
compliance with external and internal governance codes and protocols, or 
the conduct of constitutional norms such as delegation of powers, formal 
reporting between bodies and the ‘efficient’ operation, frequency of, and 
coverage of business at, meetings.  
Structural theories have focussed on ‘process definitions of effectiveness’ 
(Kezar, 2006), the dominance of which are disrupted by attending to analysis 
of the social and cultural aspects of university governance. This approach 
would appear to lend itself to more subjective readings of governance. 
However, the constructionist approach does not support a wholly solipsistic 
or individual personal perspective on what good governance looks like. 
Instead it presupposes shared positions on effectiveness, including board 
leadership in shaping, communicating and modelling university values, and 
trust in and integrity of interpersonal relationships between the board and 
other bodies and governors and senior management actors.  Whilst it would 
be an artifice to assume that these non-fixed properties and processes are 
not social constructs and forms of sense-making in their own right, they resist 
what Sonnenfeld (2004) describes as the ‘misleading myths of bad metrics’ 
(108) for good governance.32 
Three of Schofield’s nine outcomes33 of an effective governing body illustrate 
the constructed and contextual properties of good governance. The first 
32 ‘Bad metrics’ include false correlations between types of board structure, such as the ratio of independent to 
insider directors, or demographics such as directors’ age or financial literacy, and board and company performance. 
33 The remaining six outcomes are: Ensuring quality in academic and service provision; Effectively assessing risk 
and supporting innovation; Enhancing institutional reputation and competitiveness; Providing confidence in 
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outcome of ‘ensuring that the strategic plan is achieved’ may be read in the 
light of Jarzabkowski’s ‘strategy as practice’ approach, as ‘an active form of 
social construction, involving intent, skill and knowledge in the selective 
recognition and implementation of ongoing activity’ (2005:31). The intended 
role of the governing body in developing, setting and monitoring a corporate 
or strategic plan built on a five to ten-year timeframe, is arguably critical to 
ensuring that clear, long-term objectives for the direction and performance of 
the university are met.  
Construction of measures for institutional success is therefore critical for the 
board in conjunction with the senior management and, arguably, consultation 
with wider staff groupings. Part of this process of construction is the 
importance of mission differentiation (McConkey, 1981) for universities in a 
competitive global market for HE. The driver for differentiation is to mitigate 
the risk that HEIs set and communicate largely indistinguishable statements 
of strategic intent and objectives, focussing on excellence in the student 
experience, graduate employability, research-informed learning, impactful 
research, business and knowledge exchange and regional, national and 
global recognition. Therefore the role of the board in ensuring the strategic 
plan is achieved is a complex and iterative process measure, which of itself 
is not an outcome of success, if the strategic plan is insufficiently distinctive 
or not ambitious enough to ensure the long-term sustainability and success 
of the university. In turn, if the strategy prioritises flawed objectives for 
investment and growth, or apparatus such as Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) are insufficient proxies of achieving goals and objectives, 
effectiveness is an unlikely outcome.  
The contextual characteristics of Schofield’s second outcome of 
effectiveness in ‘ensuring that financial health is achieved’ is a mainstay of 
the governing body’s ultimate responsibility for the prudent oversight of its 
university’s assets and resources. Financial health is identified as a 
constructed and relative concept when applied to the real-world context of 
institutional governance; Constructively supporting and challenging the executive and other key outcomes specific 
to an HEI. 
69 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the HEI and the complex choices faced by governing bodies and executive 
management in securing long-term sustainability. For example, whilst 
bringing institutions into a surplus position, and maintaining or building 
financial reserves as a buffer for income reduction, will be a common 
objective for many boards and senior management teams. However, the 
accumulation of cash reserves at the expense of investment in institutional 
infrastructure for growth may be a flawed activity.  
The third outcome identified to illustrate the constructed and contextual 
nature of governance effectiveness is the board’s role in ‘ensuring 
accountability and regulatory compliance’. As illustrated in my IFS, this arm 
of the board’s remit is one of the most well understood at least amongst 
governors and senior management, where concerned with the board’s 
authority and accountability to HEFCE and other sector regulators. However, 
in my IFS, it was argued that governing body ‘accountability’ extended 
beyond the formal regulatory relationships and assets reported to HEFCE 
and other sector bodies, including as relevant to this study its accountability 
and wider stakeholder duties, including to staff. A view of  ‘accountability as 
regulation’ from a constructionist perspective presents accountability as a 
part of a process and regime which includes the rendering ‘visible’ to and 
from the governing body, the measurement and achievement of KPIs as 
systems of classification and proxies for effectiveness, rather than integral 
indicators of it in its own right. The widespread use of KPIs by governing 
bodies in HEIs to monitor institutional performance on ‘a range of areas of 
institutional activity at a strategic level’ are one means through which 
rendering executive management accountable’ (CUC, 2006:2). An optimistic 
view of KPIs would be their ability to crystallise and bring visibility to the 
governing body of complex performance outcomes which in contrast to the 
practice of presenting them ‘with a voluminous and detailed operational risk 
register’ (ibid.,3) is a means of presenting the ‘five things that could put us 
out of business’ (ibid.). However, KPIs risk being simplistic and reductive 
measures when viewed and monitored in isolation from a wider performance 
context.  
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 Re-coupling the construction of effectiveness and visibility is realised through 
the processes of ‘disclosure’ and ‘transparency’ as devices rendering visible 
specific aspects of board and governance accountability to a range of 
audiences. Whilst not explicitly identifying committee visibility, Spira’s (2002) 
‘ethnography’ of the company audit committee describes its disclosure 
activities as a display and performance, dependent on visual and visible 
properties, to engender shareholder confidence. These processes reinforce 
the role of the audit committee as ‘the public symbol external to the company 
necessary to enrol suppliers of finance and resources, it acts as a symbol of 
authority and control within the company, enrolling employees’ (Chapter 5, 
5.5) which are arguably reliant on the committee’s visibility.34 In HE, the 
devices deployed by HEIs, and demanded by the sector regulators include 
the Statement of recommended practice (SORP): accounting for further and 
higher education (2007 and 2015) protocols for disclosure and financial 
reporting standards, and audit committee’s annual opinion on the university 
internal control and risk environment, approved by the governing body. 
Compliance with these outcomes as a measure of good governance, 
however, needs to be treated with caution in the context of the reality of 
university performance. Conformance through compliance with regulatory 
requirements and a specific sector-body definition of accountability, is an 
inadequate proxy for strong, or even sound, institutional governance. For 
example, Plymouth University satisfied HEFCE that it was compliant with the 
formal accountability arrangements as assessed through the annual 
accountability and five-yearly assurance review process. However, these 
formal processes failed to identify the cultural and behavioural risks of 
deteriorating relationships amongst senior management and senior 
governors, culminating in a recent high-profile governance breakdown.  
 
 
34 Indirectly linked to boards, a study by Campbell, McPhail and Slack (2009) examines facial representation in the 
annual reports of 14 FTSE 100 companies as a disclosure and transparency device, through the strategic selection 
of stakeholder facial images to legitimise the positive impact of companies. 
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Chapter Four: Research Design and Methodology  
4.1 Methodology: Theoretical basis 
The scope of the study is the funded and regulated English HE sector, from 
which a sample of English HEIs is identified. Within the sample, the main 
focus will be on the institutions’ governing bodies, the online descriptors of 
their role, and the perspectives of a sub-set of secretaries as key actors co-
ordinating and supporting board arrangements and business.35 A qualitative 
mixed methods approach is adopted through the staged delivery of 
governance webpage discourse analysis (DA), followed by semi-structured 
interviewing. This is preceded by a preparatory phase zero to codify, at 
headline level, the content, navigability and interactivity of the sample HEIs’ 
corporate governance webpages. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) define 
mixed methods as a ‘class of research where the researcher mixes or 
combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, 
approaches, concepts or language into a single study’ (17). Influential 
commentators such as Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) reinforce this view, 
by arguing that mixed methods focusses on ‘collecting, analyzing, and mixing 
both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or series of studies’ 
(2007:5). Prior to discussing this study’s research design, including the 
different weightings, sequencing of, and interaction between the two key 
methods, the epistemological and theoretical considerations underpinning 
the mixed methods model merit examination.  
Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) argue that mixed methods research 
constitutes a ‘separate methodological orientation with its own worldview, 
vocabulary and techniques’ (10), which is a view echoed by Johnson et al 
(2007) who regard it as a ‘research design with philosophical assumptions as 
well as a method of enquiry’ (5). Greene (2007) extends these perspectives 
to identify mixed methods as an epistemological arena in its own right, 
through its enlistment of ‘multiple mental models into the same inquiry 
35 Private and for-profit providers are excluded from the sample in being exempt from HEFCE and HESA reporting 
at the time of selecting the sample. However, many are increasingly replicating or borrowing governing structures 
and systems of self-regulation in the HEFCE requirements and CUC guidance, reinforcing the view that many are 
‘closely aligned with government priorities’ (Fielden, 2010:6) for HE. 
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space…towards a collective generation of better understanding of the 
phenomenon’ (12), thereby transcending the binaries played out in the 
‘paradigm wars’36 cited by early mixed methods commentators. The 
combination of desk-based research into university website content and 
discourse analysis as a precursor to the principle focus on semi-structured 
interviewing, collectively form a new ‘inquiry space’, to advance a wider 
understanding of the phenomenon of governing body visibility and 
effectiveness than could be gained through selection of a single method. 
Mixed methods research therefore creates a ‘horizontal’ inquiry space 
through the breadth of focus on multiple institutional sites in the sample, 
compared to a ‘vertical’ or depth-model of a case-study.  
The mixed methods approach upholds an inductive model of reasoning, 
whereby patterns of meaning are identified by seeking responses to 
‘exploratory’ rather than ‘explanatory’ research questions on the role of the 
governing body and governor visibility. This could be regarded as an 
interpretivist approach to ‘generate or inductively develop a theory or pattern 
of meanings’ (Creswell, 2003:9), which connects to the contingent 
constructionist philosophy of this study. Within this mixed methods 
framework, dominant weighting is given to semi-structured interviewing, to 
explore the socially constructed character of the lived realities (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2005) of secretaries and two vice-chancellors through their 
perceptions on board and governor institutional visibility and its impact on 
governance effectiveness. Figure Two summarises the constructionist lens 
through which this topic is examined, and the alignment of the qualitative 
mixed methods for understanding of it.  
 
 
 
36 The paradigm wars relate to the primacy of one paradigm over others, with each offering their own merits.  (Guba 
1990:27). A number of schools of thought are identified on a spectrum, from purists who advocate the use of a 
single method and resist the combination of methods, through to those who contend that certain methods can be 
used in specific situations. 
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Figure Two 
Constructionist Features  Research Methods 
The consensus-based and shared 
impetus of decision-making at board level 
represents a shared framework of 
understanding and meaning-making. The 
collective understanding of the role of the 
board through its multiple modes of 
engagements with groups of staff 
supports a contingent constructionist 
project, as does visibility as a process for 
enabling this. 
DA of the website governing body role 
descriptors, which discursively 
construct and position (re)present the 
governing body. 
Individual actors in university governance 
have a key role to play in meaning-making 
and mediating of discussions and actions 
in the ‘doing’ of governance.   
 
Semi-structured interviewing is 
underpinned by shared assumptions 
between interviewer and interviewee. 
The technique also enables interviewer 
and interviewee agency and autonomy 
to create meaning through the 
exchange. 
 
4.2  Methodology: Research Design  
The research design comprised the following: 
Phase One: discourse analysis of discrete online governing body 
descriptors. 
Phase Two: semi-structured interviews with secretaries and two vice- 
chancellors drawn from the institutions sampled in phase one. 
The two phases were preceded by a phase zero of content analysis of 
university governance webpages forming the sample of 20 HEIs. However, 
the approach and analysis of the findings are not a core part of the thesis, 
and are summarised in Appendix Three. Whilst the content analysis phase is 
quantitative in focus by mapping webpage ‘content in terms of predetermined 
categories in a systematic and replicable manner’ (Bryman, 2012:289), its 
inclusion as a precursory phase was intended to satisfy several purposes. 
Firstly, mapping governance webpage content and site architecture provides 
a structure for my familiarisation as a researcher with the wider online 
context of the webpages within which the discourse strands and fragments of 
the governing body role-descriptors are located. Secondly, the webpages’ 
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architecture, such as the interactive and navigational features of links to 
academic governance and executive management, provide a structural 
reference point for examining the discursive construction and 
(re)presentation of boards at phase one. Phase zero therefore supports a 
definition of content analysis in ‘making replicable and valid inferences from 
texts (or other meaningful matter) to the context of their use’ (Krippendorff, 
2004:19). 
Of Creswell’s three types of mixed methods research design37, this study 
satisfies several features of a ‘sequential transformative’ strategy of selecting 
‘the methods that will best serve the theoretical perspectives of the 
researcher…(it) may be able to…better understand a phenomenon or 
process that is changing as a result of being studied’ (2003:216). In turn, the 
research design highlights the need for ‘interaction’ between the methods 
used across the three phases (including phase zero) to inform and influence 
the subsequent phase, rather than the ‘independent’ integration of these 
(Greene, 2007) as part of the concluding analysis. For example, it is 
envisaged that selected themes emerging from the online discourse strands 
will provide the context for topics included in the interview guide, which 
serves as a reference point for the conversations generated through the 
semi-structured interviewing in phase two.   
The inter-stage ‘interaction’ between the research methods will be supported 
by the potential for triangulation of findings once the two phases are 
concluded. Triangulation encompasses a range of definitions and 
applications. This includes Denzin’s influential definition of triangulation as 
the conjunction of different research methods ‘to maximise the validity of field 
efforts’ (1978:304). Hammersley (2008) expands the usage of triangulation 
as: 1) a tool for validity checking of one set of findings through use of others; 
2) an indefinite approach for the collection of accounts from different 
37 Creswell (2003) identifies three mixed methods patterns:  ‘sequential explanatory’, ‘sequential exploratory’ and 
‘sequential transformative’ models. The sequential explanatory approach commences with a quantitative technique, 
subsequently explained by a qualitative one. In the exploratory mode, qualitative methods precede the quantitative 
component, with the former given greater weighting to focus on ‘exploration’ rather than ‘explanation’ of meaning.  
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perspectives; 3) seeking complementary information, and 4) as a lever for 
epistemological dialogue or juxtaposition.   
The first definition of triangulation as a technique for cross-validation of the 
reliability of quantitative and qualitative research methods is not an objective 
given the weighting given to interviewing as a research tool. Kelle and 
Erzberger (2003) confirm this judgment by observing that ‘qualitative and 
quantitative methods are less suited to reciprocal validation than to 
complementing each other’ (174). Triangulation as the usage of different 
methods to prompt epistemological dialogue, as per Hammersley’s fourth 
definition, is also excluded, as the study adopts the single theoretical 
perspective of contingent constructionism. However, the second and third 
definitions resonate with the research design. The second sees the use of 
website DA and interviewing as generate alternative ‘accounts’ and 
perspectives on governing body institutional visibility and its impact on 
performance. In turn, the third usage of triangulation as a framework for 
gathering complementary information and data aligns to the analytical 
objectives of the research design. This definition of triangulation is reinforced 
by Jick (1979) who argues that: 
it can be something other than scaling, reliability, and convergent 
validation. It can also capture a more complete, holistic, and 
contextual portrayal of the unit(s) under study’ (603).  
 
The potential for the triangulation to go beyond a ‘strategy of validation’ 
(Flick, 1992, 2004) is therefore the objective of this study, to develop a 
complementary and broad understanding of the phenomena of governing 
body visibility and effectiveness. 
4.3 Sampling strategy  
Sampling framework  
Based on Universities UK (UUK) and HESA data, a total of 131 publicly-
funded HEIs existed in England in January 2013, from which a sample of 20 
76 
 
HEIs was selected.38 The HEIs included in the sample ensured selection of a 
sufficient number and spread of organisations, through a sampling strategy 
with each university’s legal structure, staff population volume and student 
population as elements. The first element comprises the three principal legal 
structures of HEIs in England: the chartered corporations, HECs and 
companies limited by guarantee. The size of the staff and student bodies 
therefore ranges from large staff bodies and student populations through to 
specialist institutions with small staff numbers and concentrated student 
numbers.  The academic organisation of the HEIs was not a variable in 
sample selection, but was an outcome of the process of ensuring the HEIs 
spanned a range of staff and student volumes, and includes multi-faculty 
universities, through to specialist institutions and conservatoires.  
Volume thresholds were established through reference to eight pre-existing 
student population bands set by the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA), to 
determine annual subscription fees payable by HEIs. The bands began at 
Band A for HEIs with up to 1000 students, through to Band H for institutions 
exceeding 30000 students. Reference to student population bands was not 
intended to imply that the student volume criterion carried greater 
prominence than staff volume or institutional legal structure. However, it 
provided a pre-existing framework for building the sample and populating 
each band with HEIs. Eligible HEIs satisfying the student number bands 
were drawn from published Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) 
datasets collated from the 2010/11 HESA Student return and the 2011/12 
HESA Staff return.39 40 My sector knowledge of the legal structure of HEIs 
enabled me to ensure that a spread of HEIs, pre and post-1992s were 
identified in parallel with satisfying the student number ranges. The sample 
of 20 HEIs is not selected to generate wholly reliable data, representative of 
38 The total number of English HEIs separately counts institutions in a federated structure, e.g., the Colleges of the 
University of London.  
39 Numbers and categories of academic and non-academic staff are not disaggregated. 
40 Sample selection was on the basis that no direct correlation existed between student and staff volume in HEIs. To 
illustrate, universities with a student population of approximately 15000 may have a significantly higher staff 
population count than an HEI with much larger student numbers, based on resource drivers such as the research 
environment of the institution and the number of staff funded for research, or HEIs with medical and dental schools 
requiring increased numbers of technical staff. 
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the entire English HE system. Instead, the objective was to draw 
generalizable findings about the characteristics of corporate governance 
arrangements in the English HE sector, and the inclusion of approximately 
17% of HEIs reduced the risk of sampling error, including the gathering of 
unrepresentative or distorted data, about which no generalisations could 
reliably be made.   
Selection of the sample HEIs and their mapping to the eight student number 
bands was not intended to be proportionate to the total number of HEIs in 
each student volume range. However, a key consideration was ensuring that 
HEIs in Bands A and H, as the extremes of the student volume range, were 
not disproportionately represented. In turn, proportionate selection of 
institutions representative of the three principal corporate forms for 
universities was not undertaken, but was informed by sector knowledge to 
ensure that a broad spread of HEI legal structures featured in the sample. 
Figure Three identifies the 20 HEIs and data for each of the three 
components of legal structure and staff and student volume. 
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Figure Three  
Band Student 
Number 
Range 
HEI Legal Structure Student 
Volume 
2011/12 
(N=) 
Staff 
Volume 
2010/11 
(N=) 
A >1001 
students 
Royal Central School 
of Speech and 
Drama (University of 
London) 
Company Limited 
by Guarantee 
990 145 
Leeds College of 
Music 
(Data 2010/11 as not 
available in 2011/12)  
Company Limited 
by Guarantee 
720 
 
255 
B 1001- 4000 Royal Agricultural 
University 
Company Limited 
by Shares 
1190 
 
215 
Newman University Company Limited 
by Guarantee 
3150 305 
C 4001- 7000 St George’s 
University of London 
Chartered 5115 
 
850 
Harper Adams 
University  
Company Limited 
by Guarantee 
6405 
 
465 
D 7001- 
10000 
University of 
Gloucestershire 
Company Limited 
by Guarantee 
9080 1275 
Buckinghamshire 
New University  
Higher Education 
Corporation 
9775 775 
 
E 10001- 
15000 
University of 
Bradford 
Chartered 14210 1785 
Queen Mary, 
University of London 
Chartered 14860 
 
3735 
University of 
Worcester 
Higher Education 
Corporation 
10695 1475 
F 150001- 
20000 
Bournemouth 
University 
Higher Education 
Corporation 
19750 1510 
University of Durham Chartered 16570 3980 
G 20001- 
30000 
Salford University  Chartered 21755 2680 
De Montfort 
University 
 
Higher Education 
Corporation 
21795 
 
2370 
Birmingham City 
University 
Higher Education 
Corporation 
23165 
 
2380 
 
Newcastle University Chartered  21055 5435 
H (30001 >) Plymouth University 
 
Higher Education 
Corporation 
31105 
 
2865 
Open University Chartered 201270 10920 
Nottingham 
University 
Chartered 35630 7145 
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The phase zero content analysis of governance websites was the basis for 
identifying the HEIs for inclusion in the sample, as the institutional sites from 
which the interview participants would be selected. Sample continuity 
between phases one and two was secured through the relationship between 
the 20 HEIs’ online governing role-descriptors as the focus of DA and the 
fact that a sub-set of secretaries and vice-chancellors were selected for 
interview from 10 of the institutions. 
Semi-Structured interview sample: the importance of the secretary or clerk 
10 clerks and secretaries of the governing bodies in the sample were 
identified for semi-structured interview, supplemented by two vice-
chancellors from two of the HEIs from which secretaries were selected.41 
Shattock (2006) observes that the role of the secretary ‘acts as a guarantee 
for the way the institution as a whole reaches corporate decisions’ (22). 
However, the focus on secretaries as the key sample sub-set in this study 
extends beyond their formal constitutional duties, to examine the wider 
influence of the role in supporting the conditions of effective governance. 
This study therefore seeks to build on the work of Llewellyn (2009) which 
credits the contribution of the secretary in supporting governance processes 
and relationships in both an individual capacity and through a ‘triadic’ 
network with the chair and head of institution. The rationale for focussing on 
the perspectives of university secretaries reflects the professionally-oriented 
nature of this study. On this basis, the findings are intended to develop my 
professional practice as a board secretary, and advance an understanding of 
the conditions for effective governance, in which institutional visibility as 
overlooked variable influencing board performance.  
In turn, my own experience as a secretary, and discussions with peers, 
reinforces the secretary as occupying a pivotal role in and across the 
governance ‘spaces’ of the university (Dawkins, 2011), acting ‘as a bridge in 
41 The specific nature of the sampling approach is built on an acknowledgment that the sample sub-sets would be 
wider than secretaries and heads of institutions, including the random or targeted selection of wider staff audiences, 
senior management and board actors including the chair, other independent governors and staff and student 
governors.  
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a set of roles and relationships’ (Llewellyn, 2007:164) at the interstices of the 
board and senior management and, also relevant to this study, the wider 
academic and professional support staff groups, as a key audience for board 
visibility. The organisational positioning of the secretary brings potentially 
unique perspectives on board institutional visibility, is the secretary’s 
requirement to ‘respond to two bosses’ (ibid.) through reporting to both the 
chair and, in many cases, the vice-chancellor. The negotiation of the 
secretary’s professional identity is evident in this dual-facing role, in being 
independent from senior management through their appointment and 
monitoring by the chair and wider board, whilst often being a member of the 
senior management team with a wider portfolio of management 
responsibilities.  
As the specific focus of this research is board visibility, the secretary plays a 
key role in identifying, maintaining and developing the mechanisms and 
platforms on which the board’s institutional presence and profile is 
predicated. This includes the development and maintenance of online 
internet and intranet-based information on the board and its members, as 
examined in phases zero and one of this research, and circulation and 
communication to staff more widely of the key discussions and decisions of 
the board. Secondly, the perspectives of the secretary are paramount and 
have implications for understanding institutional visibility, given their 
responsibilities for governor induction and ongoing activities which support 
the board’s collective development and as a gatekeeper, negotiator, or key 
contact for governor entry into the academic and professional support 
departments. Finally, the secretary is often regarded as in closer proximity to 
staff groupings and, as a minimum, is often the principal avenue through 
which governing body matters are communicated to staff. This observation is 
supported by Llewellyn’s study of UK university secretaries which cited 
examples where, ‘the secretary took the initiative to build relationships with 
groups perceived to be more distant from the work of the governing body’ 
(2007:166). 
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However, alongside the empirical merits of examining the perspectives of my 
professional peers in the sample HEIs, logistical factors influenced the 
sampling decisions. Identification of university secretaries afforded relative 
ease of access to the sample group and increased the likelihood of me 
securing the consent of individuals targeted to participate. This was 
facilitated by drawing on existing professional networks, and the 
preparedness of peers to reflect on professional problems linked to 
governance, including that of managing the collective institutional visibility of 
the board and governors and the link to performance and effectiveness. 
Interviewing vice-chancellors was not a compulsory component of the 
research design, contact with whom was facilitated through the secretaries 
interviewed from the two institutions in the sample. 
Sample Size 
The optimum sample size to yield meaningful and valid results in qualitative 
research is the subject of critical debate, with no clear consensus position. 
Marshall et al (2013) note the ‘lack of standards for sample size’ (11) and the 
potential deterrent this presents for undertaking qualitative research. For 
example, suggested sample sizes for interviews range from 20-30 (Creswell, 
2007) to 30-50 (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005) for studies using a grounded 
theory approach. The relatively high volume of interviews proposed may be 
linked to the inductive, theory-building approach uniting this model, and the 
threshold at which ‘saturation’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) or ‘thematic 
redundancy’ (Beitin, 2012:244) occurs, as the point at which data generated 
are unlikely to yield further insights. In contrast, qualitative interviewing 
undertaken in a phenomenological mode, which seeks to explore the 
perspectives of subjects but does not focus on theory-building, proposes 
sample sizes of 6-12 (Thomas and Pollio, 2000), or a flexible range of 2-10 
(Boyd, 2001).  
The decision to create a sample population of 12 in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews for phase two of the research was not based on any of the ranges 
identified above, thereby avoiding the trap that ‘Many qualitative researchers 
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seemingly select the size of their samples in an arbitrary fashion’ 
(Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2007:115-116). However, a sense of what might 
constitute saturation given the characteristics of the principal sample group 
of governing body secretaries influenced my decision-making. To illustrate, it 
is recognised that cultural differences exist across the 20 HEIs comprising 
the sample, as do organisational variations in the size and shape of the 
institutions, as reflected by student and staff population as elements 
informing the sample construction. However, my professional insights of 
other HEIs beyond the one in which I am currently employed, informal 
discussions with colleagues, and the regulatory requirements and guidance 
set by HEFCE and the CUC for the UK HE sector, have led to an assumption 
that a degree of structural similarity exists between university governing 
bodies and actors in the sample HEIs. Common characteristics include 
features associated with the size and composition of the university board and 
types of role for senior management actors in and around the governance 
system, which arguably lead to a degree of shared professional experiences 
encountered by board secretaries in advising these groups, and supporting 
their governance arrangements.  
The above assumptions therefore influenced the sample size for the semi-
structured interviews, whilst ensuring that the secretaries identified were 
drawn from across the seven institutional bands summarised in Figure 
Three. Alongside the methodological considerations, logistical and resource 
constraints influenced the interview sample size, reflecting the view that 
conducting interviews is intensive, creative and ‘active’ work (Holstein and 
Gubrium, 1995) and ‘costly and time-consuming’, thereby exerting 
‘extraneous pressures to reduce the numbers to a minimum’ (Oppenheim, 
1992:68).  
4.4 Websites as research sites  
Linked to the phase one DA, an overview of the use of websites as sites of, 
rather than tools for, research is required. Commentators have argued that 
the internet extends beyond ‘space’ to constitute a ‘place’, which is not just 
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imbued with the attributes of everyday life, but is an integral part of it for 
internet authors and users (Howard and Jones, 2004). The internet therefore 
constitutes a cultural context (Hine, 2005), with websites embodying and 
embedding socio-cultural texts in and through which discourses are 
constructed, circulated and interface with human actors. As Seale (2007) 
observes, sources of social research include building designs, lyrics and 
websites. This study’s inclusion of university websites as a text and 
document for DA (and phase zero content analysis) is a novel approach in 
HE research, providing a specific window - through a seemingly ubiquitous 
medium of the web - into the presence of the governing board. Whilst the DA 
phase using the online environment is a precursor to the semi-structured 
interviewing, its incorporation into the research design may be seen as an 
antidote to ‘Qualitative researchers’ almost Pavlovian tendency’ (Silverman, 
2007:42) to focus on interviews.  
No research is identified in the literature review which attends to the 
effectiveness of websites as platforms for communicating or legitimising the 
constitutional or cultural aspects of a university’s corporate governance 
arrangements at the level of the governing body. Whilst corporate 
governance and leadership may not be considered central to an HEIs’ 
‘branding promise’42, the online profile of the governing body may 
nonetheless help shed light on its role in building confidence amongst 
prospective students, sponsors, alumni and staff in the running of the 
organisation. The coding framework for phase zero content analysis is not 
covered in this section, and is summarised in Appendix Three, along with the 
findings from this exercise. 
4.5 Discourse Analysis (DA) of online governing body role-descriptors 
DA and governing body institutional visibility  
DA of the narrative summaries of the role of university governing bodies on 
the sample HEIs’ websites provides a window into the visibility of the 
42 Chapleo et al (2011) examined the effectiveness of 20 UK university websites in creating brand capital and ‘brand 
promises’ for ‘teaching’, ‘research and management excellence’, ‘international projection’, ‘universities 
environment’, ‘innovation and corporate social responsibility’.  
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university governing body in several ways. As noted in Appendix Three, 
university websites are potentially powerful platforms for, and media through 
which, information about the university governing body is communicated. 
Firstly, the online governing body role-descriptors constitute core textual 
content on its purpose and the members populating the board structures, 
and is therefore one potential vehicle, if constructed and disseminated 
effectively, through which the visibility of the board can be projected to web-
users. This literal means for governing body visibility, however, is tantamount 
to content analysis based on the ‘description’ of the board including its 
‘recognizable features or characteristics marks’ (Potter, 1996:9) of an aspect 
of the organisation of the university.43  
 
However, the richer focus of DA as an avenue for understanding governing 
body visibility is through examination of the discourses around the board’s 
role and contribution to institutional performance, and how the board is 
present(ed) in the web-based descriptors, including its relationship to other 
leadership actors and governance structures. Discourses of, and around the 
governing body are therefore inherently political, and are associated with 
institutional visibility through analysis of which discourses on aspects of the  
governing body’s role are prioritised over others, whether these are its formal 
constitutional and legal basis, its stewardship and trusteeship status or its 
strategy-setting and development role. For example, constructing the 
summary role descriptor of the governing body entails authorial and editorial 
decisions, whether conscious or inadvertent, about which aspects of the 
remit and contribution of the governing body and its actors are featured and 
foreground, and which are downplayed, ambiguous or absent.  This has 
implications for how governing body effectiveness is discursively 
constructed, and which aspects of its contribution to university success are 
conceived more influential than others.44 An assessment of the distance 
43 A corpus linguistics approach to DA (Baker, 2006), through identification of patterns such as frequencies, 
clusters, collocations and keywords has been excluded. 
44 This prompts a wider discussion on what is rendered ‘official’ and ‘legitimate’ in a university online environment. 
Firstly, whether websites constitute ‘official’ or ‘unofficial’ text(s) is debatable. Arguably, HEIs’ governance 
webpages represent official discourses of HEIs’ corporate information and narrative, distinct from predominantly 
web-based promotional and marketing content around academic and research excellence or distinctiveness. 
‘Official’ discourses do not automatically confer institutional authority and legitimacy. For example, Goldsmiths 
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between governing body discourses and the ‘reality’ of what the board and 
its actors undertake in practice in the ‘doing’ of governance, will be explored 
through observations on the board institutional visibility and effectiveness 
nexus in the interviews.  
 
Therefore, the approach to DA in this study broadly aligns to a Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA)45 perspective, through its reading of the governing 
body as a social institution in and around which ‘ideological-discursive 
formations’ (IDFs) (Fairclough, 2010) circulate. The principal thrust of CDA is 
that all discourse ‘does ideological work’, including ‘the role of discourse in 
the (re)production and challenge of dominance’ (Van Dijk and Teun 1993). 
The extent to which web-based discourses on the profile and role of 
university governing body (re)produce modes of orderly social interaction 
(Silverman, 2001) between powerful groups in the university will be 
examined. However, the intended approach and analysis of DA of webpage 
board descriptors does not assume that asymmetries of power exist between 
the governing body and executive management and academic boards and 
senates, or that one set of discourses is dominant over others.  
 
DA and constructionism 
The reason that DA supports the contingent constructionist stance of this 
study is its recognition of the constructed nature of ‘reality’, and discourses 
as means of (re)presenting specific realities around corporate governance, 
the role of actors in shaping and making meaning through discourse, and its 
potential to be re-made and re-interpreted by those entering into a dialogue 
with discourse, whether through ‘text’ or ‘talk’. It is acknowledged that the 
focus on HEIs’ public governance websites does not enable examination to 
be centred solely on how the governing body is discursively present(ed) to 
College, University of London use the descriptor ‘Goldsmiths Official’ for the governance and regulatory online 
content, juxtaposed with the predominantly creative reputation of the College.  
45 A number of CDA-influenced studies examine discourses in documentation generated in HEIs (Van Dijk and 
Teun., 1993, Gee, 2005., Fairclough, 2010), including discourses of marketization in advertisements for academic 
posts, prospectuses and programme materials (Fairclough,1995), textual and visual representations on university 
websites (Askehave, 2007), the ‘discourse of corporate management, reform and transition, the discourse of quality 
and of EU (European Union) institutions’ in Romanian HE (Chiper, 2006:720) and student recruitment in 12 US 
colleges which privilege commercialism over under-represented ‘social goods’, including class and sexual 
orientation (Saichaie, 2011).  
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staff and other internal constituencies of the university. In turn, it is important 
to note that the reception, reading and re-writing of the online discourses by 
staff groups will not be examined in this study, in take a desk-based 
approach to DA of the role-descriptors as an asset for independent analysis. 
 
However, the reason that the focus on public websites is selected is that the 
implications for institutional visibility of the governing body are two-fold. 
Firstly, those shaping, authoring and editing the online discourses are 
institutional actors, normally within the university secretary’s team. Secondly, 
the discourses around the governing body may include the implications of its 
positioning within the organisational hierarchy of the university, including the 
vice-chancellor and executive management and academic governance 
structures and systems. In summary, the discourses around the governing 
body provide an optics for the ‘construction’ rather than the ‘description’ 
(Potter, 1996) of its role and contribution to institutional performance, as a 
‘critical’ rather than a ‘descriptive’ (Fairclough, 2010) analytical approach. 
 
The DA ‘toolbox’ 
Jäger (2001) identifies a discourse-analytical ‘box of tools’ (52) as a loose 
framework for DA of the online governing body role-descriptors. The toolbox 
is not recommended as a ‘table of contents which has to be adhered to 
slavishly’ (36) but instead serves as a reference point for governing body 
role-descriptor analysis. Two features of the toolbox provide a metaphor and 
structure for understanding the online textual summaries of the sample 
governing bodies. The first is Jäger’s concept of ‘discourse strands’ as the 
wider analytical platform for discourse, such as the governance website and 
mores specifically the role description as a discrete narrative. The second is 
the notion of ‘discourse fragments’ as the analytical sub-sets of the discourse 
strand, which may form themes arising from the DA. Column one in Figure 
Four summarises the sequence and structure of the DA ‘toolbox’, with 
column two outlining the means through which the toolbox links to the wider 
structure of this study. Whilst there is a link between phase one and interview 
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phase two in the research design, the DA toolbox is not directly related to the 
interviews on the basis that semi-structured interview data are not defined in 
terms of discourses, and are not subject to DA. 
Figure Four 
DA ‘toolbox’ Means 
Brief characterisation of the ‘discourse 
plane’ as the broad context and platform 
for analysis.  
Chapter One provides the 
discourse plane in locating the 
policy and literature context of the 
HE governing body, supplemented 
by the theoretical platform in 
Chapter Two. 
Establishing and processing the material 
base or archive. 
Sample identification of 20 HEIs’ 
websites, and the distinct 
governing body pages as the 
material base.  
Structure analysis: evaluating the 
material with regards to the ‘discourse 
strand’ to be analysed. 
Analysis of role-descriptors leads 
to identification of four principal 
discourse strands. 
Fine analysis of one or more of the 
‘discourse fragments’ as constituents of 
the discourse strand. 
Discourse fragments include the 
detailed elements within the 
discourse strands, e.g., reference 
to the nature of the language used 
to position the role of the board. 
Overall analysis of the sector concerned. The theoretical, literature and 
policy context covered in Chapters 
One and Two, supplemented with 
real-world insights from the 
interview participants, provide the 
overall analysis.  
 
For Jäger, understanding the process of discourse production is key to the 
context for its analysis. Applied to webpages, this is a complex process, with 
production as a mixture of content, accumulated and edited by authors over 
time. On this basis, caveats are associated with the process of production of 
governing body role-descriptors, and identification of inconsistencies, 
discrepancies and contradictions within the discourse fragments, may be a 
reflection of the messiness of content production, rather than reliable or 
coherent ideological positions. However, a number of assumptions may be 
made on the process of discourse production, including that the authoring 
and editing of webpage text is undertaken by professional services staff 
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including the secretariat or equivalent function. A further assumption made is 
that the role-descriptors and contextual constitutional and regulatory context 
will be drawn from HEIs’ governing instruments, or the CUC’s Model 
Statement (2009:111-112) for governing bodies. Therefore, the role-
descriptors may include to the governing body role in setting and monitoring 
institutional mission and strategy, overseeing finances, estate and 
infrastructure, the staff employment framework, and non-delegable activities 
including the appointment, performance review, discipline and dismissal of 
the vice-chancellor and secretary.   
Practical considerations in DA 
As van Dijk (2001) observes, ‘full analysis of a short passage might take 
months and fill hundreds of pages. Complete discourse analysis of a large 
corpus of text or talk….is therefore totally out of the question’ (99). Therefore, 
focussing in on the discursive frame of the governing body role-descriptor is 
also influenced by practical considerations, including the time constraints to 
invest in this phase of the research across the sample of 20 HEIs’ websites, 
relative to the greater weighted given to the semi-structured interviewing.  
4.6 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Epistemological Context  
Semi-structured interviewing was the sole research method selected for 
generating data on governors’ understanding of accountability in my IFS, and 
forms phase two of this research. The semi-structured interviewing of a 
sample of secretaries and two vice-chancellors enables actor interaction and 
data generation in a framework of shared understanding, or ‘conversations 
with a purpose’ (Burgess, 1984:102), informed by the peer professional 
exchange between myself as interviewer and the participants. In turn, the 
sensitivity of the technique to the situated and constructed nature of meaning 
(Mason, 2002) supports the constructionist model of this study. Modes of 
interviewing may therefore be located on a spectrum, from ‘standardized’ 
interviews through to a ‘depth’ model (Oppenheim, 1992:67), which may 
otherwise be described as quantitative, survey-based models through to 
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free-form approaches to interviewing. The semi-structured interview is 
located on this spectrum between quantitative survey-based models and 
depth or ‘exploratory’ interviews, but more heavily lent towards the latter as 
an approach which is ‘essentially heuristic: to develop ideas and research 
hypotheses rather than gather facts and statistics’ (ibid.). Identifying five 
types of interview,46 Morse (2012) argues that ‘Semi-structured interviews 
are used when the researcher knows a reasonable amount about the topic - 
enough to identify the domain and the questions to be asked - but does not 
know enough to anticipate the participant’s responses’ (199). There is, 
however, a mismatch between Morse’s basis for deploying semi-structured 
interviews and the professional knowledge I hold, and the experiential 
encounters which inform this study. To illustrate, my knowledge of the field is 
sufficiently extensive to pre-empt a range of response profiles on governor 
visibility and role understanding, which will also be informed by the data 
gathered in phases one, as well as the content analysis of phase zero.  
Menu of Questions and Interview Delivery 
Semi-structured interviews comprise a greater degree of structure than a 
wholly qualitative, unstructured method characterised by the ‘absence of a 
pre-designed set and sequence of questions’ (Mason, 2002:67). The 
technique allows a flexible set of topics to be identified to support 
interactional dialogue between interviewer and interviewee as co-creators of 
the data generated. Alongside this, an ‘interview guide’ was devised prior to 
the interview event to enable the identification of primary topics to cover with 
participants. An interview guide is intended to be a reference point rather 
than a strict sequence supporting the questions, and ‘is flexible regarding the 
phrasing of questions and the order in which they are asked, and allows the 
participant to lead the interaction in unanticipated directions’ (King and 
Horrocks, 2010:35). McNamara (2009) places importance on the interview 
guide as a device for the researcher: 
to ensure that the same general areas of information are collected 
from each interviewee; this provides more focus than the 
46 ‘Unstructured’, ‘Guided’, ‘Focus Group’, Semi-Structured’ and ‘Guided’. 
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conversational approach, but still allows a degree of freedom and 
adaptability in getting information from the interviewee’ (quoted in 
Turner, 2010:755).  
 
The interview guide adopted for this study, consists of six core topics to 
capture secretaries’ and two vice-chancellors’ perspectives on: 
1)  whether the governing body enjoys a high or low profile amongst 
staff in the HEI base of the interviewee and the implications for its 
effectiveness; 
2) management of the institutional internal communications and 
media about the role of the governing body, its deliberations and 
decisions, and the contribution of this to understanding the 
performance of the board; 
3) board and senior management encounters on a collective and 
individual basis, and visibility as an expression of this, and factor in 
the nature and tone of these; 
4) board, academic board or senate co-visibility as a factor in 
supporting understanding of the respective remits of these bodies 
for academic strategy, policy, structure and activities; 
5) visibility as a vehicle for governing body reflection on its collective 
purpose and role, and its perception amongst staff stakeholders; 
6) risks to governing body performance linked to various modes of 
institutional visibility amongst staff groups. 
Appendix One provides examples of question phrasing using the interview 
guide format, along with the identification of a set of secondary prompt 
topics. For each interview conducted, topic one on the findings of the 2009 
LFHE and the CUC survey of governors and senior staff views on staff 
understanding of the role of the board formed the opening question to each 
interview. The placement of this at the start of the interviews was on the 
basis that most participants would have a degree of familiarity with the 
research undertaken, as an external point of departure to prompt reflection 
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on interviewees’ own institutional arrangements. The sequencing and 
specific shape of subsequent questions remained fluid, influenced by the 
direction of discussions in each interview context. The prompt question were 
intended as aids to ensure conversation was not exhausted, including the 
citing of general, scenario-based examples about governance practices and 
problems with which participants may be able to identify as a cue for 
reflection on their own experiences.  
A total of 12 interviews were conducted between January 2014 and July 
2014, ranging from 28 to 46 minutes’ duration, as summarised in Appendix 
Two. The distribution of interviews across this period was informed by a 
general objective to conduct two interviews per month over a six month 
period, subject to my professional commitments, participants’ availability, and 
opportunistic encounters with secretaries drawn from the sample, a number 
of which converted into a commitment to participate in an interview. 
Opdenakker (2006) identified four principal modes of delivering interviews: 
face-to-face (FtF), telephone, MSN messenger and e-mail. The first two 
modes were used in this research, with five conducted on a FtF basis and 
seven by telephone, with the second method facilitating interviews across 
geographical distances. Mason (2002) observes that telephone or online 
interviewing are not automatically de-contextualised, compared to the FtF 
approaches. However, the ‘situatedness’ of the interview as supported by 
visual and somatic cues of the participant and interviewer are absent in 
telephone interviewing. Other practical considerations included the clarity of 
the telephone line, usage of a speaker phone to enable the interview to be 
recorded for transcription purposes, and identification of a private and 
environment for both the interviewer and interviewee in different locations. 
 
Interview Piloting 
Sampson (2004) argues that piloting qualitative research safeguards against 
a ‘lack of preparation prior to entering the field’ (385). I decided against 
conducting a pilot of the research framework and pre-testing of the research 
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methods to assess their suitability to address the research questions. If one 
of the wider purposes of a pilot exercise is ‘to firm up your intellectual puzzle 
and your research questions’ (Mason, 2002:46), this was less relevant for my 
role as a practitioner-researcher with strong background knowledge of the 
field and the intellectual and logistical problems linked to the phenomena. 
This limited the likelihood of entering the field ‘blind’, which piloting is 
intended to help guard against.  
However, I decided to conduct a quasi-pilot of the semi-structured interview 
method, through the first interview held in January 2014. At this stage the 
interview guide had not been refined or tested, and was based on broad 
topics on visibility. The key learning point from this initial interaction with a 
secretary to a university council was that the shape and direction of the 
interview took a more desultory route than was helpful to ensure honing in on 
the research questions. For example, to cover wider topics around academia 
arose from the discussion including the council’s public interest role, 
academic promotions frameworks, wider leadership structures and student 
politics. Therefore, the principal benefit of the pilot was that it reinforced the 
importance of devising an interview guide to focus discussion. 
Transcription  
As a crucial step in data analysis, final and full transcription of each of the 12 
interviews was undertaken prior to interview coding. 11 out of 12 digitally-
recorded interviews were transcribed by the company engaged for the same 
purpose in my IFS. A number of commentators regard transcripts as 
‘artefacts in need of thoughtful consideration’ (Dresing and Pehl, 2010, in 
Kowal and O’ Connell, 2014:65). In employing a third party transcriber, I was 
alert to the pitfalls associated with transcription including that potential for 
inadvertent influence and interpretation that ‘both transcriber and the reader 
of the transcript’ (Kowal and O’Connell, 2014:65) bring to the process. 
However, third-party transcriber independence and distance from the 
interview process and subject matter brought potential benefits in mitigating 
the ‘habits, competencies and limitations’ (ibid.) and assumptions which I 
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may bring as a researcher to the task of transcription. This helped me to 
newly reflect on the content and subject matter with the benefit of time 
having elapsed, without having been immersed in the transcript production 
process. However, retrospective analysis of observations also has its 
shortcomings, whereby observations are not reflected on in situ or shortly 
after to the interview date, and could be read outside the original and 
intended context. 
Interview Coding 
The coding of the 12 interview transcripts was chosen as an analytical tool, 
building on the experiences of my IFS. From a grounded theory (GT) 
perspective, coding is regarded as the first stage of analysis and as a critical 
link between data collection and explanation (Charmaz, 2001). Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) originally used the term ‘categorisation’, for topics or thematic 
observations drawn from qualitative research data.47 Given debates around 
the stage(s) at which coding should occur in qualitative analysis, the absence 
of an agreed definition of its components and dimensions is unsurprising. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) define codes as ‘tags or labels for assigning 
units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during 
a study’ (56). However, a normative, technical definition is resisted by 
Saldaña (2013), who defines a code as ‘a word or short phrase that 
symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or 
evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data’ (2013:3). 
Implicit in this definition is the subjectivity of the coding process, informed by 
coders’ judgments on what constitutes ‘essence-capturing’ and ‘evocation’.  
On this basis, coding is an ‘interpretative act’ (Saldaña, 4), influenced, inter 
alia, by the disciplinary and theoretical orientations of the researcher’, who 
unconsciously and consciously applies a ‘repertoire of filters’ (7) to the 
coding process. Saldaña’s differentiation between ‘first’ and ‘second’ cycle 
coding provides a useful point of departure, rather than a prescribed 
47 Other approaches to GT, including more recent ones, conceive this stage as subsequent to coding and therefore 
as a precursor to theory development.  
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apparatus for the coding approach and sequence adopted. First cycle coding 
refers to the ‘processes that happen during the initial coding of data’ (op. cit., 
58) in which seven sub-categories are identified: Grammatical, Elemental, 
Affective, Literary and Language, Exploratory, Procedural and theming the 
data. As Saldana acknowledges, the sub-categories do not constitute a 
definitive suite of headings under which to place data. Recognising this, the 
coding of interview data in this study will not draw on these categories, but 
instead deploys the principal of first cycle coding, and the sub-codes which 
emerge from this.   
4.7 Ethical considerations 
Chapter Four concludes with a range of ethical considerations involved in 
designing and delivering this research. The British Educational Research 
Association (BERA) Ethical Guidelines for Educational Research (2011) 
inform the research design and delivery. The BERA Guidelines structure 
ethical considerations on the basis of responsibilities to a range of 
stakeholders in the research process: participants, sponsors, educational 
researchers, educational policy makers and the ‘general public’. I decided 
that it was not appropriate to ask participants to sign an informed consent 
form as a familiar feature in a repertoire of research ethics tools. This 
acknowledged that completion of a consent form was not fit for purpose in a 
context of reciprocal professional peer trust, and recognised the drawbacks 
in seeking consent at the start of the project (Murphy and Dingwall, 2007). 
This included concurring with the view of seeking informed consent at this 
stage as a ‘premature’ act (Marzano, 2012:445), on the basis that topics of 
conversation in the semi-structured interviews were likely to included 
unexpected topics and reflections which could not be prepared for in 
advance. However, to ensure that potential interview participants were not 
misinformed about the broad parameters of my research, they were provided 
with: 1) a summary of the research scope; 2) confirmation that the subject 
matter and approach had received ethical clearance from the IoE; 3) 
confirmation that the institution’s website had been subject to desk-based 
review and 4) an invitation to ask questions and seek clarification on any 
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aspect of the research, before agreeing to participate in an interview. 
Additionally, the number and spread of HEIs included in the study was 
notified to prospective participants, as was confirmation that qualitative data 
generated through the interviews would, wherever possible, be presented in 
such a way as to limit the likelihood of identifying the HEI within the sample 
and, by association, the interviewee. This commitment upholds the 
guidelines emphasis on the ‘participants’ entitlement to privacy’ and ‘their 
rights to confidentiality and anonymity’ (BERA, para., 25).  
Of insider research, Sikes and Potts (2008) argue that ‘alertness to the risks 
of ‘othering’, and of any way of doing harm to anyone, including the 
researcher himself, should be pervasive and paramount’ (8). This was a 
consideration in my study on the basis that participants held senior positions 
in their organisations, and by virtue of their role, would be party to 
confidential and sensitive information and insights into the dynamics between 
governing body members and senior management, which they would not 
wish to disclose through the interview process. As the ‘conscience of the 
company’ (Coyle, 2012:56) and person often responsible for helping to 
safeguard business ethics, the company secretary48 role also includes 
ensuring that the company is not brought into disrepute through breaches of 
confidentiality. This duty is equally applicable to university board secretaries, 
including when engaging with myself as a professional peer from another 
HEI. In turn, I had a personal obligation to maintain confidentiality and 
discretion, where sensitive matters were disclosed, by not discussing more 
widely the outcomes of the interview discussions with others, including 
colleagues in my workplace.  
The one area in which confirmation of ongoing informed consent of 
participants was problematic was for those interviews which were not 
delivered FtF. For example, Mason (2002) notes that one component of 
consent is shared understanding and perspective between interviewer and 
interviewee on ‘what counts as data’ (81) includes ‘intonation, body 
48  The word ‘secretary’ derives from the Latin secretum, reflecting the role of the secretarius as one entrusted with 
the secrets of officials. 
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language, pauses, general demeanour’ (ibid.) and the delivery of telephone 
interviews meant that para-linguistic cues were absent, even though pauses 
and spaces for reflection were observed. 
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 Chapter Five: Presentation of Research Findings 
5.1 DA of online governing body role-descriptors 
The sample governance webpage governing body role-descriptors accessed for 
textual analysis typically comprise two to three paragraphs of narrative posted 
on the governance homepage. Further details on the prominence and 
positioning of the homepage are provided in Appendix Three. Returning to 
Jäger’s (2001) ‘toolbox’ for DA, a close reading of each of the online role-
descriptors accessed was undertaken in the period December 2013 to March 
2014.49 The process led to the identification of four principal discourse 
‘fragments’, within the wider discourse ‘strand’. The discourse fragments 
identified are: 1) executive authority; 2) accountability; 3) ‘educational character’ 
and 4) strategy. Firstly, it is important to note that there are overlaps between 
the fragments, as themes emerging from the DA which may converge, or 
operate in contradiction to one another. This observation is unsurprising given 
the argument provided earlier in the study that the online construction of the 
role of the governing body represents a series of discursive acts, whether or not 
as conscious editorial choices, which prioritise specific strands of the governing 
body’s role and contribution over others.  
To illustrate, discourses around the accountability role of the board include its 
capacity to hold the vice-chancellor to account for the effective leadership and 
management of the university. This converges with discourses around its 
executive authority vis-à-vis executive management’s responsibilities for 
delivery and implementation. In turn, the discourses of executive authority may 
overlap, or register ambiguities surrounding or conflicting interests between, the 
discursive construction of the board’s responsibilities for university strategy and 
that of executive management. However, I argue that the discourse fragments 
represent facets of how the governing body’s role is constructed and 
49  An overlap existed between the conclusion of the DA phase and commencing semi-structured interviewing. Whilst 
the absence of a wholly separate succession of the two methods may have reduced the holistic integration of themes 
from DA of role-descriptors into interview guide development from the start of the first interview, I ensured that DA of 
each website had occurred prior to interviewing taking place at the participating HEI. 
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(re)presented, and provide a window into which of its roles are prioritised over 
others. The discourses therefore constitute dimensions of the board’s visibility 
and have implications for the communication to, and perception by staff, of its 
effectiveness in institutional oversight.  
Discourses of executive authority 
Discourses of executive authority refer to the powers of the governing body in 
relation to ‘executive’ university matters. However, as discussed in the next 
section, the discursive construction of the governing body’s role in holding the 
head of institution to account - as the chief executive officer at the apex of 
executive authority - is silent in the majority of the role-descriptors. The findings 
from the content analysis of the sample governance webpages in Appendix 
Three structurally reflect these observations, through weak or complex 
navigability between governing body and senior management webpages.  
Secondly, a number of sample statements present confusing messages about 
the locus of executive responsibility, which conflates executive responsibilities 
with the corporate governance duties of the board. For example, a number of 
the statements refer to the role of the council as the ‘executive governing body’ 
(Newcastle and Harper Adams) or the ‘governing and executive authority’ (St 
George’s University of London, SGUL). References to the role of the governing 
body in relation to ‘executive’ authority and leadership would indicate a blurring 
of non-executive and executive boundaries as commonly understood in a 
commercial corporate setting. For example, listed company boards require a 
‘clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company between the 
running of the board and the executive responsibilities for the running of the 
company’s business’ (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012:6). Executive 
governance therefore encompasses oversight of finance, estates and 
resources, and a number of the role-descriptions refer to these as explicit areas 
for which the council or board is responsible.   
The governance tenet of a lay majority of independent board members over 
internal governors is well-understood and prescribed in the English HE sector. 
Therefore, usage of ‘executive’ as a shorthand for the governing body’s role is a 
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potential legacy of a pre-Jarratt Report period when the governing body’s role 
was regarded as an executive rubber-stamping body, in contrast to the 
professional authority and collegial core activities of teaching and research, and 
the role of academic boards and senates in oversight of these arrangements.  
Therefore, the executive management responsibility delegated to the vice-
chancellor from the governing body50 is elided and arguably obscured through a 
simplistic partitioning of the responsibilities of board and academic board in 
many of the sample fragments. In turn, given that many vice-chancellors’ senior 
teams are referred to as the ‘University Executive’, or the ‘Executive 
Management Group’, a clear understanding of the respective roles and 
responsibilities of the board and executive management in the web-based role 
descriptors is limited. Whilst explicit executive powers are ascribed to the board 
in these examples, its value in rendering the board institutionally visible is 
significantly reduced if they generate a distorted understanding to readers of 
the descriptors of the board’s actual powers, and the delicate balance of 
respective responsibilities and authorities between the board and senior 
management.  This will be explored next through discussion of the discourses 
of accountability fragment. 
Discourses of accountability  
The discourse fragment of the board’s external and internal accountability role 
is arguably one of its arms of authority, rendered visible in the university setting. 
In Chapter Three, examples of audit and accountability activities involving 
disclosure displays, as ‘rituals of verification’ (Power, 1997) present a 
measurable but narrow view of governance effectiveness. In turn, these formal 
manifestations of accountability are foreground in the role-descriptors analysed. 
Arguably, the legal-rational modes of governing body accountability, such as 
the powers to appoint the vice-chancellor or approve the annual accounts are 
50 Paragraph 19 of HEFCE’s Model Financial Memorandum (2010) states that ‘Each governing body will appoint a head 
of institution. It will delegate to that person responsibility for the executive management of the institution and its 
policies’. 
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expected dominant discourses on the basis that these duties are enshrined in 
both HEFCE regulation and HEIs’ governing instruments.  
However, analysis of discourses around the ultimate authority of the governing 
body in the sample websites indicates a failure to clarify its accountability 
responsibilities. Whilst the statements signpost the governing body’s 
responsibility as the pinnacle in the organisational hierarchy as the ‘ultimate 
authority’ of the university (Open), these are general in nature. In turn, the 
majority of statements refer to specific official assets for conferring legitimacy 
on the governing body, such as the charter, statutes or instrument and articles 
of government, from which board authority flows. However, few statements 
explain the rationale for, or implications of, the constitutional authority or 
purpose of the governing body which may help legitimise its purpose and 
actions within the institution. For example, the majority of descriptors confirm 
the constitutional ‘fact’ that the university is required to establish a governing 
body, but fail to elaborate on the purpose of this. The following example 
signposts several markers of the council’s legitimacy and internal and external 
reference points, but leaves the reader unclear as to the function or purpose of 
it: 
The Council is the governing body of the University and conducts its 
business according to the Instruments and Articles approved by the 
Privy Council (Bucks New University). 
The website of SGUL states that ‘The Council of the School is the governing 
and executive authority of the School and as such shall have custody and use 
of the Common Seal’, drawing the reference directly from the School’s Charter. 
Reference in the statement to custody and use of the Seal appears to be an 
arcane and tenuous emblem of constitutional power. However, reference to the 
Seal is arguably an (albeit) narrow reflection of the legal authority of the council 
as the ‘corporation’, through its authorisation to affix the Seal to contractual 
documents and bind the School through the execution of deeds with legal or 
natural persons. The significance of the Seal as shorthand for the legal persona 
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of the Council on behalf of SGUL is unlikely to be understood by the vast 
majority of staff or students within the institution.51  
However, caution needs to be exercised when assessing the idiosyncrasies 
local to specific HEIs’ statements (as a product of institutions’ histories) against 
standard HE sector terminology. Durham, for example, refers to council as ‘the 
ultimate governing body of the University’. In the constitutional context of 
Durham, the adjective ‘ultimate’ ahead of ‘governing’ body is not a tautological 
reference, but reflects the fact that a number of governing bodies operate 
across the organisation, including two of its colleges which are independent 
foundations with separate governing councils. In turn, Durham’s Senate is 
described as the ‘supreme governing body on academic matters’ in line with a 
traditional bi-cameral structure found in many pre-1992 HEIs. A second 
example is the Open University statement, which refers to its council as its 
‘main governing body’, which is in the context of a range of other statutory 
bodies in its distributed, quasi-democratic structure including the General 
Assembly and wider national and regional representative bodies.  
The most significant and high-profile sets of acts of accountability of the 
governing body relates to the vice-chancellor. As HEFCE states in its Model 
Financial Memorandum (2010): 
The appointment (or dismissal) of the head of institution is governed 
by employment law, and this is clearly the responsibility of the 
governing body (para., 22:8).  
However, Plymouth is the only role-descriptor of the 20 sampled websites 
which refers to the governing body’s responsibility to appoint, monitor the 
performance and suspend or terminate the head of institution, as well as setting 
and reviewing the role-holder’s pay and benefits:  
…to appoint a Vice-Chancellor as head of the university and put in 
place suitable arrangements for monitoring his or her performance; 
the Board is also responsible for the remuneration and conditions of 
service of the Vice-Chancellor and for processes whereby s/he may 
be suspended or dismissed. 
51 For most external web users, the ‘Seal of the Corporation’ would be an unfamiliar proxy for the legal authority of the 
governing body. Section 36A of the Companies Act 1985 abolishes the requirement to affix company seals to a deed. 
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Whilst other HEIs make reference to this non-delegable activity in their adoption 
or adaptation of the Model Statement, its absence from the high level 
statements conceals one of the key powers of the board and, in the case of 
vice-chancellor performance monitoring and dismissal, the accountability levers 
it can pull. This is borne out by research that indicates that governors 
themselves are not wholly familiar with its collective authority and accountability 
for aspects of performance appraisal and monitoring of the head of institution.52 
The absence of reference to the accountability of the vice-chancellor to the 
board in the statements could reflect web authors’ reticence to communicate 
the board’s authority and the sensitivity of power relations between it and the 
head of institution. However, reference to these acts of accountability may also 
be omitted from the statements, as the need for the board to demonstrably hold 
the vice-chancellor to account is discharged by the governing body on a 
relatively infrequent basis. 
Discourses of educational character 
This discourse fragment is delimited to the post-1992 HEIs in the sample, as 
‘determining the educational character’ of the university is a specific power 
assigned to boards in the ‘initial instrument of government of a higher education 
corporation’ in the Education Reform Act (ERA) 1988.53 The reason this 
discourse fragment of a sub-set of the sample is foreground because the 
discourses around it register potential ambiguities and shortcomings in the 
responsibility of the board in the ‘new’ universities for the academic mission, 
shape and structure of the university. As Middlehurst (2011) observes of 
educational character, ‘what this means in practice may vary’ (10) and the role 
of the governing body in oversight of this area is therefore unsurprisingly 
obscured. Arguably, its original statutory construction in the ERA 1988 was 
deliberately general to ascribe broad powers to the new boards over academic 
matters, giving them flexibility without the bicameral council-senate baggage of 
many of the pre-1992 chartered HEIs, which ascribe authority to senate for all 
matters of academic policy.  
52 The 2009 OPM survey of 27 HEIs commissioned by the LFHE and the CUC found that ‘a third of governors were 
consistently unaware that a regular performance review of the head of institution was conducted’ (2009:29). 
53 s124 (2). 
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Of the eight post-1992 HEIs in the sample, with the exception of two 
(Birmingham City and Bournemouth), all refer to the board’s remit in relation to 
‘educational character’. However, there are two important points to note. Firstly, 
whilst each role descriptor makes reference to the boards’ responsibility for 
‘educational character’, only the Harper Adams and Newman cases precede 
the term with the verb ‘determining’, to identify the board’s ultimate locus of 
authority for this. The remaining web statements instead refer to the board’s 
role in ‘overseeing’ or being ‘responsible’ for educational character which avoid 
clarification of ownership and accountability.  Secondly, none of the post-1992 
descriptors elaborate on what is meant by educational character in the 
university’s own local setting, vis-à-vis the role of the vice-chancellor and senior 
management teams and academic boards. Studies published shortly after the 
passing of the ERA 1988 and the Further and Higher Education Act (FHEA) 
2002 respectively, indicate that minimal evidence exist of regular and effective 
consideration of educational character by the post-1992 boards on an 
equivalent level to the economy and efficiency activities of financial or wider 
resource matters (McNay, 1999, Bennett, 2002).  
On this basis the relative invisibility and lack of clarity in relation to this role of 
the board of the post-1992s as underlined in the role descriptors arguably 
reflects the HEIs’ undeveloped oversight of academic mission and strategy. 
However, the semi-structured interviews will explore whether the governing 
bodies have advanced in the depth of their oversight and understanding of 
academic strategy and policy, and their capacity to seek appropriate assurance 
from the vice-chancellor and academic board. In turn, whilst the new HEIs in 
the sample have been the subject of micro DA of this term, the findings more 
widely reflect weak reporting relationships and unclear respective authorities of 
governing bodies and academic boards or senates in the pre and post-1992 
HEIs, as indicated in the 2009 LFHE and the CUC survey.54 The potential 
contribution that the increased interaction between and co-visibility of governing 
54 The survey gathered feedback from both governors and senior management teams in 27 UK HEIs on whether 
constructive working relationships existed between the governing body and the academic board or senate. That almost 
half of the governors, and over a third of senior managers reported that they ‘don’t know’, or responded ‘not at all’, 
‘rarely’ or only ‘sometimes’ indicate limited understanding and interaction between the two bodies.   
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bodies and academic boards and senates could make to strengthening the 
governing body’s understanding of, and input to academic strategy 
development will be explored through the semi-structured interviews.  
Discourses of strategy  
The final fragment refers to discourses of strategy around the role of the 
governing body, as arguably one of the least understood aspects of the 
governing body’s role, but an area where there is most scope and demand for 
governing bodies to demonstrate their effectiveness. In a study of Australian 
HEIs’ councils Rytmeister (2009) observes that: 
While strategy has remained largely in the executive domain, this 
appears to be changing: institutional identity and mission, 
acknowledged concerns of governance, are becoming key 
components of strategic differentiation in a globally competitive 
environment (137). 
Rytmeister observes that the board’s emerging role in overseeing strategy 
increases the likelihood that ‘greater tensions may emerge between 
governance and management roles and responsibilities in this area’ (138). 
These challenges are reinforced by Collis (2004) who found that the strategy-
setting role in US HEIs was amongst the most difficult tasks facing university 
governing bodies, in terms of trustees’ capacity to deliver this, and the cultural 
constraints within institutions which prevent boards from making a full and 
effective contribution to this area. A focus on the discursive representation of 
the governing body’s role in relation to institutional strategy is insightful.  
The DA undertaken demonstrates that a number of the sampled web 
statements are silent on the role of the governing body in shaping, setting, 
steering or monitoring institutional mission or strategy (Bradford, SGUL, RAU, 
GSMD, Gloucester, LCM). The role of the Council at SGUL is described at a 
level of bureaucratic generality, in conducting ‘the general business of the 
School consistently with the provisions of the Scheme and Statutes’, which fails 
to capture reference to school strategy. Bucks New adopts a constitutional 
description of board responsibility for the outputs of ‘All staff and corporate 
policies, rules and procedures to assure effective governance’ as enablers of, 
105 
 
and subordinates to, strategy. In turn, a number of other statements use a 
language of generality around the totality and ultimate nature of board authority.  
Common to analyses of the following fragments is a failure to identify the core 
responsibilities for institutional strategy-planning and setting. The Open 
University’s Council is described as the ‘ultimate authority within the OU’ in 
which ‘It is particularly concerned with finances, property and staff matters’. The 
remit of Newcastle’s Council is similarly ring-fenced to oversight of resources, ‘It 
is specifically charged with the management and control of the University’s 
finances and property’. Both Newcastle’s and Durham’s governance statements 
adopt a language of generality around their councils’ institutional oversight, in 
which reference to university strategy is omitted. The Council of Durham is 
described as having ‘ultimate responsibility for the affairs of the University’ and 
Newcastle’s Council’s role in ‘reviewing the work of the University’. However, 
each statement is silent on the locus of the ‘affairs’ and ‘work’ in the 
organisational hierarchy for which it has responsibility, or the ‘level’ and nature 
of such activities. The absence of reference in the above examples to the 
contribution of the university councils to strategy development is arguably 
evidence of caution around ascribing this activity to the governing body, thereby 
obscuring its visibility.  
Despite these discursive gaps, several of the sample statements refer to the 
board’s responsibility in relation to the overarching strategic principles of 
university mission. De Montfort’s descriptor adopts verbs making explicit the 
board’s authority for ‘defining and upholding the overall character and mission 
of the University’, in which ‘upholding’ points to the board’s role in setting the 
tone and displaying the values of it. Other examples are less explicit, including 
the board’s responsibility for the ‘mission of the University and overseeing its 
activities’ (Newman), ‘overseeing strategic mission, direction or affairs’ (QMUL), 
or being ‘responsible for the educational character and mission’ (Gloucester, 
Bucks New). ‘Oversight’ and ‘responsibility’ for mission could be read as 
attributing a long-term function for the governing body.  
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Six of the 20 summary statements make direct reference to the board’s 
oversight of institutional strategy, but in the majority of these, the governing 
body’s purpose is linked to general oversight rather than setting out a clear role 
for it in strategic development, including a responsibility to ‘set its (the 
University’s) general strategic direction’ (Harper Adams). At Salford, the 
description of the Council includes its role to ‘assure an effective corporate 
strategy’, although ‘assuring’ a strategy could be read as a ‘check and balance’ 
audit and assurance activity, rather than strategy development and review. 
Potentially these formulations may discursively register and re-produce 
ambiguities and the anxieties of executive management around the board’s role 
in constructing and engaging with strategy.  The absence of active verbs in the 
majority of the statements to specify the nature of the governing body’s role in 
setting, shaping or reviewing strategy and mission, means that its value-added 
contribution to this fundamental activity of university leadership is not 
recognised or rendered visible for external or internal communicates accessing 
the descriptors. 
Whatever motivations may be read into the production and positioning of these 
discourses, the generality of the statements on board strategizing is unhelpful in 
ensuring this core area of board activity is understood by staff and external 
stakeholders. However, arguably the lack of clarity stems from, or is at least 
similarly reflected in, the key HE sector policy texts which are best articulate 
provide general responsibilities for the governing body around strategy. For 
example, the CUC’s Model Statement as a generic reference point for the 
board’s role in English HEIs, emphasise its ultimate ratifying function:   
To approve the mission and strategic vision of the institution, long-
term academic and business plans and key performance indicators, 
and to ensure these meet the interests of stakeholders (2009:111) 
However, the Model Statement is silent on role of the governing body in the 
‘development’ of strategy or in periodically ‘monitoring’ strategic performance. 
This arguably reflects the exercise of universities’ discretion, and where 
HEFCE’s capacity to intervene, and proclivity to do so, is limited in the context 
of institutional self-regulation. However, the absence of a more explicit 
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statement from the CUC or HEFCE risks confining the governing body to a 
ratifying function. Rytmeister’s study of perceptions of university strategizing 
reinforce this perspective, in finding that governor and executive management 
placed strategy-making ‘firmly in the domain of management or administration’ 
(2009:141), in which the council’s role is ‘a passive one of approving strategic 
direction, mission and plans…embedded in a range of best practice guidelines, 
protocols and statutes’ (op.cit.,142).55  
However, two of the sample governance statements are outliers in 
(re)presenting a more proactive, high-profile role for the governing body at the 
interface of institutional strategy. Plymouth plots board responsibilities on a 
spectrum from development of mission, through to approval of the corporate 
plan: 
To contribute to and approve the university’s mission and strategic 
plan, through approval of the corporate plan, and associated 
academic and business plans and budgets designed to support the 
achievement of the mission and vision. 
This clarifies the responsibility of the board at the university for the both the 
overarching direction of mission and strategic plan, and the specific artefacts of 
the corporate plan and associated repertoire of planning tools. Its ongoing role 
in monitoring ‘the university’s performance against approved strategies, using 
key performance indicators benchmarked wherever possible against competitor 
institutions’ is also clear, positioning the board as inward-looking (through 
strategic, planning and budgetary alignment) and outward-looking through its 
focus on external benchmarking data. The Board is presented as having a 
structured and clear, if largely approval role in supporting the realisation of 
university mission and vision. 
Nottingham University’s Council is presented as actively setting the tone at the 
apex of the authority of the University, through collaborative and proactive 
strategic development. The strapline for the Council webpage sets the scene 
55 The board’s strategic approval role was reinforced in the 2009 LFHE and CUC survey which included 13 questions on 
the spectrum of responsibilities of the governing body for institutional strategy and mission. Governor and senior 
manager groups were overwhelmingly ‘clear about their responsibilities for approving strategy’ (Schofield, 2009:13), to 
a greater extent than the wider contribution of the board to the strategy process, from shaping and setting through to 
performance monitoring, revision and re-approval. 
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for its role in ‘Supporting and guiding a global university’ in a governance and 
leadership nexus depending on the ‘commitment of all of its leaders, members 
and champions’. Council’s role is cast as one of strategic stewardship and 
meaning-making: 
University Council has a key role to play in the stewardship of the 
University helping it to fulfil its mission and ensure ongoing integration 
with and impact in all the communities that the University is part 
locally and globally (my italics). 
The role of the Council as one of a series of stakeholders in championing the 
University’s mission is emphasised. In turn, the Council is established as 
forging connections and contributing to fulfilling the University’s mission, and 
brings to life the formal legal-rational transactions of ‘conducting’ business, or 
setting direction in the other sample discourses cited.  Council’s contribution to 
leading and setting the tone for, and ongoing integration with, communities is 
emphasised further by its impact ‘in’ communities, thereby subtly subverting the 
colonial connotations of impact ‘on’ these. This positioning of the Council is part 
of a process of helping sustain an image of the University as a global entity 
incorporating and representing its China and Malaysia campuses.  
The differences in the discursive registers of the Plymouth and Nottingham 
examples are stark. The first incorporates the lexicon of strategic planning and 
performance for the board’s role responsibility for institutional strategy. In 
contrast, the second highlights the Council’s steering role in shaping and 
modelling shared cultural and collaborative behaviours across the university’s 
global network as pivotal to institutional success. Common to both examples is 
the governing body’s value-adding role in contributing to strategic development. 
This reinforces the role of the board as one of the key institutional ‘artefacts of 
strategizing’ (Jarzabkowski, 2005:183) as a steward of and, where well 
developed, a key player in the different stages of an iterative cycle of strategic 
direction-setting, formation, approval, enactment and review.  
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 5.2 Semi-Structured interviews 
Interview coding 
As outlined in Chapter Four, first cycle coding of the interview transcripts 
provides a point of departure for making sense of the secretaries’ and vice-
chancellors’ perceptions of the institutional visibility of their governing body and 
its impact on governance effectiveness. Manual coding was undertaken, 
instead of using computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software 
(CAQDAS) such as NVivo. Advocates of CAQDAS argue that it provides a 
robust, accurate and auditable trail and repository for data analysis (Welsh, 
2002), which aids the coding of content. However, detractors argue that such 
software may dictate researchers in a specific direction (Seidel, 1991), including 
indexing systems influencing how data are defined and collated, more so than 
would be the case with manual coding systems (Mason, 2002). The principal 
reason for not using CADQAS software for coding in this research was to 
mitigate the risks that the tools would distance me from the interview data 
generated. This echoes Saldana’s cautionary note that ‘your mental energies 
may be more focused on the software than the data’ (2013:26).  
Whether manual or technology-enabled coding is undertaken, it would be naïve 
to assume that the identification of first cycle codes was wholly abstracted from, 
and independent of, the assumptions underpinning the research and the 
interaction between reflections on the findings from the webpage DA phase and 
the emerging interview findings. An inductive approach to coding was 
undertaken through what Hennink et al (2011) describe as ‘active reading’ and 
‘‘seeing’ the issues raised by participants themselves’ (220), thereby 
temporarily disregarding whether participants specifically responded to the 
PRQ, SQs and interview questions. Through a process of re-reading and cross-
referencing of transcripts, four overarching themes or four first cycle codes 
were identified. These related to board visibility amongst staff: 1) impacting on 
the effectiveness of constitutional and formal processes (Constitutional); 2) 
enabling governors’ interaction with staff across university spaces 
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(Organisational Structures); 3) as a vehicle for supporting organisational 
change including strategy (Organisational Change) and 4) in fostering 
constructive relations with senior management, and modelling and manifesting 
university mission and values (Cultural).  
Prior to detailed presentation of the findings emerging from each of the first 
cycle codes, a short explanation of the properties of each of these is merited. 
The ‘constitutional’ theme reflects recurrent observations made on institutional 
visibility relating to the formal powers and remit of the governing body, its 
relationship with other bodies in the university, and the benefits brought to 
effectively discharging its accountability duties. The ‘organisational structures’ 
code captures perspectives on the impact to board performance of the 
institutional visibility of individual or groups of governor actors operating outside 
the formal confines of the ‘boardroom’, to inhabit and interact with executive 
management, and academic, disciplinary and departmental staff in less formal 
settings. The ‘organisational change’ theme brings together perspectives from 
interview participants where the visibility of the governing body and/or its key 
actors has played a role in contributing to institutional transformation and 
direction-setting around university strategy. This encompasses a process for 
facilitating organisational change steered, overseen or endorsed by the 
governing body, for staff, such as vice-chancellor succession. The final strand 
focuses on the ‘cultural’ themes which emerged from interview transcript 
analysis. Two elements are built under this banner. The first is the way in which 
institutional visibility contributes to the conditions for positive behaviours and 
dynamics between the board and executive management actors, and the 
governing body’s role in institutional tone-setting including communicative 
practices around its own role, role-holders, influence and actions.  
It is important to note that the codes, as with the discourse fragments emerging 
from the DA phase, are overlapping and have common threads. Interaction 
between the themes will be woven into analysis, as a form of axial coding, 
‘whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding, by making 
connections between categories’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990:96). The social 
constructionist stance of this study means that examination of the insights 
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afforded by the interviews into the collective and individual role of board actors 
in governance meaning-making represents another ‘axis’ in this study. This is 
therefore not confined to the ‘cultural’ code, and spans the themes. A number of 
second cycle codes are identified in Figure Five below under each of the first 
cycle codes in the first row. 
    Figure Five 
Board visibility 
impact on the 
effectiveness of  
constitutional 
and formal 
processes  
Board visibility enacted  within 
and across Organisational 
Structures(OS) 
 
Board visibility as a vehicle  
for supporting Organisational  
Change (OC) 
Board visibility as 
enabling or 
engendering cultural 
dynamics with itself 
and staff groups 
Co1)  
Formal authority 
and role 
understanding of  
 the board 
 
Co2)  
Board and 
academic 
board/senate 
relationship 
OS1) Flexibility versus fixity of 
structure in board and governor  
institutional engagement 
 
 
 
OS2) 
Trespass anxiety  
 
OC1)  
Strategizing as planned  
change  
 
OC2)  
Leadership succession  
Cu1)   
Governors’ (and others’)  
behaviours/personalities 
 
 
Cu2)  
Board Collective Identity 
 
 
Cu3)  
Informal staff  
communications  
on the board, governors  
and corporate 
governance  
 
The above constitutes a high-level ‘codebook’ which may be defined as ‘a list of 
all codes relevant to the study’ (Hennink et al, 2011:225). The second cycle 
codes will feature in the presentation of findings in the following paragraphs of 
this section.  
 
  Constitutional visibility of the university governing body 
  The visibility of the formal authority of the governing body  
    The majority of interviewees were of the view that the core constitutional role of 
the governing body as the ultimate authority at the acme of the university 
hierarchy was generally visible to, and understood by, the majority of staff. 
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However, in all cases, interview participants observed that mainstream staff 
groups were unlikely to have a specific understanding of the governing body’s 
role. Reflecting the institutional visibility spectrum in Figure One, the 
accountability role amounted to ‘apparency’. This was regarded by interview 
participants as accommodating a broad and general awareness amongst staff 
that the board made or ratified significant decisions in the name of the 
university, and that the leadership team were charged with delivering them, and 
bring proposals to a periodically convened governing body. This was not 
considered as extending to more than general awareness of the role, and did 
not represent the unambiguous authority of the board as cited in the Higher 
Education Code of Governance (2014). For example, two interview 
respondents noted that: 
I think they’re aware of the existence of the governing body, but 
they’re probably less clear about its remit…(Interview C:1). 56 
…they wouldn’t have a clear view of what council does or it would be 
very general terms, a vague understanding…(H:1). 
  However, the majority of interview participants did not consider that wider staff 
groups were aware of the detailed powers of the governing body to be a 
significant factor in supporting board effectiveness. In turn, it was not 
considered a major influence on building staff confidence that the university 
was being well run. The two secretaries quoted above were of the view that 
their council’s visibility and demonstration of its influence and role was less 
important to wider staff groups during times of stability, but that a need existed 
for heightened visibility during times of organisational change and uncertainty: 
For your regular staff members I think that, providing everything is 
working well, it’s not an issue…and often they’re not really interested 
in governance. It’s only when things go wrong that they might have an 
interest (C:2). 
…if a place is being well-managed and things are on an even keel, the 
visibility of council perhaps matters less (H:2). 
56 Subsequent quotations from interviews will be assigned a letter between A-L to differentiate the 12 interviews. The 
numerical reference after the colon refers to the page number of the interview transcript. 
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As will be discussed in the next section, examples are cited where the specific 
powers and decisions of the governing body are communicated to staff when 
major events which occur demand this, or make it desirable. An observation 
made by the participant in Interview C, however, was that staff understanding of 
the role of the governing body ‘in some ways matters more to the governing 
body than to the staff members’ (1). Firstly, this supports the view that 
institutional visibility to and from the governing body to staff groups is not one-
way from the board to staff, but functions as a dialogue and joint meaning-
making activity in a constructionist mould. The implication of this observation is 
that governors seek ‘recognition’ from staff for the role they perform, to ensure 
staff awareness of the accountability arrangements in place to review the 
performance and actions of the vice-chancellor and wider senior management.  
One of the two vice-chancellors interviewed echoed the view that the benefits of 
wider staff groups having an enhanced understanding of the role of the 
governing body was minimal, beyond general awareness of it at the ‘apparency’ 
end of the visibility spectrum. However, the purpose of such awareness as a 
means of staff understanding the wider decision-making structures of the 
university beyond their own departments, schools and faculties was considered 
important for sense-making and recognition of: 
…the ultimate responsibility that the governing body has for the 
academic shape of the institution, and its financial management and a 
whole raft of other things (G:1).  
Examples of engagement with staff on the broader role of the governing body 
cited, included staff induction events, which provided an opportunity to 
positioning staff’s individual roles in the wider governance and leadership 
structure of the university.   
As anticipated, the specific constitutional powers of the governing body were 
considered more explicitly understood at the level of senior management team, 
through its direct engagement with the board in the endorsement or approval of 
executive business.  However, one example cited poor levels of understanding 
amongst staff in senior roles, who would not generally engage with the board: 
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...I’m staggered at the level of ignorance and the assumption even at 
levels of deans of faculty, that a vice-chancellor’s omnipotent and their 
lack of understanding that a case needs to be built and made, that’s 
convincing, that stands up to scrutiny (E:2). 
However, this may be read as a wider observation on tensions at the interface 
of academic autonomy and corporate and executive accountability per se, 
whereby the governing body’s role is consciously overlooked or misunderstood 
due to its perception as a potential obstacle to progressing specific activities 
considered the preserve of the academic community.  
Relationship with academic governance  
The majority of interviewees reported weak formal reporting relationships 
between governing bodies and their academic board or senate, reflecting the 
outcomes of the LFHE and the CUC survey quoted throughout this study. 
However, the interview findings indicate that the basis for an effective 
relationship between the governing body and the academic board or senate is 
not reducible to the formal constitutional protocols of governing body 
‘supervision’ or ‘superintendence’ of academic matters. Instead, relations 
between actors on the various bodies were considered important, with various 
modes of institutional visibility as a lever for building and sustaining these 
relationships.   
The limited understanding and variable quality, scope and frequency of 
information flow between the two bodies (but mainly up to the board) was not 
considered as impairing the capacity of the governing body’s performance to 
challenge or approve decisions with direct academic implications. For example, 
one of the council secretaries interviewed from a Russell Group HEI observed 
that the five senate appointees to the council helped forge a constitutional 
connection between the two bodies. However, this was qualified by the 
observation that the ‘unreconstructed senate’ (J:6) of the university, in 
comprising over 100 members, presented political as well as logistical barriers 
to frequent and well-developed co-visibility and mutual understanding between 
the council and the senate.  
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The interviewee observed that the bi-cameral partitioning of the two bodies did 
not delimit the council’s performance or capacity, but enabled it to focus on 
strategy: 
They do get reports from senate but by and large council is absolutely 
delighted to leave the academic business to senate (J:6).  
Whether this same degree of trust and delegation would be granted from the 
governing body of a university with a lesser academic reputation and ranking in 
the different league tables, or perceived performance challenges in terms of 
academic and research quality, is an interesting question. Poor visibility as a 
symptom of limited reciprocal role-understanding and engagement between the 
two bodies and respective sets of individuals was cited in other interviews. The 
majority of interviewees highlighted shortcomings in the performance of their 
academic boards, with a role for it restricted to ratifying decisions already taken 
by other bodies or individuals. Reflecting the decline of academic board 
authority through the assertion of the governing body as recommended by 
Jarratt, one secretary observes of senate that: 
It’s been squeezed by council itself, inadvertently, and it’s also been 
squeezed by the university’s Learning and Teaching Committee, 
which is doing a tremendous amount. That previously used to go 
through to the academic governing body (D:12). 
Other interviewees identified poor or partial visibility of academic board matters 
at the level of the governing body - whether through insufficient or low quality 
reporting and contextualisation on academic strategy and policy matters: 
I was always struggling because there were reports of academic 
board and all that sort of stuff. There were annual reports and the 
governors just didn’t have a bloody clue, really, what it was all 
about...(K:11).  
However, respondents were unable to pinpoint the potential adverse impact of 
this on governing body effectiveness. As with other qualitative measures of 
‘good governance’, it was acknowledged that the impact on governing body 
performance was difficult to measure or impact-assess. However, it is 
inconceivable that several of Schofield’s outcomes of effectiveness as 
examined in Chapter Three would be satisfied without the governing body being 
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visible, and the deeper understanding of academic matters this helped 
engender. Whether the outcomes of ‘Ensuring quality in academic and service 
provision’ and ‘Enhancing institutional reputation and competitiveness’ could be 
satisfied without a contextualised board understanding of the core ‘business’ of 
teaching, learning and research, and the role of institutional visibility in 
informing this, arises from interviewees’ reflections.   
Several interviews included examples of measures introduced to raise the 
profile of academic policy and strategy at the level of the governing body. For 
example, the participant in Interview A noted a provisional recommendation 
from a recent internal governance effectiveness review that senate should 
establish an assurance sub-committee to independently review its own 
decision-making processes around academic governance, on which a lay 
council member could sit to report back to the council on the effectiveness of 
academic policy formation and monitoring. Further, in Interview C, the secretary 
cited nominations committee’s intention to fill a council vacancy brought about 
by the retirement of an academic registrar from another HEI, on the basis of the 
value the appointee added to board discussion and decision-making, in 
validating or challenging management perspectives.  
Relatively innovative practices were cited by interview participants in two of the 
sample sites: a small specialist HEI and a smaller HEI based on staff and 
student numbers, where visibility was identified as an enabler of interaction 
between governing body members and academic governance counterparts. For 
example, the physical presence of nominated independent governors attending, 
or as a member of, the academic board was judged to be effective 
supplementary activity to formal reporting on academic matters to the board. 
The independent governor observer at academic board was considered positive 
on several levels. The role included forging enhanced board understanding of 
the basis for academic decision-making, and strategic performance measures 
included KPIs for student satisfaction and graduate employability. 
Feedback from the governor observer to the governing body helped make the 
academic business a ‘reality’ for the board, and reduced risks of board 
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remoteness from the academic action of the institution, as well as providing 
assurance that academic policy and quality activities were being effectively 
deliberated and decided upon: 
Anna was able to say, “Well, I was at the academic board last week 
and I can assure the board that there was a very, very lively 
discussion about x, y and z…(K:12).  
This example of concentrated and targeted governor institutional visibility could 
be regarded as a carefully set of managed sense-making activities on behalf of 
the board in navigating what may be an unfamiliar academic landscape. In turn, 
the nature of the assurances afforded to the board through the direct, 
demonstrable engagement of independent governors in the academic 
governance system, mitigated the temptation of governor trespass into 
academic policy and practice.  
The vice-chancellor of the small specialist institution noted that, with his 
support, the board had appointed one of its independent governors to academic 
board on the basis of them being a senior academic at another university. In 
this case, the inclusion of an independent voice on academic board was 
welcomed by the vice-chancellor, to encourage academic board to reflect on its 
decision-making, whilst also ‘to make sure that the governing body felt as 
though it was getting a really good sense of what the academic body was 
thinking’ (G:3). As elaborated on by the interviewee: 
That person happens to be the senior academic in another institution, 
which is helpful because they understand the academic nature of 
decision making, but they are then asked to report back on meetings 
in the academic board to the full governing body. That creates a 
connection then between those two organisations (G:3).  
The example illustrates that a managed process of governor visibility through 
‘facework’ commitments to academic board, to quote Giddens from Chapter 
Three, is perceived to be a meaningful way of informing the governing body of 
the work of academic board and vice-versa, alongside reporting through the 
‘faceless’ regulatory artefacts of academic board minutes and reports. In turn, 
the periodic attendance of professional services staff at board meetings to 
present on specific areas represent ‘rituals of verification’ (Power, 1997) in 
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which ‘They want to check out whether what the vice-chancellor is telling them 
is right’ (L:31). One secretary refers to a board session with the academic 
registrar on academic quality and enhancement: 
…I had the Academic Registrar come and do a question and answer 
presentation session to members of the board about how it all works 
and fits together. They liked that, and then feel assured (F:14). 
Therefore, the building of ‘trust relations which are sustained by or expressed in 
social connections established in circumstances of co-presence’ (Giddens, 
1990., op.cit.) is exemplified through these actor-centred approaches. To 
conclude this sub-section, one of the vice-chancellor interviewees captures the 
positive impact on meeting debate and dynamics of governors engaging with 
wider staff on specific areas of board business:  
So that’s a different sort of meeting because they’re then directly 
engaged in the debate. They’re not actually just responding to what 
they’re being told by the executive (G:8). 
 
University governing body visibility enacted within and across 
Organisational Structures  
The extent to which the board and its actors inhabit organisational spaces 
outside the formal, periodically scheduled environment of the boardroom, and 
the implications of this for board and its actors’ visibility and potential value-
creation, was a recurrent reflection throughout the interviews.  
Parallel governor and executive strategic portfolios and contributions to projects 
The formal allocation of specific areas of oversight to independent governors in 
parallel to executive management members’ responsibilities was not favoured 
by the majority of secretaries interviewed. This was with the exception of 
interviewees from the two institutions which operated some form of ‘lead 
governor’ model (Salford and Harper Adams), and considered it an effective 
means of providing a nominated governing body member reference point and 
‘sounding board’ for executive management members. In turn, the model was 
regarded as helping to crystallise and focus accountability at the level of the 
board for areas such as health and safety, equality and diversity or fundraising 
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and major gifts, and empowered (and expected) governing body members to 
elicit information and assurance from management on the relevant areas.  
It was also argued that in terms of visibility of issues and the associated 
visibility of the lead governor and the wider board that the model makes 
manifest and explicit what may otherwise be a more latent area of interest for 
the board or more formally reported on through the sub-committee system. 
Caution cited by other participations around this model included the perceived 
risks of governor and board encroachment on matters of implementation and 
operation within the domain of management. 57 One secretary states that: 
We’ve never gone down the route of associating each governor with a 
particular area of work. We’ve always felt that that was counter-
productive and made them quasi-champions and open to all sorts of 
lobbying (E:12). 
Another secretary observes that ‘We do discourage them from having a 
portfolio’ (K:5) to avoid the risk that ‘it becomes a kind of lobbying-of-the 
governor kind of thing’ (K:6). Another HEI had attempted implementation of a 
‘buddy system’ (J:10) which had been abandoned, as ‘It didn’t feel remotely 
natural for anyone’ (ibid.), as a form of imposed ‘association’ of, rather than 
‘engagement’ between, governors and senior managers.  
One of the two vice-chancellor participants also posed the risks of governor 
academic and professional service departmental formal linkages: 
The ultimate then is to be linked up with an area, where they have 
regular visits. I think that’s hugely dangerous. I think there are huge 
risks in that; because I think they get a very particular perspective, 
often one dimensional. Often one which is - it may be a bandwagon of 
a particular group of staff…(L:3). 
These interactions thereby risk governor misreading of local interests taking 
precedence over, or being representative of, a university-wide position or 
interests.  
57 The ‘dual assurance’ and ‘dual engagement’ model at the University of Exeter is an example of this. A recent review 
of this model indicated that whilst both senior management and council supported the system, ‘too much detail relating 
to the business area in question is raised which simply doesn’t need to engage Council members’ (2014:8). A further 
factor cited related to a risk that the model limited board debate and discussion amongst Council, with one review 
respondent observing that ‘D.A leads tend to talk, others don’t challenge’. (2014:3) 
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However, examples of governor visibility through input to strategic initiatives 
and projects align to individuals’ skills sets and experience was cited in the 
majority of interviews, providing additional expertise and challenge to senior 
management. For example, one participant referred to independent governor 
involvement in ‘special interest groups’ chaired by a member of the executive 
team which were ‘not actually part of a governance structure’ (D:10), but in 
which input precedes any formal discussions of the proposal at the council.  
Capital and infrastructure projects were areas where the presence of targeted 
governors, including with commercial and estates experience, was judged as 
beneficial:  
…We’re benefiting from their expertise in them being there. Also 
they’re able to report back if you like, so that they have a greater 
understanding of the process, to give them more reassurance (L:20).  
This assurance to executive management and the governing body was 
perceived by participants as productive in engendering mutual trust between 
the two groups, as well as supporting due diligence on project risks, in 
‘…helping us later in terms of the audit trail’ (L:21). This was echoed by a 
former board secretary, citing governor involvement in a major estates project 
through a joint management and board working party: 
Because someone – two or three people have spent the time 
exploring in detail and are satisfied and can provide that assurance to 
other members of the Board (E:18). 
This included development of a due diligence ‘template, which had the 
confidence of the Board’ (19) as a consistent reference point for reporting on 
such matters. 
Governor and wider staff engagement 
Unstructured or loosely structured activities to enable the engagement of the 
governing body in a range of institutional activities where they interacted with 
wider groups of staff arose as an activity in the majority of interview exchanges. 
The benefits highlighted of this mode of less formal institutional visibility as 
features of effective governance included engendering trust in governance 
arrangements and the ‘system’, through raising the profile of the governing 
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body amongst staff groups, whilst also broadening the perspectives and 
contextual understanding by governors of the university context. The improved 
capacity and competency of governors to therefore make more informed 
inquiries of management for information and interpretations on business, and 
decisions was cited, which supports one of Schofield’s outcome of board 
effectiveness in ‘Constructively supporting and challenging the executive’.  
A tight-loose approach was advocated by the majority of respondents in 
managing governing body members’ entry into non-boardroom, non-corporate 
environments, such as visiting faculties and academic and support 
departments. One secretary notes that this was: 
…deliberately not overly managed. So it’s not managed by the Vice 
Chancellor or anything like that (F:1-2). 
Another participant observes that: 
We give them the opportunity - we don’t force it on them, we give 
them the opportunity - to have one-to-ones with key senior staff in the 
University (B:9). 
This form of sense-making of governors’ and staff respective roles and 
responsibilities across disciplinary and organisational boundaries - as a 
constructionist endeavour - is enacted through these informal engagement 
encounters and events. It is presented therefore as a dialogue in seeking 
mutual role understanding and recognition, as opposed to more conventional 
modes of one-directional reporting to the board:   
What we sought to do as well is to involve staff from different schools 
within the university in meeting with members of the governing body 
as well so that they - it’s a two way thing (K:1-2). 
The positive contribution of governors’ literally ‘being seen’ and having regard 
for non-formal institutional activities and initiatives through these forms of 
engagement for members’ own knowledge development is borne out in several 
interviews. One example included the opportunities for council members’ 
interaction with senior academics as a form of vicarious visibility or confidence 
cascade, through which the credibility and relevance of the council as a set of 
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actual individuals, rather than an abstract body was subsequently percolated 
through the senior academic to wider staff groups. One secretary observes that:  
…the teams are getting the impression that Council is real, these are 
not just people falling asleep around a committee table once a 
month…that they’re actually active in the industries that we are 
engaged with and are bringing benefit and value to the University and 
to the students (B:12). 
In turn, the importance of the governing bodies seeing first-hand the reality of 
activities and individuals with which they engage with on only a superficial, 
general and remote level through formal board and committee transactions. 
One secretary referred to the annual rotation of groups of governors to visit the 
university’s China and Malaysia campuses, which enabled them to ‘get to see 
the reality of it’ (K:4) and directly engage with the aspects of the university’s 
offshore activities in a way which would not be captured through a position 
paper or performance report. The same secretary identified the importance of 
governors engaging with grounds staff, which in the context of the agriculture 
and horticulture subject specialisms of the university, rendered real and 
material the latter group’s wider contribution to the university:  
…the governors really, really enjoyed that, because they didn’t 
understand, for example, the extent to which those staff don’t just 
manicure the flowerbeds and manage the trees, but they also manage 
the woodland that’s used for teaching. They actually teach - we do 
rural skills, and a number of those staff actually teach on those (F:2). 
Whist not prevalent, the risks associated with governor outreach in the 
university were identified by several interview participants, including the 
potential for tensions to arise when the executive management and the board 
fail to comprehend and respect each others’ roles: 
I’ve seen a situation where there was the potential for the governing 
body and the executive to fall out, and there was a lot of behind the 
scenes activity, which was quite complex and tricky, until a point of 
resolution was found (C:25). 
The role of the secretary in helping to manage such scenarios will be examined 
later in this chapter. 
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University governing body visibility supporting Organisational Change  
The visibility of the governing body in relation to strategy  
As addressed throughout the thesis, the governing body’s contribution to 
university strategy represents an emerging area of its remit, where its potential 
for value-creation in influencing the long-term direction and success of the 
university is significant and could be most visible, particularly vis-à-vis 
constructive advice and challenge to the vice-chancellor and wider senior 
management teams. One secretary was of the view that clarity existed in 
relation to governors’, executive and, potentially, wider staff understanding of 
governing body authority for strategy setting and shaping:   
There’s no doubt the governing body has to approve the strategy. 
There’s no doubt that they should be able to shape it as well so it 
shouldn’t be a rubber stamp (D:6). 
Another secretary cited that their vice-chancellor made explicit to staff that the 
board owned the university’s corporate plan:   
…he makes it clear to everybody that it’s not his strategic plan, it’s the 
Board’s strategic plan (K:3). 
These conversations with staff would no doubt raise the board’s profile and 
visibility in terms of responsibilities for strategy, and the ultimate nature of its 
stewardship and responsibility beyond his ownership of it. However, 
communication of this message requires careful calibration to avoid the 
impression that the university strategy is not a matter for wider engagement, 
whether between the board and senior management and, in turn senior 
management and wider staff groups, but is instead an imposed direction and 
non-negotiable set of objectives. Arguably the two examples above are what 
Jarzabkowski (2005) terms ‘procedural strategizing’ (81) by conferring structural 
legitimacy on strategy, through the governing body’s formal ownership of and 
reporting on, an institution’s corporate plan.    
In line with the DA of the online governing body role-descriptors, university 
strategy-making is a process integral to the nature of the interface between the 
board and senior management, and which may bring into sight the potential 
fault lines between these groups of actors. Rytmeister’s study of councils’ roles 
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in university strategic development exposes the ‘perceptions, practices and 
tensions at the governance-management interface’ (2009:138). This scenario is 
reflected by one secretary respondent in my study, who identifies fissures in the 
respective authorities of council and senior management around the locus of 
authority for approving the strategic plan: 
We’re redeveloping our strategy at the moment, and there’s been a 
semantic discussion about whether the council sets the strategy. In 
the sense that the executive feel that they set the strategy by writing it, 
whereas you could also perceive the word ‘set’ to mean approve, so 
there has been quite an interesting dichotomy there (C:15). 
It could be argued that ‘semantic’ debates about university strategy are 
unsurprising in an academic context and are primarily philosophical and 
conceptual in nature rather than materially impacting on the effectiveness of 
this governance strand. However, these debates also function to bring the role 
of the council to the fore in terms of its contribution to the long-term direction of 
the university and, from a constructionist angle, constitute actors seeking to 
make sense of sensitive issues of power relations, which may be regarded as 
features expected in a well-functioning strategy development process.  
The vice-chancellors interviewed refer to a more complex role dynamic of 
governor and senior management players in shaping and setting strategy, 
reflecting a mode of ‘interactive strategizing’ to account for ‘face-to-face 
interactions between top managers and other actors’ (Jarzabkowski, 2005:51) 
facilitated by the institutional visibility of the board. One of these referred to 
governing body agenda-setting and the arrangements for the meeting as a 
carefully managed process involving the chair, vice-chancellor and secretary, 
centred on development and review of performance against the five-year 
strategic plan. This entailed the scheduling of two board meetings per 
semester, the first of which covered more routine regulatory business, with the 
second focussing on a strategic topic such as the student experience, by 
adopting a ‘much more discursive’ (L:4) approach through exploratory material 
rather than fixed reports, ‘using quantitative data, but also more qualitative stuff’ 
(ibid.). At these sessions, the institutional visibility of the board was one factor 
contributing to interactive strategizing through strategic council meetings 
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involving a broader group of participants and attendees, ‘So it’s not just the 
board and the senior team, there are other members of staff there’ (ibid.). The 
conditions were supported by configuring the meeting room tables in ‘cabaret’ 
style to foster collaboration and breakdown the formality and hierarchies implied 
by a formal boardroom structure. 
Strategy development as an institution-wide process of iteration was a feature 
of the planning cycle cited by the other vice-chancellor interviewed, reflecting 
the ‘journey of the strategy’ (C:15) in which board visibility is seen as one 
enabler for its journey, from staff groups at more junior levels, through to the 
senior management team and onwards to council and vice-versa. Another 
respondent cited the role of the board executive planning day in supporting the 
trajectory of the strategy taking shape, in being used ‘to set out our stall for a 
new strategic plan’ (G:12). The outcomes of this session subsequently fed into 
staff consultation meetings, centring on sense checking including around the 
nuanced areas of how it is pitched and therefore likely to be ‘received’. This 
was prior to reporting the draft strategy through management and back up to 
the governing body for approval, with some degree of assurance of staff 
understanding and acceptance of it: 
…where we feel comfortable enough to share this with staff and say 
“What do you think?” Is this the right sort of tone? Is it the right sort of 
direction that we’ve got for the institution?” (F:13). 
The transparency of the council’s role in strategy development and its intention 
to ensure staff input through a process of engagement, had the potential to 
support staff buy-in and increase the likelihood of the strategy being owned 
throughout the university, and thereby delivered at local levels.  Other examples 
offered through the interviews included preparation for a council away day with 
senior management which invited the independent governors to co-create 
material for the event, by gathering feedback from staff within the institution. 
The case cited illustrates ways in which executive management in the university 
‘strategized about the away day’ (I:8), by identifying independent governors to 
investigate strands of activity which would feed into the sessions: 
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…we actually made the independent members go and do some 
research, and find out about different aspects of the institution. We set 
up meetings for them so they could meet different constituencies, and 
then report back to the away day (I:8). 
The potential outcomes of directing independent governors to explore and 
gather information on a specific theme, activity or function ‘inside’ the institution, 
served to both raise the visibility of independent governors across staff and 
student groups, whilst also building governors’, council’s and also, most likely, 
senior management, knowledge and understanding of the area.  
Governing body visibility supporting leadership succession management 
Alongside strategy development as a focus of long-term organisational change, 
several interview participants identified major change processes and incidents 
necessitating, or acting as opportunities for, governing body visibility. 
Governance review exercises were cited as examples which formally fostered 
institutional reflection on the effectiveness of the board, its structures, 
relationships and actors. As one interviewee notes: 
…people know more about it now because of the quite sustained work 
we have done for the governance review (A:1). 
Another interviewee referred to an effectiveness review as an opportunity to 
evaluate the profiling of the council within the university: 
When we had our last effectiveness review of our Council we wanted 
to very much look at the profiling of the governing body within the 
institution (K:1). 
The purpose of this exercise was to help overcome the challenges faced by a 
large pre-1992 HEI in communicating the role, decisions and deliberations of 
the council to a diverse and geographically dispersed staff and student 
population.   
One respondent noted that circumstances in which governing body visibility 
was deliberately heightened by agreement between the chair and vice-
chancellor activities, included strategic landmarks or events in the life of the 
university, whether celebratory or for matters of change, challenge or crisis:  
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It’s usually only in the event of a major decision but it could be on 
issues around…issues of emergency, financial stringency, the need to 
make cuts, the prospect of a potential merger. It’s in those sorts of 
areas where the decision-making of the governing body becomes 
apparent within the institution (E:5). 
This was echoed by a pre-1992 HEI secretary, who drew on recent experiences 
of high-profile governance and leadership challenges and changes in the 
university where it was considered appropriate by the chair of council to make 
manifest to staff that the university’s senior management were supported by the 
council, and were also held accountable to it: 
…I think particularly when we’re going through perhaps difficult times,  
assurance that there is a body which is ultimately accountable and is 
reviewing exec performance I think can be a sort of comfort to staff 
more generally (H:18).  
Change and challenge would appear to involve a re-calibration of relationships, 
which exist beyond the formal parameters of board and committee powers and 
terms of reference. Instead these are instead based on subtle shifts in stance 
and positioning between the bodies and key actors: 
…traumatic events thankfully only happen occasionally. I think since 
then, I think there’s perhaps been a rebalancing and the governance 
voice is perhaps being heard more than it was previously (H:20). 
One of the vice-chancellors interviewed cites a significant moment of change 
embodied in a leadership succession planning exercise following the 
announcement of their own retirement. The role of the governing body in the 
process included the production of a video for staff which featured the chair, 
and included assurance along the following basis: 
I’m the Chair. This is a process of appointing a new Vice-Chancellor 
which is a board responsibility. This is what we’re going to do; this is 
how we’re going to involve you etc. This is our plan (L:9). 
This represents a real-world scenario where it was appropriate to communicate 
one of the key roles of the governing body to staff, to provide re-assurance that 
the vice-chancellor’s decision to step down was both planned and effectively 
managed rather than as an outcome of a breakdown in relationships or other 
crisis. This was intended to both inform staff, and aid them in making sense of a 
change in leadership, and what this might mean for the university. The 
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importance of facial encounters, albeit via the medium of video, in engendering 
trust relations is evident:  
I think it was an opportunity for them to see her literally, what does 
she look like. Also…the intention was to try and reassure that this is 
not something that we’re just going to lurch from...It has been planned 
out; reassurance. It’s not about a huge change of direction (L:9).    
 
Governing body visibility informed by, and instilling, institutional culture 
Overview 
It is recognised that there is not one single culture which characterises each 
university, despite the fixation in the critical literature on university types, 
including collegial, bureaucratic, entrepreneurial, corporate forms (Dopson and 
McNay, 1996). However, if culture in universities is regarded as an ‘invisible 
tapestry’ (Kuh and Whitt, 1988) woven into organisational structures and 
behaviours, it poses the question of whether the institutional visibility of the 
board helps shape, set and articulate university mission, values and culture. 
One secretary observes the different cultural contexts of universities which: 
…vary from institution to institution and according to the personalities 
of the individuals involved (E:31). 
The flexibility and openness of senior managers to governors in accessing 
university spaces to engage with staff more widely, is presented by a number of 
interviewees as a barometer for the wider institutional culture and tone set or 
modelled by the leadership team. One of the vice-chancellors interviewed refers 
to a culture of trust in which executive management consciously - and 
conspicuously - relinquish control of governors beyond corporate level 
interactions with senior managers. The potential scope of this approach in 
helping advance governor understanding and development of the wider 
university context, alongside the cultural messages this signals are considered 
significant:   
You have to, as an executive I think, just let go a bit. If you see it as 
an opportunity to gather more information, rather than risk that a 
governor’s on the loose (G:7). 
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The confidence in releasing or loosening control is reflected in another 
interviewee’s observation that ‘There is nothing to fear from a properly trained 
non-executive’ (A:5). Another example cited the importance of a culture of 
transparency ‘We’re quite open; we want to foster and engender working 
relationships’ (B:10) amongst the governing body and senior management.  
These perspectives are in contrast to the director of a company cited in 
research by Cornforth and Edwards (1998), where a company director sought 
to avoid the board interacting with each other, or staff outside meetings, 
through fear that it would undermine her authority, which led to board over-
reliance on the information and representations made to them by the CEO.  
These behaviours, and the adverse impact of them on governance 
effectiveness, are reminiscent of the closed management milieu cited in the 
cases of HE governance breakdown in Chapter Two. 
Governor personalities and perspectives  
Human dynamics in governance include understanding the interplay between 
governor actors’ personalities and those of senior management, and the extent 
to which the surfacing of personalities balances with the formal roles and 
responsibilities to deliver effective board performance. Role performance, 
therefore, extends beyond constitutional remits and job descriptions of key 
actors populating the governance system. Instead good governance is closely 
related to mutual recognition and respect of respective governor and executive 
roles. As one secretary highlights:  
I think what’s underestimated often in governance is the personality 
because you can’t really legislate for it and personalities change a lot. 
You can have all these codes of practice and very good structures, 
very good committee secretariat, but it could still go horribly wrong 
because the personalities aren’t right (D:9). 
Another secretary participant observes of personalities that ‘it’s often because 
of egos, and people trying to exclude the others’ (C:26) where damage occurs:   
I’ve seen a situation where there was the potential for the governing 
body and the executive to fall out, and there was a lot of behind the 
scenes activity, which was quite complex and tricky, until a point of 
resolution was found (C:25).  
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Recognising Dearing’s concerns about the size and function of governing 
bodies, one secretary reflected on what was once an unwieldy, collegial and 
consultative council of more than 40 members, which represented:   
…an abdication of responsibility on the part of individual governors 
because it was so large. They were there, largely, for their 
representative function (E:29). 
However, despite the demands on the duties of individual governors, and the 
importance of interpersonal dynamics between actors, the collective identity 
and purpose of the governing body and how this is projected more widely, is 
seen as constitutionally crucial for consensus-based decision-making: 
Big Personalities believe they run the institution. Collectively they are 
the trustee board, but individually they don’t have any right of action 
(A:4).  
Institutional visibility through governor engagement with staff outside senior 
management put governors’ skills to the test, including how effectively 
individuals were able to place a partition between their personal perspectives, 
and their duty to act in the best interests of the university. One Secretary noted: 
Our Council members are pretty astute…They know when somebody 
is trying to push a particular view which is maybe not the right thing to 
do, and we’d take it with a pinch of salt (B:8). 
Examples were cited of governors’ ability to negotiate and mediate the 
viewpoints of staff interest groups or local concerns when encountering staff on 
a visit to a department. These included the ability of governors to identify the 
‘elevator pitch’ from head of a department on the need for new facilities or 
accommodation (A:5) for his department, and filter contentious comments made 
by a student to an independent governor:  
Yes I think he understood. He fed back to us and said, “I’m not going 
to bring this up at the council away day, because I think it’s something 
that you need to discuss outside of the meeting” (I:9). 
However, a number of interviewees identified risks to independent governor 
institutional engagement with staff, such as being susceptible to lobbying:  
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The more visible they are the more likely it is that they will be hassled 
by people who want to lobby then or want to register a complaint or 
whatever (K:12). 
The risk of governors forming misconceptions about areas or activities as a 
result of engagement with specific departments and staff was also identified. 
This required recovery activity by the secretary and head of institution, to 
rectify, counter or at least balance the viewpoint, to limit the potential of 
distorting the collective understanding of the governing body on the matter:  
They can inevitably end up with a skewed view of reality because 
they’re just getting a very narrow and temporal snapshot of what’s 
going on. If they allow themselves to be drawn into imagining that 
that’s the way everything is, then we spend quite a long time 
unpicking that and trying to retrieve it (K:13). 
Difficulties were identified where governing body members sought to assert 
their own abilities and knowledge of an area of expertise, and impose these on 
an equivalent area of activity within the university:  
…the desire of people to demonstrate their expertise in that area 
versus their role in steering and critiquing and advising gets crossed 
(J:9). 
Cultural convergence of university mission and values 
As quoted earlier in the thesis, one of the seven enablers of effective 
governance is board ‘commitment to vision, organisational culture and values’.  
The extent to which institutional board visibility fosters or strengthens this level 
of commitment emerged from several interviews. The size of the staff and 
student population of the university appeared to be an influencing factor on the 
capacity to ‘connect’ to staff and demonstrate cultural alignment. One 
respondent of a small specialist HEI observed that ‘I would say our governors 
are a little bit like the institution’ with independent governors’ professional 
experience linking to the academic disciplinary base of the university, as well as 
them aligning to the wider ethos and culture:   
So they’re quite high powered people, but they’re not hierarchical. I 
think if they were desperately aware of their own importance and very 
hierarchical, it wouldn’t work (F:25). 
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Interview participants from the other smaller HEIs in the study, including three 
of the four B, C and D institutions in the sample, associated a more contained 
staff (and student) community as increasing the likelihood of greater institutional 
engagement between the board and staff.  One interviewee observed of the 
independent governors that, ‘They get to know some other people. We’re not a 
big organisation so that’s possible’. (G:9). This contrasted with a pre-1992 HEI 
with global campuses, a student population exceeding 30000 and a staff 
population of 5000, in which the challenges of council engagement with staff 
were identified as a result of the size, complexity and geographical reach of the 
university:  
…because of the sheer scale of the institution, they can’t possibly 
hope to get - none of us can - a sense of the detail of what’s going on 
on the ground (K:10). 
McNay (2002) echoed this perspective in a study which asserted that a cycle of 
presentations to governors on a university’s academic activities  was 
‘impossible in the larger institutions where…governors rarely meet staff other 
than the senior management team (SMT) and elected staff governors’ (308). 
However, potential risks arise with the close connections borne between board 
and staff in small, specialist institutions, which Schofield (2009) refers to as ‘the 
governance and management continuum’ (15) and the associated dangers of 
governing body drift into management matters and vice-versa, or ‘cultural 
congruence between governors and governed’ (McNay, 2002:304) at the 
expense of independence, challenge and, ultimately, accountability. 
Internal communications 
The final area addressed in this section is the role played by internal, less 
formal or informal communications in profiling the governing body within the 
university, demonstrating its effectiveness and engendering confidence in 
governors and connections to them amongst staff. Almost all interview 
respondents considered both formal and informal communications about the 
role, deliberations and decisions of the governing body to be under-developed 
in their own institution. A number of secretaries and vice-chancellors cited this 
as symptomatic of poor internal communications in universities, cited in more 
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extreme terms in one example: ‘the actual effectiveness of communications in 
universities is woeful anyway’ (D:22). However, most participants were of the 
view that more could be done to disseminate information on the outcomes of 
board deliberations to staff in an accessible and comprehensible manner. This 
was in contrast to the more formal existing communications, including the 
circulation of executive summaries of meetings to staff, which: 
…might tell staff something like, you know, “The Board has approved”. 
Something like that. I don’t think it’s very lively though is what I’d say 
(L:24). 
However, in many instances, accessible communications through platforms and 
media including the staff intranet were favoured, provided that what was 
published did not over-simplify discussions and decisions, and thereby increase 
the risk of staff misinterpretation of the rationale for or outcome of these. 
Communicating decisions of council shortly after meetings and the time was 
favoured in several interviews, ‘it might be something we could do after Council 
meetings…’(I:15). In one example, the secretary reflected that this could  
operate in parallel to existing channels for communicating the key discussions 
from executive team meetings which are streamed to staff in a short video 
presented by the vice-chancellor or registrar, ‘We might think about maybe 
doing that for council going forward…’ (H:10). 
Pro-active, actor-centred communication, including interviews of governors 
which provided a more personalised alternative to the formal publication of 
governor biographies and disclosures of registers of interests were favoured by 
interview participants. Central to this was ‘to raise awareness about who they 
are, and what they do for the University, and why they want to do it for the 
University’ (B:21). The potential for governor interviews to function as narratives 
to which staff (and students) could relate, and be inspired by, was cited in one 
interview. The interviewee reflected on a lost opportunity to profile within the 
university the achievements of a governor who retired from board membership 
as a charity fundraiser, rather than his professional career highlights: ‘Why 
didn’t we get that inspiration out to our students’ (B:22). Enhancement to 
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communications of this type featured as a reflective moment for a number of 
secretaries, as area which they would co-ordinate as part of their roles:  
   Maybe we should do more on that. It’s a good point (D:22). 
  I think it would be quite good, maybe, to profile it a bit more (L:24). 
Effective governance in this context is less about conferring of legitimacy on the 
board, but is instead about ensuring that staff are confidence that a body of 
individuals exist which is distinct from, and challenging of senior management,  
whose role is to support the best interests of the university. 
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Chapter Six: Summary of research findings, recommendations 
and professional implications    
6.1 Integrating research findings to respond to the research questions 
The potential contribution made by the institutional visibility of the governing body 
amongst staff to board performance as set out in Chapter One, is re-visited here: 
1) supporting the board’s formal accountabilities; 2) enabling interaction with 
staff; 3) facilitating organisational change and university strategic development 
and as a cultural enabler; 4) supporting governor and senior management 
relations and 5) helping to inform and model a university’s values.  
Prior to summarising and integrating the findings of the two phases of the 
research in response to the PRQ, the outcomes of the research highlight the 
following key points. Firstly, the perceptions of the secretary reinforce the 
observation in Chapter Three that the institutional visibility of the governing body 
is a multi-faceted construct and activity in the ‘doing’ of governance. In turn, the 
outcomes of the DA of the online governing body role-descriptors and the 
examples identified in the interviews, illustrate the many ways in which the 
governing body’s role and performance and actors are rendered visible.  These 
include the reciprocal relationships between the governing body and different 
strata of staff in the university hierarchy, in formal transactions through to less 
formal engagements. Secondly, the research findings indicate that the 
institutional visibility of the governing body amongst staff is regarded as a 
potentially powerful, but under-estimated contributor to its effectiveness. From a 
‘paradox perspective’ (Cornforth, 2004:1), non-profit boards embody both 
‘conformance’ and ‘performance’ functions. However, the study found that the 
visibility as vehicle to support the accountability (conformance) function of the 
board such as legal and regulatory compliance to sector bodies, and holding the 
vice-chancellor to account was perceived as a less valid measure of 
effectiveness than its broader performance role. The wider remit for the board 
which institutional visibility supported, including in harnessing board knowledge 
of the context of the university, helping it steer and shape strategy, and visibility 
as a mode of interacting, fostering positive relations with senior management and 
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staff. The PRQ is re-visited below in order to summarise how the research 
findings respond to it:  
What perceived role does the institutional visibility of the university 
governing body amongst staff groups play in contributing to its 
effectiveness? 
With one exception, semi-structured interview participants considered it 
important that mainstream staff groups in their university settings had a broad 
understanding of the accountability function of the institution’s governing body. 
The collective institutional visibility of the board was not regarded as a major 
variable in strengthening the accountability as conformance function of the 
governing body. However, in broad terms, the institutional visibility of the 
governing body in deepening governors’ reservoir of contextual knowledge 
beyond the confines of business reported to the board, informs the board’s 
collective capacity to interrogate information in reports brought to the board for 
accountability or developmental purposes, and make intelligent inquiries of 
management on business brought before it.  
 
What emerged from the interviews were the difficulties associated with 
measuring and articulating the contribution of the accountability role of the 
governing body to its performance and the wider institution’s success, beyond 
the act of signing-off of documents including the financial statements, budget and 
forecasts and the audit committee annual report as formal accountability returns 
to HEFCE. This was also evident from the DA of the online role-descriptors, 
where descriptions made general reference to the ultimate authority of the board 
for fundamental university matters, but failed to elaborate on the fundamental 
basis and purpose of the governing body in ensuring accountability. These 
outcomes register a gap between HE governance policy expectations and the 
practical realities of boards demonstrating accountability to their stakeholders, 
both internal and external to the university. To illustrate, the Association of 
Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges (AGB) in its Statement on Board 
responsibility for governance (2010) recommends that ‘The governing board 
should manifest a commitment to accountability and transparency’, but the 
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challenges of defining, not least manifesting, meaningful and authentic 
accountability to stakeholders through acts of visibility and transparency are 
evident from this research.  
 
One facet of visibility amongst staff which supported Schofield’s effectiveness 
outcome of ‘ensuring accountability and regulatory compliance’ included 
manifesting board oversight of key acts and interventions related to its formal 
powers, including around the vice-chancellor’s leadership, or periods of change 
and challenge in the governed university. To illustrate, circumstances in which 
the board and its key role-holders were rendered visible featured in several 
interviews, including one chair’s communication of the process of appointing a 
new vice-chancellor to staff, or times of organisational restructuring. The former 
scenario of vice-chancellor succession illustrates the ways in which the board’s 
‘conformance’ and ‘performance’ responsibilities (Cornforth, op.cit.) were 
undertaken, and how the visibility of the chair enabled the performance aspect to 
be progressed. To illustrate, conformance was satisfied through the board 
ensuring its constitutional powers to appoint the vice-chancellor were adhered to, 
with chair presentation to staff ensuring that the appointment process was 
understood and engaged with, helping to mitigate staff uncertainty during times 
of change. The research has advanced an understanding of how institutional 
visibility can engender an understanding of, and confidence in, acts of board 
accountability, and its potential contribution to institutional morale. This supports 
two of Schofield’s outcomes of board effectiveness: 1) ‘ensuring accountability 
and regulatory compliance’ and 2) ‘ensuring confidence in institutional 
governance’ amongst staff. 
With reference to Figure One, the ‘engagement’ end of the institutional visibility 
spectrum, as represented through less formal interactions between the board, 
individual governor actors and staff groupings, was considered a form of effective 
governance. This is not to imply that this mode of engagement was recognised 
as a substitute for collective decision-making, as a fundamental, non-delegated 
board responsibility. Instead, the research findings indicate that engagement with 
staff can operate as a precursor or accompaniment to, or outcome of, the 
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collective role of the governing body, which challenges the fixation in classical 
governance theory of the board ‘only being effective if it is a collective decision-
making body’ (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2013, op.cit.). However, less formal, 
actor-centred interactions outside the board’s formal, constitutional powers and 
role have the potential to enhance governors’ understanding of the context of the 
university, and support their knowledge development, which feeds back into 
collective board deliberations and decision-making in the boardroom.  
Alongside the staff engagement elements of visibility as a vehicle for governors’ 
knowledge-building, the various expressions of board and governor visibility was 
regarded as a factor supporting its contribution to university strategy 
development, setting and review, centring on the university’s strategic or 
corporate plan. The secretaries interviewed regarded this as one of the most 
important, emerging areas of the board’s remit, in which governing bodies had 
the potential to add significant value to institutional long-term sustainability and 
success, with HEIs’ leadership teams seeking strategic focus, distinctiveness 
and competitive advantage in a new and uncertain market and operating 
environment for HE.  
However, the DA of online role-descriptors and the interviews identified this as 
an obscured area of the board’s remit, which was insufficiently defined and 
under-developed. A possibility exists that senior management anxieties around 
the balance of powers and assertion of board authority relative to that of the 
head of institution, were registered in the findings emerging from aspects the DA 
and the semi-structured interviews that the board’s contribution to strategy were 
ambiguous or absent. However, exceptions existed in the DA case studies and 
where interviewees cited scenarios where the board’s contribution to steering 
strategy was visible and, in turn, where visibility played out through board 
engagement with senior management and wider staff, supported strategy 
consultation and development.  
Another principal contribution of board visibility amongst staff was as a cultural 
vehicle helping to shape and then model and manifest to staff, the values and 
ethos of the university. The importance placed on this in the interviews was in 
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helping to create a narrative for the university and a consistent set of values 
during times of change, either through the collective presence of the board, or 
actual encounters between governors and staff. Arguably, these cultural and 
behavioural properties are both enabled and expressed through the acts of board 
visibility. The potential of institutional visibility - through the practices of staff 
engagement - to help inform the shaping of university mission in a way which is 
meaningful and attuned to the culture of the university, emerged in several 
interviews.  
The proposition in Chapter Three that board ‘effectiveness’ is a relative, context-
specific construct upholds the constructionist lens through which governance 
practice is viewed in this study.  All interview participants were of the view that 
the institutional visibility of the board as a contributing factor in board 
effectiveness and governor development, resisted verification or measurement. 
However, the different forms of board institutional visibility did offer opportunities 
to satisfy Schofield’s outcomes of effectiveness. In turn, elements of 
effectiveness cited included the board having fuller and franker discussions and 
debate between the board and management than may otherwise be the case, 
echoing Bader’s (2001) examples of value-adding boards in the health sector in 
which ‘Sounder decisions results, not because trustees are smarter than 
management’, but through a ‘synergistic effect, producing new insights and 
innovative ideas’ between both groupings (16).  
SQ1: Which arrangements and activities supporting the board’s 
institutional visibility are more effective than others in supporting board 
performance, and on what basis? 
A key finding of the study is that formal constitutional protocols such as structural 
committee machinery and vertical and hierarchical reporting to staff, play a 
modest part in rendering apparent the board or supporting its effectiveness. 
Reflecting back on the institutional visibility spectrum in Figure One, the interview 
findings indicate that the ‘apparency’ (staff broadly understanding what the 
governing body purpose is and general make-up) and ‘transparency’ (open 
disclosure of key discussions, decisions and wider practices of the governing 
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body) play a modest role in supporting governing body effectiveness. Phase two 
of the research indicates that the formal structures and role summaries published 
on the governance webpages, as examined in phases zero and one, were 
considered of limited importance as a means of supporting the apparency and 
transparency of the board amongst staff communities. The interviews also 
identified the variability in the quality, breadth, accuracy, currency, accessibility of 
governance webpage content. The perceived principal value of the governance 
webpages was as a functional repository of core information on the formal 
powers and composition of the governing body, rather than as a mode of staff 
communication giving insights into its role, decisions and actors.  
The ‘apparency’ and ‘transparency’ aspects of board visibility, through web-
based or internal communications about the role and composition of the 
governing body, were regarded as playing a general role in supporting one 
outcome of effective governance - ‘Providing confidence in institutional 
governance’ (Schofield, 2009, op.cit.). This finding does not imply that acts of 
apparency and transparency around board discussions and decisions affecting 
the direction of the university increase the likelihood of staff support for these 
decisions. However, staff understanding of the wider decision-making structures 
inhabited and overseen by the governing body, and making transparent the basis 
and rationale for decisions made on behalf of the university, may be regarded as 
a more positive outcome than staff being uninformed or misinformed about the 
board and its business. In turn, a potential exists for staff confidence in the board 
to motivate governors, and sustain resilience during times of tension or challenge 
at the interface of senior management, or external pressures exerted on the 
institution. This is an appropriate stage to re-visit Montagu’s observation on the 
governing body in the Introduction that ‘It doesn’t loom large in their lives’ (op. 
cit.), with the research findings challenging the view, ‘That is as it ought to be’ 
(op. cit.). However, the findings indicate that staff awareness about the governing 
body is dependent on staff desire and interests to understand and engage with 
board business, and appreciate its relevance to their own roles within the 
organisation.  
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The interview findings indicated that governor engagement with staff was more 
effective when it was decentralised and not subject to strict gatekeeping by the 
secretary, head of institution, chair or a combination of these. Participant 
feedback cited cases of carefully managed, but flexible and ‘tight-loose’ 
structures around of governor interface with staff as effective in their own HEIs. 
The mutual contextualisation and knowledge-enhancing benefits for governors, 
the wider board and staff were highlighted in the previous section of this chapter.  
The importance of physical and material interactions which rendered ‘real’ 
governor and staff relations was highlighted in several interviews, through a 
range of examples. Several examples were presented where social connections 
forged in the ‘doing’ of governance outside the boardroom, helped challenge and 
erode a view of the board amongst staff as an abstract, bureaucratic and remote 
body. Scenarios which supported ‘facework commitments’ (Giddens, 1990, 
op.cit.) were recalled in the interviews, in which governor and staff exchanges 
engendered trust and understanding about the role of board and its contribution 
to the performance of the university. Several means of governor interactions with 
segments of staff at varying degrees of formality, from advisors to project task 
and finish groups, participating in faculty and departmental visits, or membership 
of academic board, were considered effective ways of achieving mutual role-
understanding between governors and staff. These insights were perceived as 
having the potential to feed back into, and inform, board deliberation and 
decision-making. Finally, informal and accessible internal communications about 
the backgrounds and motivations of individual governors, and the outcomes 
governing body discussions and decisions were considered potentially potent 
narratives to connect staff with governors, and the wider organisational and 
leadership structure in which their own roles were located.  
SQ2: What risks are associated with the institutional visibility of the 
university governance body as threats to its performance? 
Interview participants observed potential and ‘in principle’ risks associated with 
over-active governing bodies and members, including encroachment on 
executive management or academic territory. Threats to performance included 
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governor vulnerability to lobbying by specific staff interest groups, including from 
staff assuming that the governing body influenced local decisions on staff 
resources, or capital and infrastructure investment. The risks to governance 
effectiveness included the potential for damage to trust and constructive relations 
between the board and the executive team, or poor decisions being made by the 
board, based on ill-informed or distorted information or influences. In these 
circumstances, senior management, including the secretary, staff and student 
governors invested significant effort to recover and rectify skewed or misinformed 
perspectives presented to the board as an outcome of ineffective staff 
engagement. The interview scenarios signpost the key role of the secretary in 
contributing to this process, and the diplomatic dimensions of his or her duties in 
helping to resolve potential tensions, whilst seeking to ensure positive relations 
at the interface of board and senior management are preserved.  
 
However, the opportunities arising from governor engagement with staff were 
considered as outweighing the identified threats to independence. Only a limited 
number of examples were cited in the interviews where collective board or 
individual governor institutional engagement and activity crystallised risks to 
effective governance. However, the majority of interview participants considered 
the incidents of governing body trespass on management territory minor or 
immaterial in their impact on board performance or relations. In turn, governor 
motivations were identified as largely well-meaning and driven by enthusiasm for 
participating in management matters, rather than furthering their own personal 
interests or agendas, or seeking to undermine executive authority.  
6.2 Contribution to knowledge and claims of originality 
The thesis makes a distinct contribution to knowledge through its focus on 
perceptions of governing body visibility amongst staff groups as a lens through 
which to view university board effectiveness. In examining both the collective 
board and individual actors’ contribution to this process, the study responds to 
the critical and policy deficit in university governance in which ‘human dynamics 
have remained under-investigated’ (Kezar and Eckel, 2004:373). A further area 
of originality is the incorporation of methodological innovation in the research 
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design through the DA of university governance webpages (and whilst only a 
contextual part of the study, online content analysis) in conjunction with the 
interview process.58 An empirical contribution is also made through privileging 
the perspectives of the university secretary over governors or trustees, as an 
unexamined role-holder in supporting governance effectiveness in the research. 
6.3 Recommendations for policy and practice  
A number of recommendations emerge from this study as means of enhancing 
the effectiveness of governing body’s value-creation beyond compliance with 
constitutional and accountability protocols. An overarching theme in the 
recommendations is the potential for the different facets collective board and 
governor visibility to build, maintain and further develop constructive relationships 
with executive management, academic boards and senates. In turn, institutional 
visibility has been shown to start or strengthen meaningful connections with 
wider staff groups, which have mutual benefits for board and the staff base. It is 
acknowledged that the generalisations made from the research findings are 
‘fuzzy’ (Bassey, 2000) reflecting the qualitative and interpretative nature of the 
two research phases. However, the recommendations in the following 
paragraphs of this section - not least because they arise from research using a 
sample of HEIs across England - are applicable beyond my own workplace to 
other HEIs’ governance settings in England. Reflecting the themes proposed for 
institutional visibility at the start of the thesis, and the first cycle coding, the 
recommendations relate to constitutional, organisational and cultural measures 
and interventions for governing body secretaries to consider, in conjunction with 
chairs and heads of institutions. Alongside, providing a reference point for 
internal institutional reflection, the recommendations presented have implications 
for the advancement of policy and guidance of HE sector bodies with an 
influence of institutional corporate and academic governance, namely the LFHE, 
the CUC.  
The first overarching recommendation is that HEIs take a co-ordinated approach 
to internal communications and media on the role of the governing body and its 
58 Peck (1995) observed that the majority of qualitative studies on corporate governance have attended to the accounts of 
board members through a sole focus on interviewing, rather than gathering data through other techniques.    
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members, drawing on professional internal resource within the university’s own 
communications and media functions. This proposal is informed by the interview 
insights into the value of producing and publishing less formal communications, 
including the dissemination of information about the deliberations, decisions and 
membership of the governing body. Within this recommendation is a proposal to 
develop less formal communication including a programme of internal media 
which profile an HEI’s governing body and ensure key decisions and discussions 
are circulated to staff and student communities in a timely and accessible way. 
This would help deliver the LFHE and the CUC’s joint survey recommendation 
that ‘enhanced internal communication about governance’ (Schofield, 2009:15) 
within HEIs would be beneficial in aiding staff understanding of the governing 
body and potentially foster the increased buy-in of staff into decision-making.  
This recommendation could be realised in several ways. One means would be to 
more systematically, regularly and proactively (rather than reactively) produce 
joint statements and announcements for staff from the chair and head of 
institution on landmark events in university life, such as major decisions including 
organisational change programmes or major investments or collaborations. This 
could be extended to the ‘managed’ participation of the chair and other key 
governors, including staff and student governors, in staff-wide briefings 
traditionally led by and comprising the vice-chancellor and senior management 
team.59  
Another medium identified in several interviews for the dissemination of 
governing body information, is the production and publication of in-house 
marketing features and stories on individual governors, which elucidate the 
personal and professional background and motivations of independent 
governors, and implicitly elucidate their contribution to the university.  Finally, 
within this recommendation it is proposed that increased care and attention is 
invested in the design and review of each institution’s governance webpages. 
59 This represents a less contentious response to, and compromise position for the recommendation of the Report of the 
Review of Higher Education Governance in Scotland (2012) that ‘annual meetings of governing bodies should normally 
be held in public unless the matters under consideration are deemed to be of a commercial or sensitive nature’ (Chapter 
4: Recommendation 1:15).The Scottish Code of Good HE Governance (2013) has not converted this recommendation 
into a requirement. However, holding annual public meetings of courts and boards which all staff and students are eligible 
to attend, is regarded as a ‘good practice example’ (29) in the Code.  
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This is to ensure that consistent, high-quality information on the role and 
composition of the governing body is published and maintained, which accurately 
describes the governing body’s contribution to institutional oversight, and clearly 
delineates the relationship between the corporate, executive and academic 
governance domains of the university.  However, the level of resource should be 
proportionate to web-user traffic and interest in governance webpages, 
recognising that governance webpage content is predominantly corporate and 
outward-facing.  
The second recommendation is the structured identification by executive 
management (including the secretary) of external governors to apply their skill-
sets and experience to provide independent advice to strategic proposals and 
projects at the design, development or due diligence stages which are likely to 
have a fundamental reputational, financial and wider resourcing impact. 
Acknowledging that the destination of such proposals would be the governing 
body or of its key committees, this model would help provide assurance to the 
board or committee by the point at which a collective decision or endorsement 
was required of it. Whilst the examples cited by interviewees indicate that these 
practices already exist, the recommendation proposes that an agreed framework 
within HEIs and beyond would be beneficial for embedding these in a more 
systematic and structured way. This could be implemented by devising 
institutional protocols or, nationally, through the development of CUC guidance, 
which would provide parameters for executive teams inviting governor input, the 
secretary, participating governors and the board. The establishment of shared 
principles and guidance is intended to safeguard contributing governors’ 
independence to the process and mitigate governor ‘trespass’ risks.  
The third recommendation arising from a focus on institutional visibility is to 
increase the formal and informal opportunities for co-visibility and engagement 
between governing bodies and academic boards and senates. This would help 
further the OPM survey finding on ‘the need for more effective consultation with 
academic board or senate’ (Schofield, 2009:13). Identifying good practice from 
the interviews, consideration could be given to the appointment of at least one 
independent governor with a current professional background in universities such 
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as a senior academic or senior professional services manager to university 
governing bodies, where a university’s governing instruments does not already 
prescribe this. This proposal would help strengthen shared formal and informal 
reporting between the two bodies, including through informal, human feedback 
and assurance to the board on the effectiveness of the academic governance, 
strategy and policy framework of the university.  
Whilst referring to an outcome of decentralised and networked approaches to 
macro policy-making, Rhodes (2007) argues that ‘If governance is constructed 
differently, contingently and continuously, we cannot have a toolkit for managing 
it’ (1257). However, there is scope to apply the research recommendations 
across HEIs through the incorporation into existing sector governance toolkits 
and guidance. For example, the recommendations could inform the development 
of the draft illustrative practice notes currently being commissioned by the CUC 
to supplement the principles and requirements in the revised HE Code (2014). 
To illustrate, governor engagement in strategic project and steering groups in the 
second recommendation, could support the board in discharging its duty in the 
HE Code of ensuring that a ‘rigorous process of due diligence’ (2014:9) exists for 
high-profile university initiatives. 
6.4 Research limitations and qualifications  
Prior to outlining the methodological limitations of the research, a logistical and 
resource shortcoming linked to effective governance in universities is the extent 
to which governor visibility as an enabler of staff engagement is constrained by 
the competing external commitments of many independent and external 
governors. The examples cited in the interviews and research recommendations, 
reflect in-depth modes of governor engagement with staff. However, the 
exhaustibility of an intense and structured level of governor engagement with 
staff at various levels cannot be excluded in practice. Irrespective of the 
attributes of self-motivation, confidence and competence required of governors, 
the limited number of governors populating the board to engage with staff groups 
beyond senior management - relative to the number and diversity of an 
institution’s staff - represents a logistical and practical obstacle to engagement. 
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In turn, the voluntary and infrequent basis on which governors attend their host 
university, as part-time appointees overseeing the work of full-time professionals 
(Chait et al, 1996, op.cit.), means that governors’ and others’ expectations of the 
contribution they can make needs to be realistic. The HE Code (2014) states that 
the governing body should satisfy itself that ‘members are able to allocate 
sufficient time to undertake their duties effectively’ (25). However, it is unlikely 
that informal staff engagement is considered core to such duties. Shattock 
(2006) notes that it is ‘difficult to see how governing bodies can build up the 
necessary expertise and involvement in strategic decision-making’ (50) when 
spending only a modest amount of time on board matters, and staff engagement 
outside the boardroom is likely to be a casualty of these constraints.   
Related constitutional features which may be contrary to board and governor 
visibility include membership turnover and succession. To illustrate, governors 
normally serve three-year or four-year terms, subject to renewal for a second and 
up to a third period. However, the expiry of appointments, member resignation 
and anticipated pressures on nominations committees to replace governors who 
lack the required skills-set in a demanding HE environment, potentially 
undermine the building of governing body and governor stability, continuity and 
as a consequence recognition and visibility. However, membership renewal and 
change needs to be balanced with the potential risks of governors serving more 
than one term of office and ‘over-staying their welcome’, which could risk a 
misguided sense of complacency in understanding the university context, or 
over-familiarity with management.  
The methodological limitations include the restricted reliance which can be 
placed on the DA phase identified earlier in the thesis, which require re-visiting. 
Firstly, the desk-based aspect of DA presents a one-dimensional window into the 
visibility of the board. The DA of discrete textual summaries of the board’s role 
risks delimiting the content which thereby overlooks the wider online context as 
well as the reception and co-creation or re-interpretation of the governing body 
discourses. This reflects the view that: 
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…any qualitative exploration would have to be what research arenas 
the internet comprises and how they shape, as well as are shaped by, 
participants’ and producers’ experiences of use (Orgad, 2009:34). 
Inferences or assumptions about authorial intention in constructing discourses 
around the governing body therefore need to be approached with caution, 
recognising that discourses can be overly constructed or deconstructed through 
analysis. This risks reinforcing the particular perspectives and positions of the 
researcher as a form of ‘interpretive positivism’ (Fish, 1981:63), rather than 
reflecting the multiple truths and realities of authors and audiences.  
 
A second methodological improvement identified is that the delivery of a survey 
to the sample group on HEIs’ wider institutional communications and media 
strategies around the governing body may have been a more focussed precursor 
to the interview phase. The third methodological limitation reflected on is the 
restriction of the interview phase to the sample stratum of the governing body 
secretaries. The rationale for prioritising the perspectives of secretaries is set out 
in Section 4.3, and supports the practitioner-oriented nature of this study, and the 
argument that the secretary is pivotally positioning to influence the conditions 
and arrangements for governing body visibility amongst staff. An alternative to 
focussing on the single sample sub-set of the secretary would be to conduct 
interviews of different clusters of governance actors across several universities, 
including the secretary, chair and head of institution (Llewellyn, 2009); ex-officio, 
appointed and elected governors (Rytmeister, 2007) or governors, presidents 
(heads of institutions in US HEIs) and sector commentators (Kezar, 2006).   
 
A related limitation of the sampling decisions made in this study is that a wider 
spectrum of staff perspectives were not sought, as potential onlookers of the 
board, in various degrees of proximity to, and interaction and visibility exchanges 
with, the governing body and its members. For example, sub-sets could seek the 
views of elected staff governors, senior management team members, academic 
board or senate appointees, heads of department or teaching, research and 
professional services staff, or targeted interest groups such as officers of the 
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recognised trades unions, who would be potentially alert to corporate 
governance machinery and decisions centring on the governing body.  
 
However, securing access to a wider range of staff and a focussed rationale for 
identifying specific staff groups over others is not a straightforward exercise. 
Aside from gatekeeping issues, the degree of reliance that can be placed on the 
insights of interview participants from across these groups would require careful 
consideration in the sampling strategy, and reliance may need to be placed on 
referral between participants. The trade-off in selecting a wider sample of HEIs in 
the research design for this study is that it constrained my ability to cross-
reference the perspectives of different categories of governance actors or staff 
groups, for logistical, time and resource reasons. Adoption of a single or 
comparative university case-study would have aided interviewing different board 
membership or staff categories, to support the triangulation or differentiation of 
perspectives on the phenomenon of board visibility.  
 
6.5 Future research areas 
Opportunities for further research arise from the methodological limitations 
identified in 6.4 to address this study’s principal focus on the perspectives of the 
secretary and vice-chancellors.  Wider staff perspectives in and around the 
corporate governance system on board visibility, and its impact on performance 
merit further research. Research in this area could further the recommendation 
that governance practice guidelines place increased emphasis on the informal 
interactions and relationships between the secretary, chair and head of institution 
(Llewellyn, 2009). This could encompass assessing differences in board and 
staff engagement across disciplinary domains or formal management structures, 
and whether these encounters contributed, for example, to challenging ‘taken-for 
granted status hierarchies’ (Trowler, 2012:7) of academic staff.  
In the US, Mathies and Slaughter (2013) have examined the role of university 
trustees as channels between ‘academe and industry’ (1286) using an executive 
science network case-study. Another research area prompted by the board 
institutional visibility-effectiveness nexus would be to examine the existing and 
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potential contribution of independent governors to knowledge exchange. This 
could include assessing the possibilities for re-imagining the governor role in a 
new engagement environment co-habited with staff, as an extension of the ‘third 
space’ of ‘blended’ (Whitchurch 2008) academic and professional roles. 
Feedback from a number of interview participants considered governors and 
knowledge exchange and engagement as a nascent area, which has the 
potential to enhance wider institutional success.   
The final future research area identified is broader in scope, and reflects the 
practitioner-oriented aspect of this study. Emerging from my own reflections and 
the observations of other secretaries, research is required into the changing role 
and profile of university board secretaries, and the skills-sets demanded to 
support governance effectiveness in a new business and operating environment. 
This would help advance the work of Llewellyn (2009) on the critical role of the 
university secretary in institutional governance, and provide a HE sector parallel 
to a recent study by Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2014) into the company 
secretary’s contribution to company performance. Common to both of these 
studies is the finding that the role and contribution of the secretary to governance 
effectiveness is under-estimated, whether as a sounding board for the chair, 
independent governors, NEDs, vice-chancellors or chief executives, or a 
repository of company history, culture and potential guarantor of continuity in a 
context of changing board membership.  
 
6.6 Practitioner-researcher status  
The penultimate section of Chapter Six will reflect on my insider-outsider 
positioning as a practitioner researcher in a professional setting.60 It has been 
argued that all individuals are ‘insiders in some contexts and outsiders in other 
situations’ (Adler, 2004:107), and therefore ‘insider-ness is not a fixed value’ 
(Trowler, 2012:1). To illustrate, it would be simplistic to define my research as 
‘outsider’ solely on the basis that the sample sites were external to my 
60 The conceptualisation of the insider-outsider researcher as an identity position is arguably analogous to the role of the 
independent governor located at the internal and external crossroads of the university, seeking to balance objectivity with 
insight and involvement.  
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workplace. This is because the research entailed both access to webpage 
content with which I was broadly familiar, and interview interaction with 
professional peers and senior colleagues with whom I had a degree of role 
affinity and understanding. I self-define as an ‘indigenous outsider’ (Banks, 1998) 
of the sample universities in this research.  The indigenous outsider role troubles 
a simplistic binary of insider-outsider researcher, and has been positive to my 
own practitioner-researcher and wider professional development. This 
positioning has helped me to avoid the insider researcher risks associated with a 
work-based case-study, including potential conflicts of interest and what audit 
ethicists refer to as ‘familiarity threats’ to independence and objectivity.  
In turn, a conscious decision was made not to undertake case-study research in 
my workplace, which helped to mitigate the risk that ‘researchers can lose their 
sense of self if they are pulled one way or the other by being seen alternatively 
as an insider or outsider’ (Humphrey, 2007:127). Nonetheless, my semi-native 
status in researching other HEIs’ governance practices, influenced and arguably 
dictated the direction of the research design and sampling strategy. For example, 
my full-time role as a professional in another HEI was perceived, at least by 
myself, as a potential barrier to securing access to a wider pool of research 
participants than the secretary sample group, including a wider group of vice-
chancellors, senior managers and governing body chairs. An independent 
researcher, or academic may have felt less constrained to seek access to a 
wider pool of participants in and around an HEI’s governance system.  
6.7 Conclusion  
Future funding and policy changes in HE will no doubt exert greater pressures on 
HEI governors and leaders to develop (and demonstrate) effective and 
innovative academic, finance and wider resource strategies for their universities. 
Arguably, governing bodies and leadership teams making crucial decisions 
behind closed doors is no longer wholly feasible, with the contemporary 
equivalents to the secret chamber or cabinets of the arcana imperii as 
increasingly inappropriate in a climate where transparency trumps confidentiality 
of deliberation and decision-making.  
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A concluding observation from the first interviewee in this study is that, ‘it will be 
the non-executives leading the sector into the new era’ (A:10). If we subscribe to 
this view, senior managers and staff are likely to increasingly expect enhanced 
accountability from their governing bodies, as more acutely aware of the 
performance of the board and the decisions it takes in the name and interests of 
the university.  This may, in turn, necessitate university governing bodies 
reflecting more fully on their own roles, and the skills and support needed from 
members and - literally - how well ‘placed’ and ‘positioned’ it is to respond to the 
new challenges. ‘Rising to the Challenge or Running for the Door?’ is the 
question posed by Cornforth and Mordaunt (2002) in their study of board 
directors and trustees of non-profit organisations during times of change and 
crisis. It is hoped that the governing bodies of our universities will rise to the 
challenge, and that any door they pass through is not the fire exit in the council 
chamber or boardroom, but the doorways of senior management and academic 
and professional support departments to engage with staff. Arguably, the 
manifestation of their leadership in coalition with, or constructive challenge of 
senior managers, whilst also being cognisant of the perspectives of wider groups 
of staff, is arguably needed more than ever.  
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    Appendix One: Semi-Structured Interview Guide  
No General Question Phrasing Prompt Questions/ 
Follow-Up 
1) The Leadership Foundation conducted a survey in 
2009 on board effectiveness. One of the findings 
from governors and senior management that came 
out of the survey was that many staff and students 
did not fully understand the role of their institution’s 
governing body.  Could you discuss your 
experiences linked to this observation, including 
whether that perspective is borne out?  
Do you think it is 
important that staff 
understand the role 
of the governing 
body, and who is on 
it, and why?   
2)  I have reviewed the public information on the 
Board or Council on your university’s webpages? 
Could you discuss the internal communications 
and PR in place in your university, and its role in 
promoting the visibility of the governing body, the 
duties it discharges and decisions it makes?   
Do you 
communicate key 
decisions of the 
governing body to 
the wider staff, and 
if so how, and how 
often? 
What impact do you 
think this practice 
has on staff 
understanding of the 
board? 
3) In what ways is there a clear understanding of the 
distinctive roles of the governing body and the 
senior management/executive team amongst both 
of these groups? 
Can you provide 
examples where the 
contribution of 
governors to 
executive matters 
has been effective, 
or less than 
effective? What 
influenced this? 
4) 
 
 
Can you discuss the relationship between the 
governing body and your university’s Senate or 
Academic Board, and the impact of this on the 
performance and effectiveness of each body?  
What arrangements 
are in place in to 
ensure connections 
and 
communications 
exist between both 
bodies? 
5) How does the relationship work between the 
collective role of your governing body, compared 
with the role and influence of key individuals such 
Does the board or 
council collectively 
reflect on their own 
function and 
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as the chair or committee chairs? 
 
purpose? 
Do board or council 
members reflect on 
their individual roles 
and identities? 
6) Could you talk about the risks and opportunities 
associated with raising the profile and presence of 
the governing body within your institution?  
Can you cite 
examples where 
any risks have been 
managed, or 
opportunities have 
been exploited? 
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Appendix Two: Semi-Structured Interview Sample HEIs, 
Participants and Schedule 
HEIs from sample 
framework 
Interview 
Participants 
Interview Mode Interview 
Date(s) 
Birmingham City 
University  
Recently Retired Chief 
Operating Officer and 
former University 
Secretary 
Face-to-Face (FtF) 07/04/14 
Bucks New 
University  
i. Director of 
Governance and 
Quality 
ii. Vice Chancellor 
Telephone 
 
Telephone 
06/02/14 
 
30/07/14 
University of 
Durham  
University Secretary FtF 22/01/14 
Harper Adams 
University  
i. University 
Secretary  
ii. Vice-Chancellor 
FtF 
FtF 
07/04/14 
07/04/14 
University of 
Newcastle Upon 
Tyne  
Registrar and 
Secretary 
FtF 17/03/14 
Queen Mary, 
University of 
London  
Secretary to Council 
and Academic 
Registrar 
Telephone 03/03/14 
University of 
Salford  
Head of Governance 
and Secretary to 
Council 
Telephone 11/04/14 
University of 
Nottingham  
Registrar and 
Secretary  
Telephone 11/06/14 
St Georges,  
University of 
London   
Head of Governance 
and Secretary to 
Council  
Telephone 29/04/14 
University of 
Worcester 
Secretary and  
Pro Vice-Chancellor 
(Students) 
Telephone 29/07/14 
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      Appendix Three: Content Analysis approach and findings 
  Coding framework 
The coding framework for phase zero adapts and selectively applies Bauer and 
Scharl’s (2000) criteria for website classification and evaluation, which are 
‘content’, ‘interactivity’ and ‘navigation’. Adopting a quantitative approach, the 
authors favour use of ‘autonomous software tools to capture the characteristics 
of commercial Web information systems, determine their specific importance, 
and store them in a central data repository’ (2000:31). The smaller scale of my 
research, and the adaptation of this model as a precursor to a core research 
design, dispenses with the need for software to systematically search content. 
Manual analysis has therefore been undertaken.  
  Content 
Bauer and Scharl’s quantification of the number of website documents is 
excluded from the content analysis of governance webpages in this study. 
Instead, the codification of document ‘types’ embedded in webpages is 
included, as an index of the different mechanisms through which web authors 
post information on the university governing body. On this basis, the number 
and type of documents (e.g., textual, graphic, photographic) will be quantified. 
The number of kilobytes downloaded is also excluded from analysis, as the 
value of data types with differential kilobyte levels (e.g., JPEG images or text) is 
not considered a valuable measure for understanding site architecture, structure 
or substantive aspects of content which can meaningfully link to the discursive 
properties examined at phase two of the research. The number of discrete 
webpages comprising the core governance site will be counted, as will types of 
webpages (e.g., constitutional versus biographical or visual information on 
governors).  
  Interactivity 
The interactivity element of Bauer and Scharl’s model includes the number of 
web-based forms which users can access, populate and submit. This type of 
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interactivity is of limited relevance to the governance area of university 
websites, and will not be the subject of analysis. Also, the number of documents 
using Javascript or Java Applets is excluded from analysis, the first of which is 
based on understanding the programming basis of web content, and the second 
of which is a small embedded feature within a webpage, such as interactive 
animations or calculation tools.  The key criterion applied under the interactive 
heading is the number and type of e-mail ‘link to’ features, to institutional 
contacts for information and queries related to the governing body.  Whilst not 
covered in Bauer and Scharl’s model, mapping the prominence of the linkage 
between the university website homepage and the governance webpage will 
enable assessment of: (a) its position in a hierarchy of wider corporate 
information about the university, measured through the number of webpages to 
be clicked through to reach the destination and (b) the route taken to reach the 
destination. Navigation from the governance website to key information on both 
senior management and academic governance (e.g., academic board or 
senate) webpages will be analysed, to plot the online linkage between these 
pillars of the governance system.  
  Navigation 
The navigation criterion used by Bauer and Scharl overlaps significantly with the 
interactivity elements discussed above. The two key navigational features 
included in the analysis are the numbers and types of internal links and external 
links. Internal links refer to embedded links signposting a governance intranet, 
which is often accessed through a password-protected area containing 
information and documentation for staff and governors. External links are 
websites or other information sources outside the institution, including HE 
sector bodies or social media or professional networking sites connected to 
through icons or widgets, such as enabling specific webpages and information 
to be shared or liked. The elements of Bauer and Scharl’s website coding 
framework which are included in, adapted for, or excluded from, the analysis 
are mapped in the diagram below, with inclusion and exclusion indicated by a 
tick and cross symbol respectively. 
177 
 
         University Governing Body webpages – Content Analysis Coding Criteria 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. documents  ✘ 
Kbytes downloaded  ✘ 
No and type of files  ✓ 
No. images  ✓ 
No and type of text 
webpages 
✓ 
No. Forms ✘ 
No. documents with  
JavaScript [total] 
✘ 
No. Java applets  ✘ 
No. Mail To-links ✓ 
Frames ✘ 
No. internal links  ✓ 
No. external links  ✓ 
No. anchors ✘ 
No. links to anchors ✘ 
Governance Homepage 
 Number of links from university homepage 
 Governing body descriptor on webpages 
navigated from homepage to governance 
webpage 
 
 
Content Interactivity Navigation 
Staff or Governors’ 
Portal/Intranet 
HEI homepage 
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 Prior to discussing each of the content components mapped through analysis 
of 20 HEI governance websites, an overarching observation is that there is 
limited distinctiveness in content and structure across the sample webpages. 
Whilst a minority of HEIs in the sample have sought to expand page content 
beyond the core information on the structure of corporate governance and 
those who populate it, including as required by HEFCE on behalf of the 
Charity Commission, most pages indicate limited discretion in providing 
additional information to the core requirements. The potential for the 
governance website to be content rich and an intuitive and visually distinctive 
repository of information, is one means of building an online presence for, 
and understanding of, the governing body for staff, students and external 
audiences. In isolation, web-based content through a governance microsite 
is not a wholly reliable proxy for assessing the visibility and profiling of the 
university governing body. However, the findings indicate the limited usage 
of the sample governance websites in presenting and promoting a full online 
profile of the host university’s board structures and governors. 
Annex One summarises the numerical frequency and/or narrative 
explanation, where appropriate, for the content, interactivity and navigability 
criteria.  Each category, or cluster of categories, is accompanied by an 
analytical commentary. The sample governance webpages were accessed 
between 01 and 10 November 2013. Website development and changes to 
the architecture and internal structure is likely to have occurred across a 
number of HEIs in the sample, as has routine maintenance and revision such 
as updating of cyclical changes to content (e.g, material related to the 
academic and financial year) or ad hoc changes, including policies or 
governor and trustee profiles. Content analysis therefore at best provides a 
snapshot in time of the online positioning of each university’s corporate 
governance apparatus and arrangements.  
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File types 
Aside from the HyperText Markup Language (html) files, in which webpage 
contents are coded, the majority of file types in the sample websites were 
PDF documents and digital images, with a limited number including Microsoft 
Powerpoint slides (e.g., committee organograms) or Microsoft Word 
documents. The individual numbers of PDF documents or graphic images 
has not been quantified in the content analysis, but the number of file types 
has been tracked for each set of governance webpages. The file types 
ranged from webpages comprising only html files in one example (Leeds 
College of Music), with the majority of websites incorporating a mixture of 
PDF and graphic files. For example, Nottingham University’s council 
webpage contained four different file types in addition to HTML: PDF 
documents, rolling photographs, static photographs and videos or podcasts 
of governor experiences. 
PDF documents 
The number of PDFs hosted by each of the sample websites was not 
quantified. However, these were the most prevalent of file types, and for the 
most part perform a perfunctory, information-sharing role, presenting static, 
core corporate governance information and data. These provide access to 
the governing instruments as documents which HEIs are required to make 
accessible online, corporate governance policies and key constitutional 
content such as board powers and committee terms of reference, governors’ 
terms of office and narrative information including biographies and registers 
of interest. The inclusion of links to PDF documents is a means of focussing 
key html text on webpages, such as the core descriptors of the purpose of 
the governing body, subject to discourse analysis next. However, it also 
renders less prominent key contextual information. For the purpose of 
website navigation, PDF documents constitute content routed to a cul de sac 
and risk user exit from the website, unless navigation frames are used or 
hyperlinks are embedded in the PDF to enable return to the previous page.  
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 Images  
Visual imagery is identified as a distinct file type on the sample websites, and 
falls into four main categories. The most common mode of visual content is 
the use of digital portraits of governors and, in limited circumstances, group 
photographs of the governing body. Therefore this indicates that most 
website editors and owners consider facial profiling of governing body 
members to be a worthwhile investment, whether for the benefit of external 
or internal stakeholders, akin to the widespread use of faces in corporate 
annual reports (Campbell, McPhail and Slack, 2009, op.cit.). Three of the 
sample websites did not include photographs of governors (Leeds College of 
Music, Worcester and Plymouth). The majority of the websites included 
embedded static digital portraits of governors took the form of a scroll-down 
or scroll-across gallery format.61 The Nottingham webpages made varied use 
of digital photographs, including informal, non-frontal and expressive shots of 
groups of council members, a stack of mock ‘polaroid’ images linking to the 
members’ gallery of individual portraits, and a rolling trail of images under 
which are governor quotations on the link between institutional governance 
and the university’s global performance. Digital media also extended to short 
videos of governors discussing the council’s contribution to the university’s 
strategic development.  
The second most frequently occurring feature of visual content is generic 
corporate governance imagery and iconography, which provide graphic and 
photographic representations mirroring the webpage textual content, such as 
the display of a boardroom and table (e.g., Newcastle) or groupings of 
individuals whose gesturing indicates board or management interaction and 
debate. Another visual component, which was not widespread across the 
sample websites, is the usage of institutional insignia such as the university 
coat of arms (Open) or photographs of official emblems, including the scroll 
61 HEIs’ approaches to capturing the images of governors appears to be varied, including sourcing of images 
through internet search engines, such as the use of pre-existing corporate shots from the professional ‘lives’ of 
governors, through to consistent photographic portraiture, backdrops or colour palettes. The drivers for different 
approaches may be many and varied, including governors’ availability. However, corporate consistency in 
photographic ‘facework’ could contribute to the cementing of a collective governing body identity.  
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of the university charter. An assumption is made that the importation of 
formal imagery is intended to connect to the constitutional subject matter of 
the governance webpages and confer a degree of legitimacy on the authority 
base of the governing body.  
The third main category is generic branded web banners, often replicated 
across the website, including the trading name, logo and any stylised 
university branding, e.g., the placement of ‘DMU’ as a banner in the headline 
frame on the board pages of De Montfort. This generic imagery provides a 
corporate look and feel across the website. In a minimal number of cases, 
design decisions appear to have been made which seek to create a 
distinctive branding for an institution. For example, on the Royal Central 
School of Speech and Drama board webpages, use of black and white digital 
images of both the governors and senior management team, accompanied 
by red typeface headings for governor names and black typeface for the 
narrative, mirror the red and black corporate palette on the wider website. 
This design decision implies symmetry of the board and senior management 
to the ethos of Royal Central. 
Webpage numbers and types  
Quantifying the number of individual webpages is not wholly straightforward, 
due to the links of pages to other parts of the website which may contain 
corporate governance content. For example, a number of leadership and 
governance homepages combine headline information on the senior 
management teams with that of governing bodies and academic governance 
arrangements. In turn, the link to a gateway page containing institutional 
charitable information has been counted once only. Password-protected 
pages, such as an intranet or governors’ portal are excluded from the page 
count. The majority of sample institutions have multiple governance 
webpages (between two to six), often including a general introduction to or 
statement of the role and purpose of the governing body, and pages which 
as a minimum include the biographies and images of governors in gallery 
format. Two institutions have one governance page containing corporate, 
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academic and executive information (Leeds College of Music and Open). 
The second of these has a single webpage for its ‘Formal Governance 
Structure’, including a summary paragraph on the Council, Senate, General 
Assembly, Membership, Audit and Remuneration Committees, with further 
information provided through a menu of PDF documents under each 
heading. The maximum number of webpages listed was 10 
(Gloucestershire), although five of which refer to generic governance 
information. The type of board-related information on webpages varies 
considerably, with the most frequently occurring information, aside from the 
core descriptor on the governing body which exists in each case, is 
summarised below: 
Board-related webpage content Frequency 
Summary page of key board 
committees (e.g., Audit, Finance and 
General Purposes, Nominations, 
Remuneration). 
n=14 (some websites have pages per 
committee, and others have joint 
pages). 
Preamble on the legal status and 
structure of the University. 
n=12  
Contact Details (e.g., a page with 
details of the secretary, governance 
team or how to contact the board). 
n=11  
 
Intranet/Members’ Area webpage or 
portal 
n=5 
Governor Recruitment or Election 
Information  
n=3 
 
Interactivity 
Homepage Prominence  
On each of the sample webpages, homepage routes to the governance 
webpages are through an ‘About Us’, ‘Leadership and Governance’, ‘How we 
are run’ or equivalent tab. The charitable ‘gateway’ webpage also included a 
linked to the core governance webpages where navigation was strong. For 
the majority of the HEIs the route from the ‘About Us’ link is to a menu of 
information in the margin, such as a drop-down list including ‘Governance 
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and Management’, ‘Governance’, or ‘Board/Council’. In a number of cases a 
generic ‘University Governance’ link is identified (De Montfort, Open) 
directing users to a horizontal set of panels or blocks containing key 
headings which link to webpages with more information on each 
organisational domain. For example, the four panels on the De Montfort 
governance homepage are: Chancellor, Board, Vice-Chancellor, Executive 
Board and Executive and Governance and Legal Services. Two different 
sample examples of the route for accessing the governance webpages are 
provided below, both of which exceed the ‘three-click’ rule: 62 
Homepage 
 About the University  
o Organisation and Governance 
 Admin and Governance  
• The Open University’s formal governance 
structure 
o The Governance of the Open University 
(Council, Senate and General Assembly) 
 
Homepage 
 Discover Worcester 
o About Us  
  Charitable Information (‘gateway’ page listed 10/18 
within the ‘About Us’ tab) 
• Governance (General webpage) 
• Profile of Governors 
• Governor Trusteeships (PDF) 
 
An index of information existed in the majority of sample HEIs, normally on a 
side bar menu or dropdown list.63 However, in many cases the link to 
information on corporate governance and the board was not located towards 
or at the start of the index, signalling a structural mismatch between the 
organisational hierarchy of the governing body and its online indexing. The 
majority of HEIs sampled had 10 or more key information areas in an index 
62 The ‘three click rule’ (Zeldman) is an unofficial norm to ‘create sites with intuitive, logical, hierarchical structures’ 
(2001: 22). The rule has been challenged, e.g., Porter (2003) could not find a correlation between the number of 
times users clicked and their success in finding the content they sought, or evidence of leaving the website where 
multiple clicks were required.  
63 The ‘About Us’ tab was normally accessed through the navigation menu in the margin, or horizontal button bar at 
the head of the webpage.  
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for different aspect of university life, with up to 20 (27 at Plymouth) including 
schools and departments, through to sustainability, news and events, jobs, 
history of the university. With the exception of De Montfort (1/20) Newman 
(1/18) and Newcastle (2/5), the link to the governance webpage was half-
way down, or in the bottom quartile of the index of information links (e.g, 
Harper Adams 12/15, Bournemouth 14/16, Plymouth 27/27). 
Links to senior management webpage 
The majority of HEIs in the sample demonstrate ‘weak’ navigability and 
interactivity between governing body and senior management webpages. For 
example, the ‘Who’s Who at Worcester’ link provides information on the 
chancellor and the university executive team, but does not link to its 
governing body, thereby creating a constitutional information gap which 
elides the link provided by the pro-chancellors and wider board between the 
roles of the chancellor and vice-chancellor. A limited number of websites 
included a generic webpage to access separate board and senior 
management areas (e.g, Open and De Montfort). However, in the majority of 
cases, information on the spheres of governance and management are 
connected solely by a hyperlink to the respective pages, with minimal or no 
contextual commentary on the relationship between the bodies and actors. 
The principal link between the majority of sample HEIs’ leadership and 
governance domains is the vice-chancellor’s trustee profile.  
Academic Governance Links 
Direct access to information on the senate or academic board does not 
feature on the majority of the ‘About Us’ or equivalent pages of the sampled 
HEIs. Whilst this is expected given the subordinate status of the academic 
board or senate to the governing body, the limited linkage between corporate 
and academic governance webpages, emerged from the content analysis. Of 
the small number of HEIs with a generic governance and leadership page, 
reference to academic board or senate and key role-holders and 
membership was absent. However, there are examples of explicit 
relationships and routes between council and senate webpage, such as the 
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demarcation of a bi-cameral structure of governance at Durham, with senate 
as the ‘supreme’ governing body on academic matters, subject only to the 
superintendence and final authority of council. On the Open website the 
broader governance structure is mapped clearly, from council and its 
relationship to senate as ‘academic authority’, through to the wider 
democratic structures including its general assembly. In the majority of 
websites the role of senate is presented in one or more of the following ways: 
i. in an online list of committees of the governing body (e.g., a link to a 
separate webpage or a PDF of terms of reference and membership); 
ii. through a link to the institution’s publication scheme for Freedom of 
Information (FoI) purposes, on how and who makes decisions at the 
university  (e.g., Harper Adams, Worcester); 
iii. through a link to a separate senate or academic board webpage which 
directs users to a separate area of the institution’s website, such as 
the academic quality team or Registrar’s webpages; 
iv. by reference to the vice-chancellor or principal chairing senate or 
academic board on their trustee profile. 
The extent to which a limited relationship between the corporate and 
academic governance structures is a signal of ambiguous relations between 
these two domains will be examined in phase one.  
Mail-to links 
The majority of university websites sampled included a ‘mail-to’ link, such as 
to the office of the secretary, or named contact, and a general 
correspondence and e-mail address. In all cases, e-mail contacts direct to 
the chair of the governing body or members are not provided, with the 
secretary or secretariat serving as gatekeeper of enquiries.   
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Navigability 
Internal Links 
Internal links refer to the presence of intranet for password-protected access 
to further information and documentation for staff and/or governors. Almost 
one third of the sampled websites included an internal link to a governance 
or governor portal, in the form of a members’ area (Newcastle) or a wider 
staff and members’ portal (such as the Insight staff portal at Gloucester).64  
The content was inaccessible to me as the pages were password-protected. 
However, it is likely that many HEIs  adopt the ‘Principles of Openness and 
Transparency in the Operation of Governing Bodies’ in the CUC Guide 
(2009) which includes a recommendation that ‘all institutions might include 
placing copies of the governing body’s minutes on the institution’s intranet’ 
(29).  
External Links 
The majority of the sampled HEI websites include a mixture of specific 
external links relevant to constitutional and governance matters. For 
example, the majority of the HEIs linked to external sector representative 
bodies such as the CUC or the CUC Guide, or HEFCE (e.g, St Georges, De 
Montfort). Others include links to the LFHE Governor Development 
Programme webpages, and a limited number link from the governance 
webpages to external benchmarks for board and management conduct, such 
as the Committee on Standards in Public Life, or civic connections such as 
the Lord Mayor of Birmingham’s website (Birmingham City). 
Alongside links to external sector or local bodies and contacts, the majority of 
sampled webpages deploy Web 2.0 features through inclusion of social 
media or professional networking icons as website-wide headers or footers, 
to enable information to be readily shared, including emailing a link to the 
page through Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn. The extent to which 
64 Other sampled websites may have a portal or utilise the intranet to provide further information for governors and 
staff on governance material, such as meeting agendas and minutes, but this was not identified on the public 
webpage. Access may also be available to independent, virtual boardroom software, access to which is outsourced 
to an external server. 
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governance-related content is shared through the selection of social media 
icons, is likely to be limited compared to the traffic of sharing information on 
university news, achievements and events. LinkedIn65 is likely to be the most 
relevant external links to the corporate governance websites, and could be 
used as a tool supporting governor recruitment, and for independent, staff 
and student governors with professional responsibilities to record their 
governance role and responsibilities, whilst also promoting the work of the 
university.  
Summary of content analysis findings 
The function of the content analysis was to provide a window, as a 
preparation and wider context to the discourse analysis of governance 
webpages into how the governing body is represented to audiences both 
internal and external to the university. Website content, interactivity and 
navigability as charted through content analysis cannot be relied on to draw 
definitive conclusions about the reality of reporting and wider relationships 
between boards, academic boards and executive management. A range of 
factors influence website design and how this is structured, managed and 
maintained on local webpages of institutions’ websites. These factors include 
unstructured and ad hoc design decisions in the absence of central oversight 
of the indexical positioning of items, and adjustments to the ordering and 
nature of content over time.  
However, analysis indicates that there are shortcomings in the online 
information available on the governing body in terms of volume or 
connectedness of content for external and internal audiences. The structure 
and contextualisation of governance content is a further area of weakness on 
the majority of sample websites. It is important to acknowledge that any 
analysis of content on university webpages cannot definitively identify and 
isolate political motivations behind content production and management. The 
majority of HEIs’ websites will be developed and maintained by a central 
team of web designers and editors, with use of web content management 
65 ‘LinkedIn Higher Education’ provides general resources which HEIs can access, including for marketing and 
admissions purposes. 
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systems which enable flexibility in design, for multiple individuals to edit and 
maintain websites. However, given the scale and breadth of content on 
university websites, it is perhaps unsurprising that the devolved nature of 
website management can lead to poor interactivity and navigation, with 
corporate information on the board serving a secondary status to promotional 
and marketing and teaching, learning and research and business content.  
At the level of university website architecture and branding, many institutions 
will be developing or delivering a digital communications strategy, central to 
which is the use of digital marketing and online branding which prioritise 
promotion of university performance and achievements, such as the student 
experience, league table rankings and graduate employability over corporate 
governance matters. However, content analysis indicates that many 
university communications teams have failed to consider the presentation of 
their governing body as part of a wider internal communications strategy. 
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In conclusion, the following broad connections are made between phase 
zero and phase one, the second of which forms part of the main thesis:  
i. in many of the sample websites, the low positioning of information on the 
governing body index in the ‘About Us’ or equivalent tab, was mirrored 
by incomplete or ambiguous references in the board role-descriptors to 
the basis and nature of governing body authority and its accountability 
role;  
ii. overall, weak interactivity between the webpages of the governing body 
and the academic governance domains of academic board and its 
committees, was matched by ambiguous or absent references in many 
of the samples to the role of, and relationship between academic board 
or senate and the governing body;   
iii. weak interactivity between the governing body and senior management 
webpages reinforces the role-descriptors which inadequately articulate 
the distinction, and relationship between both bodies and sets of actors.  
190 
 
   Annex One:  Governance Webpage Content Analysis Summary 
 Content Interactivity Navigation 
Sample HEIs Types of 
file  
Types of images No of pages Homepage 
prominence 
No of 
links from 
home 
page 
Links to 
Senior 
Management 
pages 
Links to 
academic 
governance 
No of mail-to 
links 
No internal 
links 
No external 
links  
Royal Central 
School of 
Speech and 
Drama  
PDFs Black and White 
Governor Portraits  
5 
 
‘About Central’ 
> Governance 
5/10 position on 
index  
2 0 1 0 0 0 
Leeds College  
of Music  
 
HTML  Graphic for 
governance title and 
strapline  
1  About Us > 
‘Governance – 
who we are and 
how we work’ 
2 0 Reference to 
external 
degree 
validation 
0 0 5 
Royal 
Agricultural 
University 
 
HTML  1 generic – display 
of names 
Individual photos of 
governors 
2 ‘The RAU’  > 
‘Governance 
and Finance’  
 
8/8 position on 
index 
2 1 0 1  1  0 
St George’s 
University of 
London (SGUL) 
HTML 
+PDFs and 
photos 
Individual photos of 
Council Members 
2, plus sub-
pages for 
individual 
members 
‘About Us’ > 
‘Governance’ 
9/10 position on 
index 
2 0 0 direct 
Indirectly 
through general 
committee list  
0 0 2 
Newman 
University  
 
HTML + 
PDFs and 
photos 
Lay governors and 
VC only 
3  
 
‘About Us’ > 
‘Governance 
and 
Management’ 
1/18 position on 
index 
2  0  
Joint governance 
and management 
page 
0  
Joint governance 
and 
management 
page 
0 0 0 
Harper Adams 
University  
HTML + 
PDFs and 
photos 
Individual photos of 
Board members  
5  
 
‘About’ > 
‘Governance 
Overview’  
12/15 position 
on index 
2 0 Indirectly via 
Publication 
Scheme  
1 1 0 
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University of 
Gloucestershire 
 
HTML, 
PDFs, 
photos 
Individual photos of 
Council members 
10 
 
‘About Us’> 
‘Council’ 
 
5/7 position on 
index 
2 0 0 1 1 1 Dedicated internal 
and external 
resources page - 
HEFCE, CUC, LFHE, 
IoD 
Bucks New 
University  
HTML, 
PDFs, 
photos, 
powerpoint 
diagram, 
word forms  
Individual photos of 
Council members 
5  ‘About Us’> ‘Our 
Structure’ > 
Council 
3 1 0 1 0 3 
University of 
Bradford 
(website under 
review as of 
09.11.13) 
HTML, 
PDFs, 
photos 
Individual photos of 
Council members 
9  ‘The University’ 
> ‘Our Structure 
and 
Organisation’ 
>Governance 
3 1 1  1 0 0 
Queen Mary, 
University of 
London 
HTML, 
PDFs, 
photos 
Individual photos of 
Council members 
3 ‘About Us’ > 
from ‘Main 
Menu’ and 
‘Charitable 
Status’ 
3 1  1 1 0 0 
University of 
Worcester 
HTML, 
PDFs 
N/A 4  
 
‘Discover 
Worcester’> 
‘Board’ 
10/18 position 
on index 
4 1 publication 
schemes 
directories on 
academic board 
and management  
1 publication 
schemes 
directories on 
academic board 
and 
management 
0 0 0 
Bournemouth 
University 
HTML, 
PDFs, Word 
forms and 
hyperlinked  
diagrams, 
photos 
Individual photos of 
Governors 
1 
 
‘About BU’ > 
‘Governance’  
 
14/16  position 
on index  
2 1 > ‘People/ 
Senior People’ 
(e.g, Chancellor, 
Board, Executive) 
1 integrated 
committee page 
1 0 1 
University of 
Newcastle 
PDF, photos Individual photos of 
Council members + 
Generic board table 
photo 
6 ‘About Us’> 
‘University Staff 
and Structure’>  
1/6 information 
dashboards. 
3 1 1 0 1 2 
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University of 
Durham 
HTML, 
PDFs, 
powerpoint, 
photos 
Individual photos of 
Council members 
6  ‘About DU’ > 
‘How the 
University is 
run’>  
‘Council, 
Senate, Legal, 
Leadership’ 
3 1 a level above at 
‘How the University 
is run’   
1 a level above 
at ‘How the 
University is run’   
2 1 0 
Salford 
University  
HTML, 
PDFs, 
photos 
Individual photos of 
Council members 
8 ‘About Us’ > 
-‘Corporate 
Information’ > 
‘Governance’ > 
‘Governance 
and 
Management’ > 
‘Council and 
Executive’ > 
Council 
4 0 1 1  1 0 
De Montfort 
University 
 
HTML,  
PDFs, 
photos 
 
Multi-coloured 
Graphic with 
Individual photos of 
Governors  
3 ‘About DMU’> 
‘University 
Governance’ 
1/20  position 
on index 
 
Plus  1/4 
information 
dashboards 
2 1  0 1 1  2 
Birmingham City 
University 
HTML, 
PDFs, 
photos 
Individual photos of 
Governors 
4 ‘About Us’ > 
‘Corporate 
Information’ > 
‘Governance’ 
 
7/11 position on 
index 
3 1 a level above at 
‘Corporate 
Information’ which 
includes ‘Our Vice-
Chancellor’s Office’ 
0 1  0 3  
Plymouth 
 
HTML, 
PDFs 
0 5 
  
‘Our 
University’> 
‘Governors’ 
 
26/27 position 
on index 
2 
 
0 one-way link 
from ‘Vice-
Chancellor’s 
Welcome’  
2 1 0 0 
Open University HTML, PDF, 
Coat of arms 
Coat of Arms image, 1  ‘About the 
University’> 
‘Organisation 
and 
5 0 1 The 
Governance of 
the Open 
University’ 
(covers Council, 
Senate, General 
0 0 0 
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  governance’ 
>‘Admin and 
Governance’ > 
‘The Open 
University’s 
formal 
governance 
structure’ >‘The 
Governance of 
the Open 
University’  
Assembly)  
 
Nottingham 
University 
 
HTML, 
PDFs, 
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 Appendix Four: Interview Transcript Extract from Interview 
G - 07.04.14 pp., 5-8  
 
Interviewer: Yes. Then the more social informal side is lunches after the 
meetings and other visits they may do, or events they’re 
invited to. I’ve had chairs who have been pretty active in the 
past. It’s about not holding them back from going anywhere 
and talking to anybody. I think that’s really helpful because 
they will get a different sense of the institution, from being 
able to do that. You have to, as an executive I think, just let 
go a bit. If you see it as an opportunity to gather more 
information, rather than risk that a governor’s on the loose. I 
don’t think that’s actually the case, because they’re very 
sensible about how they do it. 
Interviewer: Absolutely. I think that degree of trust is really important isn’t 
it? 
Interviewee: Yes. 
Interviewer: You know that they’re not going to go native. I think with the 
conditions of trust there, they’re less likely to do so probably 
anyway. 
Interviewee: I think also there are a couple of other mechanisms that 
we’ve       introduced which make that helpful, but still keep 
them governing and not managing. So we have a lead 
governor system so that governors are expected to report 
against certain items on the agenda, be they finance or 
estates or whatever it might be. So that it’s not just the 
executive reporting to the non-executive governors, there are 
The extract below provides a rich source, namely the ‘Organisational’ and ‘Cultural’ first cycle themes, as well as a 
number of second cycle codes, including ‘tight-loose/flexible open structures’, ‘trust’, and themes including the 
institutional size in terms of staff and students and its impact on the conditions for board visibility. The highlighted 
text and coding commentary illustrate the manual process of content review, coding and my own reflections as 
annotated in the text boxes. 
Coding commentary:  
-Flexible organisational 
structures 
-Different perspectives 
gained by governors 
outside the boardroom 
-Executive trust in 
governors 
-Limited risks  
 
 
Coding commentary 
-lead governor system, 
specific governor-
executive budding model 
- proactive non-
executives with open 
access to staff 
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actually some non-executive governors getting a little bit 
deeper into what does this paper really mean? They’re given 
the opportunity to talk to officers, before the meeting, so that 
they can find out. The Chairman will call upon them to report 
on the paper, unless it’s something very technical or specific, 
or up to the minute which the officers would then deal with. 
So that’s a different sort of meeting because they’re then 
directly engaged in the debate. They’re not actually just 
responding to what they’re being told by the executive. 
Interviewer: So do you feel that the other governors almost derive comfort 
by association almost. They can see that one of the non-
execs has taken a lead there, and therefore that gives them 
more comfort without that person dominating? 
Interviewee:  What we’re looking for is association but not relaxation. We 
don’t expect governors to think well governor X is going to 
report on finance therefore I don’t have to [Cross talking 
0:11:19]. 
 
Interviewer: Therefore I don’t need to worry about it. 
Interviewee: That’s been a perpetual concern of that sort of system. So we 
do make sure then that other governors are brought into the 
discussion, so they have an opportunity to say something. It 
goes alongside that connection with visiting departments, 
meeting people over lunch, being involved in other activities, 
that they have a deeper insight into the mechanics of the 
organisation. They’re not just turning up once every quarter 
and expecting to be told things, or have read their papers and 
make decisions completely unaware of what else is going on, 
across the rest of the institution. 
Interviewer: They’ve got that wider contextual knowledge. 
 
‘Tight-loose’ structure of 
engagement 
Quality of debate can’t be 
specified, not about 
output, but better 
 
Informal engagements give 
governors deeper insights 
into the operation of the 
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Interviewee: Yes. They get to know some other people. We’re not a big 
organisation so that’s possible. They will understand a little bit 
about the pressures on certain departments, all the way 
through from our portering and catering staff, right the way 
through to the professoriat. They will actually have contact 
with these people, so they can better understand what they’re 
going through. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Small organisation aids 
culture, conditions and 
logistics for governor-staff 
engagement.  
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Appendix Five:   Interview Transcript Extract from Interview 
C - 03.03.14 pp., 13-16 
 
Interviewee:  I think there’s a potential for misunderstanding. One 
thing we’ve looked at, in terms of our membership of our 
governing body, is the value of having somebody who is 
an experienced university manager as an external 
member. 
 
We used to have that in one of our members, who had 
been academic registrar of a large research intensive 
institution, and often the governing body looked at that 
person to be the expert and give them a reality check on 
what the executive were saying.  
Actually, that was quite helpful, and we were originally 
thinking, “Well, we’ve already got lots of higher 
education experts on our governing body from the 
executive, and from the elected staff and so forth.” 
In fact we’re also thinking that there was a real value in 
that, and we’re missing that now, and we might actually 
want to instigate that as we’re filling vacancies going 
forward.  
That worked quite well in the past, just in the same way 
as they would look to somebody who is perhaps an 
expert on financial matters or estates, to reality check 
some of the estate things. 
Build this consideration into 
governor recruitment 
practices 
Value of lay council 
member on council with 
university expertise and 
experience. 
The extract below provides covers aspect of the ‘Constitutional’ (e.g., Council Membership, the locus of authority for 
strategy) as well as ‘Organisational’ and ‘Cultural’ first cycle themes. One of the second cycle codes identified 
relates to the importance of personalities and personal qualities of governors as a factor in governor visibility and 
credibility amongst staff. 
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Interviewer: Do you think that might give not tokenistic but symbolic 
credibility with bodies like Academic Board, and indeed 
the wider staff community as well, if they see somebody 
there as a member of the council that does have that 
breadth of experience? Do you think that might reassure 
those members of the community that might be more 
cynical, shall we say, about independents coming in and 
not understanding fully the business? 
Interviewee: I think it’s a really hard, tough call, because often it’s all 
about personalities and personal qualities, and 
someone’s credibility isn’t always to do with exactly what 
their day job is and what their expertise is, and it’s as 
much about how they approach things.   
One thing I don’t think we’ve been hugely successful at, 
at Queen Mary, but now that we’ve got our Council 
Secretariat back to solid staffing we might look to take 
forward in the future, is I think that we have a 
responsibility to our external members to help them 
understand the academic business of the college. 
What I'm keen to see is that we do things like visits to 
departments, so they can see what kind of work of it is. 
Because the other issue as well about the academic 
activity is that, when we have conversations about 
academic matters in the council setting, it’s either in 
relation to admissions, and therefore money, or just 
programmes and programme delivery.  
Never does the issue of research come into the 
conversation, for example, so it’s quite one-dimensional, 
which is clearly a bit of an issue if you're a research 
intensive institution. 
Personalities and 
interpersonal qualities in 
gaining credibility in the 
institution 
Informal governor 
engagements with staff 
departments as a 
development tool 
Gaps in governor 
understanding of key 
academic strand of 
business 
199 
 
Interviewer: Absolutely. Where there’s obviously been a very high 
performance as well. It almost does become a corporate 
strategic pillar, doesn’t it, really, that kind of stuff?  
We’ve spoken a bit about strategy, around the role of the 
board in strategy. Do you feel in many institutions, just 
looking at websites and the way people describe this, 
whether it’s sometimes…? We talk about the board’s 
role in overseeing strategy. We’ve spoken about 
academic strategy and policy. We talk about the board’s 
role in monitoring strategy.  
How visible do you think its role there is to the wider 
community in doing that strategically? People know it 
does the accountability piece in many senses, but what 
about that value-added piece, I suppose, around mission 
and direction? How well-aware do you think colleagues 
are about that particular very important function? 
Interviewee: I think the broader community isn’t so aware of it, as 
such. They might trouble themselves to read the 
opening page of the strategy, which describes how it 
was approved by council, but beyond that they might not 
know the more active role that council members might 
have had, in terms of the approval journey of the 
strategy. 
I also think, at the same time, in the context of this 
institution, that the executive would have a very different 
view of that. We’re redeveloping our strategy at the 
moment, and there’s been a semantic discussion about  
whether the council sets the strategy. 
In the sense that the executive feel that they set the 
strategy by writing it, whereas you could also perceive 
the word ‘set’ to mean approve, so there has been quite 
Locus of ownership of 
strategy unclear amongst 
staff 
Council and executive 
philosophical debates 
about strategy ‘setting’ 
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interesting dichotomy there. If you're the secretary to the 
governing body, you hear different views about 
involvement expressed on the different sides and role. 
Interviewer: Have you seen the council’s role, or do you envisage the 
council’s role being one that’s also shaping an iterative 
process in helping to shape that strategy, rather than 
just a sort of ratification and, “Oh, we don’t like this 
wording”, or whatever?  
Do you think it is a more fundamental role, and perhaps 
some colleagues on the executive would rather not see, 
or…? (Laughter)  
Interviewee: Yes, exactly. The council very much sees that role for 
itself, in terms of shaping, contributing to it, having 
discussion about it. The executive feels that it’s very 
much its responsibility to come up with a strategy, or the 
strategic plan, for the council then to approve, and 
doesn’t always value the contribution of council 
members to the strategy. 
 
 
Potential executive tensions 
around council input to 
strategy 
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